CALIFORNIA:  AN OWNER'S MANUAL

Chapter 3:  California's Policy Process

WHAT IS PUBLIC POLICY?

Public Policy can be described as public responses to public problems.  Governmental legislation, programs, controls, and the like, are all mechanisms that public bodies utilize in an effort to improve the public welfare.  Public policy has been defined in different ways by different observers.  Peters defines policy as "the sum of government activities... (that have) an influence on the lives of citizens."[1]  Lasswell pointed out that public policy determines "who gets what, when, and how."[2]  Contemporary policy analysts might also include "why?"  Ripley and Franklin define policy and the policy process more specifically:

Policy is what the government says and does about perceived problems.  Policy making is how the government decides what will be done about perceived problems.  Policy making is a process of interaction among governmental and nongovernmental actors; policy is the outcome of that interaction.[3]

In a real world context, public policy can be understood as the public solutions which are implemented in an effort to solve public problems.  Policy actors are those individuals and groups, both formal and informal, which seek to influence the creation and implementation of these public solutions. 

This chapter explores the function and influence of public policy in California.  It begins with an overview of the "rules" to California's policy process, and then move on to explore the points of vulnerability in the process, and the policy actors, including the institutional actors -- the Governor and Executive Bureaucracy, the State Legislature, the Courts --  and the non-institutional actors -- the media, parties, interest groups, and political consultants. Finally, the chapter explores California's budget as a case study of policymaking in the state.

RULES TO THE POLICY GAME

The public policy process has been described as a game by several observers.  The game metaphor is not intended to trivialize the process, rather, it suggests that policy actors must utilize rational strategies to maximize their interests.   Players will increase their chances of winning to the extent that they have knowledge of the policy bureaucracy (bureaucratic knowledge), access to individuals within the bureaucracy (network), citizen backing (size of constituency), money for political contributions, and resources to mount an effective public relations (media) campaign.  But these resources are only one part of winning the policy game.  It is also necessary to understand the rules and culture of the policy environment.  The following discussion explores the context and environment of the policy game in California.

Maximizing Policy Strategies

In The Prince[4] Machiavelli presents a blueprint for the effective development and maintenance of power.  Machiavelli's notion of virtu' -- controlling political destiny -- is based on the successful manipulation of human circumstances.  The virtuous prince is good, merciful, and honest, as long as expediency dictates,  Yet, he must be prepared to be cruel and deceptive.  Control is the primary consideration, both of one's populace, and of one's neighboring states.  Virtu', ultimately, requires successful strategies to maximize policy interests.

Murray Edelman[5] similarly argues that those who seek to maximize their policy interests will use deceit and symbolism to manipulate the policy discourse.  No one person can possibly experience the entire world.  Yet, everyone has an image or "picture" of the world.  Burke suggests that however important that "sliver of reality each of us has experienced firsthand," the overall "picture" is a "construct of symbolic systems".[6]  This construct is based on political cognitions which Edelman suggests are "ambivalent and highly susceptible to symbolic cues..."[7]  Government, Edelman argues, influences behavior by shaping the cognitions of people in ambiguous situations.  In this way, government, or policy elites, help engineer beliefs about what is "fact" and what is "proper."

Maximizing policy strategies is critical for winning the policy game.  Each player, regardless of his or her position in the policy environment, seeks to influence policy outcomes.  The degree to which players utilize rational strategies, however creative, however slippery, will determine the degree to which policy success can be achieved.  This is not to suggest that there are no ethical constraints on players; there are.  Rather, the Machiavellian legacy in our political environment recognizes that strategy and cunning are acceptable and necessary components of the policy game.

Some suggest that democratic processes are dominated by the influence of economic elites -- specifically, corporate elites.  Domhoff argues that there is a social upper class that effectively operates as a ruling class by virtue of its dominance of economic resources.  While there are other political resources -- for example, expertise and bureaucratic knowledge -- these other resources can and are purchased.  Thus, as Domhoff[8] points out, financial power is often the basis of policy influence.  If it is true that policy influence requires requisite political resources, inequality in resource distribution is tantamount to inequality in political representation.  Maximizing policy strategy, therefore, includes maximizing the ability to raise funds.

POLICY ACTORS

The policy process is significantly more subtle than many realize.  While the state Constitution provides for a legislature that makes laws, an executive that enforces laws, and a judiciary that interprets laws, the policy process has evolved into a confusing web of state departments, agencies, and committees that make up the institutional policy bureaucracy.  And, unlike the Federal level, California's Constitution requires that governmental  authority be shared with voters through the initiative process, the recall, and the referendum.  In addition, the vast network of organized citizen groups (parties, interest groups, and PACs), as well as the rise of the electronic media, political consultants, and other image making professionals, further complicates the process.  The role each actor plays, in combination with the relationship between actors in both policy bureaucracies, is ultimately what determines policy outcomes.

Institutional Policy Actors

The State Legislature

The Legislature is the central institution in the policy process because of its legislative authority.  Within the Legislature it is the committees where power is centralized.  Committee chairs have disproportionate influence over policy as a consequence of their power to determine committee agendas. Similarly, certain committees have more policy influence than others.  The Assembly Rules Committee, for example, is responsible foe determining which bills will be heard and in what order.  The Appropriation Committees in both the Assembly and Senate are responsible for reviewing any legislation that requires funding.  The power that members of such committees hold, and the powers of committee chairs make them key players in the policy process.

Legislative staffers are another source of influence that is often overlooked.  In The Power Game[9] Hedrick Smith describes staffers as "policy entrepreneurs."  Staffers are important in two areas.  First, the increasing use of staff in district offices to service constituents strengthens the legislator's stature among local voters, perhaps explaining in part the strength of incumbency.  Second, staffers are the real expertise behind the legislator.  With hundreds of bills introduced in an average session, legislators rely more and more on staff to analyze legislation, negotiate compromises, research issues, and meet with lobbyists.  In their roles as legislative analyst and policy negotiators, as well as their role as political confidant and counselor, senior staffers have significant policy influence.  And, with term limits now state law, staffers will have more experience than Legislators, giving them even more power to influence.

The Governor and Executive Bureaucracy

The Governor is mandated by the California Constitution as a partner in the policy process.  But, unlike the Legislature, the Governor can only approve or disapprove legislation, he or she has no power to amend.  And, California's Constitution requires that the seven non-gubinatorial executive officers be directly elected, diluting the Governor's power further. Thus, the policy priorities of the Governor cannot be directly imposed.  Rather, Governors must rely on legislative partners in both houses, and on, what Richard Neustadt called, the "power to persuade."[10]  This persuasion comes as a result of several factors.  Paul Light suggests that executive policy is a result of the "stream of people and ideas" that flow through the executive office.[11]  If public policy is a process of identifying problems, identifying solutions, and implementing those solutions, the identification of problems and solutions, Light argues, is tied to the assumptions held by players in that stream.  The policy stream must accommodate the issues that percolate up through the systemic agenda, as well as those issues that may be on the executive agenda.

The implementation of gubinatorial policy objectives involves a different set of problems than those of the legislature.  While the legislature makes laws, the Governor can only recommend laws.  Effective Governors use the powers and perks of their office to maximize their policy agendas.  Appointments are a major source of  policy influence.  By appointing individuals who share his or her political perspective and agenda a Governor is able to extend influence throughout the executive and judicial bureaucracies.  Cabinet officers and heads of regulatory agencies establish policy priorities within their agencies.  And, since most legislation allows for a significant measure of discretion among implementing and enforcement agencies, the Cabinet officers and agency heads have wide latitude in defining, implementing, and enforcing policy.

The policy influence of regulatory agencies within the executive bureaucracy is substantial.  Meier[12] describes the regulatory process as a combination of regulatory bureaucracies (values, expertise, agency subculture, bureaucratic entrepreneurs) and public interaction (interest groups, economic issues, legislative committees and sub-committees).  Regulatory outcomes are a consequence of subsystem interaction between all of these influences.  Those who are best able to influence these subsystems are best able to maximize their interests.  As a result, policy subsystems are major points of access for policy influence.

The Courts

The influence of judges in interpreting laws has an equally significant impact on policy.  And this impact is not free of political influence.  Unlike the Federal system, State judges are vulnerable to political scrutiny.  This was most dramatically demonstrated in the expulsion  of Chief Justice Rose Bird in 1984.  The policy role of the judiciary is not universally appreciated.  The current debate over judicial activism and judicial restraint is only the most recent in a long discourse.  In "Towards an Imperial Judiciary?"[13]  Nathan Glazer argues that judicial activism infringes on democratic policy institutions, and that an activist court erodes the respect and trust people hold for the judiciary. Still, whether a court is active or passive, there are significant policy implications.  Non-action is in itself  a policy decision with substantial policy implications.

Non-Institutional Actors

Public policy is not merely the result of independent policy making institutions.  Non-institutional actors also play a significant role: the public elects legislators and executives; the media influences policy through its inherent agenda setting function; parties, in their role in drafting and electing candidates, influence policy through influencing the composition of legislative and executive bodies; and, organized interest groups lobby elected officials and non-elected policy makers (e.g., agency staff).  Policy, then, is a result of institutional processes influenced by non-institutional actors. 

Media

The media are influential to policy outcomes because they help define social reality.  The work of McCombs and Shaw[14] suggests that the media influence the salience of issues.  As Lippmann[15] observed in 1922, perceptions of reality are based on a tiny sampling of the world around us.  No one can be everywhere, no one can experience everything.  Thus, to a greater or lesser extent, all of us rely on media portrayals of reality.  Graber[16] argues that the way people process information makes them especially vulnerable to media influence.  First, people tend to pair down the scope of information they confront.  Second, people tend to think schematically.  When confronted with information individuals will fit that information into pre-existing schema.  And, since news stories tend to lack background and context, schemata allow the individual to give the information meaning.  In such a way, individuals recreate reality in their minds.

The data collected by Iyengar and Kinder[17] show that television news, to a great extent, defines which problems the public considers most serious.  Iyengar and Kinder refine the agenda-setting dynamic to include what they call "priming."  Priming refers to the selective coverage of only certain events, and the selective way in which those events are covered.  Since there is no way to cover all events, or cover any event completely, selective decisions must be made.  But, there are consequences:

By priming certain aspects of national life while ignoring others, television news sets the terms by which political judgements are rendered and political choices made. (Iyengar and Kinder 1987:4)

The implications for public policy are serious.  If policy is a result of a problem recognition model then the problems that gain media recognition are much more likely to be addressed.

California politics relies on the media, perhaps more than most states, to distribute political messages.  With 32 million people, it is not possible for policy advocates to truly "meet" the voters as they might in New Hampshire or Iowa.  Television, radio, and newspapers allow politicians, candidates, and interest groups to cover more ground with less money.  In the Los Angeles television market alone, for example, policy advocates can reach 10 million people at once.  The implication, of course, is that those interests with more financial backing are more likely to get their messages across. 

Parties

Political parties are distinct from other citizen organizations.  Rather than attempting to influence existing policy makers, parties seek to get their own members elected to policy making positions.  While interest groups seek influence on specific policy issues, parties seek influence on a wide spectrum of policy issues.  Parties develop issue platforms, draft candidates, campaign on behalf of candidates, and work to get out the vote.  In short, parties work to bring together citizens under a common banner. 

While most people may think of parties only during election cycles, their policy influence extends beyond campaigns.  While the rise of the media over the last thirty years has de-emphasized the power of parties in electoral politics, parties continue to play a dominant role in policy outcomes.  Due to the institutional role parties play in the legislature, and the grassroots role that parties play at the local and county level, the party that emerges dominant often determines the direction policy will take.  The Governor is responsible to the party that got them elected, and therefore must pursue at least some of the policy objectives articulated at the party convention.  The legislature continues to distribute committee membership and chairmanships according to party affiliation.  While negotiation and compromise is typically necessary, the general direction of legislative policy is directly tied to the ideology of the larger party. 

The strength of political parties has waned over the past three decades, but parties maintain policy influence in critical areas.  Elections, patronage appointments, legislative committees, and policy discourses all reflect the influence of parties.  In California, registered Democrats have outnumbered registered Republicans for the past generation.  But, Republicans tend to turn out in higher numbers than Democrats.  In 1994, for example, the Democratic party had 7,219,635 registered members in California, while the Republican party had 5,472,391 members.  But, only 3,517,707 Democrats turned out to vote for Governor, while 4,777,630 Republicans voted, reelecting an extremely partisan Governor.  Parties remain critical to the policy process. 

Interest Groups

Interest groups are a fundamental partner in policy making.  Citizens participate in the policy process through communication with policy makers.  Such communication takes place individually (e.g., letters to elected representatives), and collectively.  Interest groups facilitate collective communication.  James Madison recognized the propensity for individuals to factionalize in an effort to maximize political influence.[18]  Robert Dahl further refined the analysis of Madisonian democracy, arguing that in an open society all persons have the right to press their interests.  To the extent others share these interests, collective pressure may allow greater policy influence.  Indeed, Dahl argued, those issues that have greater salience have greater interest group representation.[19]

The interest group dynamic, however, is not so simple.  While it may be true that many salient issues have interest group representation, the strength of that representation is not tied to the strength of the issue salience.  Further, the salience itself may be a consequence of interest group action.  When studying policy outcomes it is necessary to identify the policy actors and the political resources they use.  Maximizing policy interests --winning the policy game -- requires specific political resources.  The most common resources include bureaucratic knowledge, a network of contacts, citizen backing (size of constituency), an ability to make political contributions, and an ability to mount a public relations (media) campaign.  Clearly, no group utilizes all of these resources.  But, the ability of an organized group to utilize one or more of these resources is critical for policy influence.

The pluralist model of counterbalancing elites mediating interests is inadequate.  The theoretical work done by Mills, and empirical work done by Dye, Domhoff, and Presthus, among others, suggest that rather than competing, the interests of economic elites tend to cohere in key policy areas.[20]  Lowi's The End of Liberalism[21] argues that this interest group influence threatens the democratic basis of government.  If interest groups provide the framework for government-citizen interaction, and these groups are based on individual self-interest, there is little opportunity for pursuing a meaningful national interest. 

Interest groups have long influenced the California political landscape.  The Central Pacific Railroad, for example, dominated California politics from the 1860s through 1910 when the Progressive movement successfully won Constitutional amendments and new statutes to limit railroad influence.  Today, some 989 registered lobbyists represent over 1776 groups, advocating on everything from agriculture to organized labor to manhole cover contractors.[22]

Political Consultants

Increasingly, political expertise is purchased by those with the need and the resources.  In reviewing the rise and structure of the political consulting industry, Sabato[23] exposes the fragile relationship between articulating ideas in a political marketplace and manipulating public opinion.  It is virtually impossible to win at the policy game without the marketing skills held by consultants and strategists.  Like many other policy resources, political consultants are costly.  As a consequence, those with greater economic resources enjoy a policy advantage.

The extremely competitive nature of California's political environment has made political consulting a growth industry in the state.  There are 14 major political consulting firms in the state, representing candidates at all levels of government.[24]  In addition, there are thousands of additional firms offering media consulting, public relations, survey research, direct mail, and fund raising.  Critics argue that the selling of politics has become just as slick and self-interested as the selling of cars.  Public policy has become just another commodity in a market environment.  The implication, of course, is that the policy process may be becoming less democratic as a consequence.  It is often political consultants, rather than public interested candidates, who are defining the political discourse in the state, and nationally.  Whether or not one perceives this as a problem might be related to an individual's access to the financial resources needed to purchase these services.

POLICY OUTPUTS: CALIFORNIA'S BUDGET AS A CASE STUDY

The California State Budget provides one of the best case studies on the policy process.  Since the budget defines fiscal allocations, it serves to define the state's policy priorities for the following year.  As such, the budget process brings both institutional and non-institutional actors into passionate political battle.  Legally, the formal budget process plays out as follows:

January 10th: the Governor submits his or her budget to both houses of the legislature. 

February: The Legislative Analyst publishes its Analysis of the Governor's Budget.

March & April: Senate and Assembly budget subcommittees hold hearings on each budget item.

May:    Governor submits the "May Revision," a revised estimate of revenues and expenditures.

Subcommittee hearings end.

Senate and Assembly budget committees send bills to their full houses.

June:   Conference Committee of both houses meets to reconcile differences between Senate and

Assembly version of budget bills, and ultimately sends recommendation to both

houses for final vote.

June 15: Budget goes to the Governor for signature.[25]

While the process at first glance appears to include only the institutional policy actors, there are several points at which non-institutional actors become involved.  Long before the Governor's budget is submitted in June, citizens, interest groups, corporations, and legislators  lobby the Governor's office and each other in order to maximize the chances of receiving funding for policies they favor and for cutting funding for policies they are against.  Once the Governor's budget is made public these groups direct their attention to the Senate and Assembly budget committees and subcommittees, lobbying and testifying at budget hearings. 

Simultaneously, those groups with the economic resources will begin to "lobby" the public through both paid and non-paid media.  Political advertising can be used to cue public concern, which may cue public budgetary demands.  Similarly, policy advocates may seek media coverage through news or public affairs programming.  Not only is this type of media free, it places a mantle of "objectivity" on the commentator.  Surely, talking heads on television news interviews wouldn't lie, would they?  In short, each policy actor -- institutional and noninstitutional -- will do all that he or she can to maximize their policy interests. 

The budget wars of the early 1990s provide an illustrative example.  The recession of 1991 and 1992 brought tax revenues crashing down, causing the worst budget crisis since the depression.  By July 1992, the state was out of funds, causing the state controller to issue IOU warrants.  Most banks only honored the warrants for the first month.   Democrats, who controlled both the Senate and Assembly at that time, sought a mild tax increase to protect the state's social safety net. The Governor, and his Republican colleagues in the legislature, sought deep spending cuts.  With neither institution prepared to back down, the deadlock resulted in a 63 day period where the state was without a budget.  Ultimately, a $57.4 billion budget was passed.  The Governor received most of his demands, the Legislature minimized to some extent the damage to their favored programs.  The Governor often dominates the budget process as a consequence of the two-thirds legislative majority necessary to pass budgets, and the item veto.  The required two-thirds majority makes it difficult for any one party to dominate the legislative process.  The item veto allows the Governor to selectively cut spending at the final stage of the process.  Still, the Governor can't create a budget unilaterally, so the refusal of the Legislature to accede to the Governor's demands reflects the best -- and worst -- of democratic politics: inclusive and participatory processes often result in divided and stalled government.

SUMMARY

This chapter has explored the role and influence of actors in the policy process -- both institutional (the Legislature, the Governor and Executive Bureaucracy, and the Courts) and non-institutional (media, parties, interest groups, and political consultants).  From the discussion it can be seen that policy outcomes are typically a result of institutional processes and non-institutional influence.  As the previous chapters explain, California's political culture and structure is quite complex, representing the diverse interests of 32 million Californians.  The policy game, therefore, is important to understand.  As Californians navigate the ship of state, there is little consensus of who is at the helm.  While the Governor may be the captain, the crew are under little obligation to follow his course.  With the multitude of destinations sought, it is little wonder that California politics are contentious and passionate.  But, that after all, is what democracy is all about.