PUBLIC POLICY:  THE ESSENTIAL READINGS

Chapter 22

The Players:  Institutional and 

Non-Institutional Actors in the Policy Process

Matthew A. Cahn

 

     As discussed earlier public policy has been defined in different ways by different observers.  Peters defines policy as "the sum of government activities... (that have) an influence on the lives of citizens."1  Lasswell2 pointed out that public policy determines "who gets what, when, and how."  Contemporary policy analysts might also include "why?"  Ripley and Franklin define policy and the policy process more specifically:

Policy is what the government says and does about perceived problems.  Policy making is how the government decides what will be done about perceived problems.  Policy making is a process of interaction among governmental and nongovernmental actors; policy is the outcome of that interaction.3  

In a real world context, public policy can be understood as the public solutions which are implemented in an effort to solve public problems.  Policy actors, or "players," are those individuals and groups, both formal and informal, which seek to influence the creation and implementation of these public solutions. 

     This chapter explores the function and influence that policy actors exert in the policy process.  It begins with an overview of the policy process, and then moves on to explore each actor within the process, including the institutional actors -- congress, the president, executive agencies, and the courts -- and the non-institutional actors -- the media, parties, interest groups, and political consultants.

     The policy process is significantly more subtle than many realize.  While the Constitution provides for a legislature that makes laws, an executive that enforces laws, and a judiciary that interprets laws, the policy process has evolved into a confusing web of state and federal departments, agencies, and committees that make up the institutional policy bureaucracy.  In addition, the vast network of organized citizen groups (parties, interest groups, and PACs), as well as the rise of the electronic media, political consultants, and other image making professionals, further complicates the process.  The role each actor plays, in combination with the relationship between actors in both policy bureaucracies, is ultimately what determines policy outcomes.

 

Institutional Actors

Congress

     Congress is a central institution in the policy process because of its legislative authority.  Article I, section 8 of the Constitution define the various powers of Congress, including the power to:

in the implementation of the other powers. While congressional power is diffused among the 435 voting members of the House and 100 voting members of the Senate, there are specific points where power is focused.  It is these points that are points of access for those seeking policy influence.

     The vast majority of legislative decisions are made in committees.  Between standing committees, special committees, joint committees, conference committees, and all of their associated sub-committees, there are several hundred committees in a typical congressional session.  As Fenno4 describes, committees and sub-committees are responsible for the initial review of draft legislation.  Committees can report positively or negatively on any bill, or they can report amended bills.  Rather than report negatively on bills, however, committees typically ignore bills that lack favor.  This precludes the necessity of debating and voting on the bill on the full floor, since bills that are not acted upon die at the close of the congressional session.5 

     Committee chairs have disproportionate influence over policy as a consequence of their power to determine committee agendas. Similarly, certain committees have more policy influence than others.  The House Rules Committee, for example, is responsible foe determining which bills will be heard and in what order.  The Appropriation Committees in both the House and Senate are responsible for reviewing any legislation that requires funding.  The power that members of such committees hold, and the powers of committee chairs make them key players in the policy process. 

     Congressional staffers are another source of influence that is often overlooked.  In The Power Game6 Hedrick Smith describes staffers as "policy entrepreneurs."  Staffers are important in two areas.  First, as Fiorina7 points out, the increasing use of staff in district offices to service constituents strengthens the congress member's position among local voters, perhaps explaining in part the strength of incumbency.  Second, staffers are the real expertise behind the legislator.  With over six thousand bills introduced in an average session, legislators rely more and more on staff to analyze legislation, negotiate compromises, research issues, and meet with lobbyists.8  In their roles as legislative analyst and policy negotiators, as well as their role as political confidant and counselor, senior staffers have significant policy influence. 

     There are several explanations of congressional behavior.  What appears to be consistent between analyses is the observation that members of Congress are primarily concerned with achieving reelection.  Mayhew9 argues that the organization of Congress itself evolved to maximize the re-electability of members.  Since congressional power is tied to seniority, this is not surprising.  But, it does have negative policy implications.  If members are acting to maximize their individual political futures, their ability to govern in the national interest in severely limited.  The need to satisfy constituent interests over national interests has led to dangerously high levels of pork in legislative outcomes.     The election connection has other impacts which are similarly troubling.  The average cost to run a successful congressional campaign is $400,000 for a House seat and over $3.5 million dollars for a Senate seat.10  As a consequence, members of Congress are in a constant state of fundraising.  Those interests with greater financial resources may thus achieve greater access.  With limited time to meet with members of the public, legislators have a built in incentive to meet with those individuals who can best benefit their reelection efforts.

     Committee decisions, compromises between committees and executive agencies, the influence of staffers, and the cozy relationships between legislators and deep pocket lobbyists has even greater policy importance because they all take place outside of the public eye.  Although, as a consequence of political reform in the 1970s, committee meetings are open, staff reports are available for public review, lobbyists are required to register with the government, and all financial contributions are public record, few people have the time to closely follow the intricacies of the policy process.  As a consequence, members of congress and those whose business it is to influence them -- and thus have the time -- are generally free to act without concern of public attention. 

The President and The Executive Bureaucracy

     Like Congress, the president is mandated by the Constitution as a partner in the policy process.  But, unlike Congress, the president can only approve or disapprove legislation, he or she has no power to amend.  Thus, the policy priorities of the president cannot be directly legislated.  Rather, presidents must rely on legislative partners in both houses, and on, what Neustadt11 called, the power to persuade.

     In The Presidential Policy Stream Paul Light suggests that presidential policy is a result of the "stream of people and ideas that flow through the White House."12  If public policy is a process of identifying problems, identifying solutions, and implementing those solutions, the identification of problems and solutions, Light argues, is tied to the assumptions held by players in that stream.  The policy stream must accommodate the issues that percolate up through the systemic agenda, as well as those issues that may be on the presidential agenda.

     In addition to balancing the demands of the systemic agenda with presidential policy objectives, the president also must balance domestic policy concerns with foreign policy concerns.  Wildavsky13 suggests that there are in fact two presidencies, the domestic presidency and the foreign policy presidency.  Each has different responsibilities, and different policy objectives.  The foreign policy president has much more power, Wildavsky argues, than the domestic president.  As Richard Neustadt suggests, the domestic president may have to rely more on his or her ability to persuade Congress and members of the executive bureaucracy to implement presidential policy objectives than on any specific domestic power.  The foreign policy president, on the other hand, has the power to move troops into combat, negotiate executive agreements and treaties, and controls a vast international intelligence network. 

     The implementation of presidential policy objectives involves a different set of problems than those of Congress.  While Congress makes laws, the president can only recommend laws.  Yet, the president, as chief executive, may do whatever is necessary to enforce legislation.  That enforcement, typically, involves discretionary policy decisions.  Article II, sections 2 and 3 define the powers the President:

While the president is often looked upon to set the national policy agenda, he or she can only do so as long as he or she holds an ability to persuade.  With the expressed powers of the president limited to specific areas, effective president's must rely upon their power to persuade members of Congress, the bureaucracy, the media, and the public.

     When expressed powers are insufficient, presidents can rely upon executive prerogative.  Executive orders have the power of law, but have no statutory basis.  Roosevelt's 1942 executive order #9066 authorized the incarceration of 110,000 Japanese Americans without warrants, indictments, or hearings.  Submitting to anti-Asian hysteria following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt lifted the Constitutional protections of a specific class of American citizens. 

     Reagan's 1981 executive order #12291 required a benefit-cost calculation be performed prior to implementing any policy.  The costs outweighed the benefits, the policy would not be implemented.  Aside from the obvious problem in quantifying benefits -- what is the value of clean air, for example? -- EO 12291 redefines the policy relationship between the executive and the legislature.  Rather than fulfilling the constitutional imperative to "faithfully execute all laws" EO 12291 claims for the executive the right to evaluate whether laws should be enforced, and how extensively. 

     Effective presidents use the powers and perks of their office to maximize their policy agendas.  Appointments are a major source of policy influence.  By appointing individuals who share his or her political perspective and agenda a president is able to extend influence throughout the executive and judicial bureaucracies.  Cabinet officers and heads of regulatory agencies establish policy priorities within their agencies.  And, since most legislation allows for a significant measure of discretion among implementing and enforcement agencies, the Cabinet officers and agency heads have wide latitude in defining, implementing, and enforcing policy.   This is best illustrated by Reagan's appointment of Anne Burford as EPA Administrator.  Burford, a corporate attorney who often represented clients in suits against the government over environmental regulations, sought to bring Reagan's anti-regulatory philosophy into the EPA.  In order to sidestep the legislative mandate that defined EPA's mission, Burford instituted a variety of mechanisms intended to reduce environmental enforcement.  She held unannounced meetings with regulated industries, effectively precluding public participation.14  Further, she centralized all decision making in her office, effectively paralyzing staff activities.15  Ultimately, discretionary policy enforcement fell to an all time low.16

     The ability to control the executive bureaucracy is critical for the development and maintenance of presidential power.  The tendency to organize bureaucratically is best described by Max Weber, who suggests that "modern officialdom" seeks the efficiency of specificity and hierarchy.17  Bureaucratic government incorporates a vast network of interrelated offices, each of which has a specific jurisdiction and a specific task (task differentiation), there is a set hierarchy, and authority is subservient to the rule of law.  In "The Rise of the Bureaucratic State" Wilson explores the evolution of the American bureaucracy.18  While bureaucratic organization is necessary to administer a society of 250 million people, the size of the bureaucracy itself represents certain hazards.  Weber warned that bureaucracies inevitably become insensitive to individual concerns.  With the executive bureaucracy employing over five million people it may often appear sluggish and unresponsive.  Still, specialization is critical for effective government; the Department of Defense clearly has different needs and concerns that the Department of Agriculture.  There may, as a result, be little alternative to bureaucratic organization.

     The policy influence of regulatory agencies within the executive bureaucracy is substantial.  Meier19 describes the regulatory process as a combination of regulatory bureaucracies (values, expertise, agency subculture, bureaucratic entrepreneurs) and public interaction (interest groups, economic issues, legislative committees and sub-committees).  Regulatory outcomes are a consequence of subsystem interaction between all of these influences.  Those who are best able to influence these subsystems are best able to maximize their interests.  As a result, policy subsystems are major points of access for policy influence.

The Courts

     The influence of judges in interpreting laws has an equally significant impact on policy.  The Brown v. Topeka Board of Education decision in 1955, for example, initiated anti-segregation policies and acted as a catalyst for the voting rights acts of the 1960s and civil rights policies through the 1980s.  Similarly, the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision virtually defined abortion policy thereafter.  But, judicial policy influence is not restricted to Supreme Court decisions.  As Lawrence Baum20 points out, Appellate Courts are significant, if often ignored, partners in policy making.  Appellate Courts have had critical policy influence in several areas, including abortion and civil rights policy.

     The policy role of the judiciary is not universally appreciated.  The current debate over judicial activism and judicial restraint is only the most recent in a long discourse.  In "Towards an Imperial Judiciary?"21 Nathan Glazer argues that judicial activism infringes on democratic policy institutions, and that an activist court erodes the respect and trust people hold for the judiciary. Still, whether a court is active or passive, there are significant policy implications.  While the Brown decision may be considered "activist," for example, had the court chosen to remain passive, civil rights policy might have remained non-existent for many more years.  Non-action is in itself a policy decision with substantial policy implications.

 

Non-Institutional Actors

     Public policy is not merely the result of independent policy making institutions.  Non-institutional actors also play a significant role: the public elects legislators and executives; the media influences policy through its inherent agenda setting function; parties, in their role in drafting and electing candidates, influence policy through influencing the composition of legislative and executive bodies; and, organized interest groups lobby elected officials and non-elected policy makers (e.g., agency staff).  Policy, then, is a result of institutional processes influenced by non-institutional actors. 

Media

     The media are influential to policy outcomes because they help define social reality.22  The work of McCombs and Shaw23 supports the assertion that the media influence the salience of issues.  As Lippmann24 observed in 1922, perceptions of reality are based on a tiny sampling of the world around us.  No one can be everywhere, no one can experience everything.  Thus, to a greater or lesser extent, all of us rely on media portrayals of reality.

     Graber25 argues that the way people process information makes them especially vulnerable to media influence.  First, people tend to pair down the scope of information they confront.  Second, people tend to think schematically.  When confronted with information, individuals will fit that information into pre-existing schema.  And, since news stories tend to lack background and context, schemata allow the individual to give the information meaning.  In such a way, individuals recreate reality in their minds.

     The data collected by Iyengar and Kinder26 show that television news, to a great extent, defines which problems the public considers most serious.  Iyengar and Kinder refine the agenda-setting dynamic to include what they call "priming."  Priming refers to the selective coverage of only certain events, and the selective way in which those events are covered.  Since there is no way to cover all events, or cover any event completely, selective decisions must be made.  But, there are consequences:

By priming certain aspects of national life while ignoring others, television news sets the terms by which political judgements are rendered and political choices made. (Iyengar and Kinder 1987:4)

The implications for public policy are serious.  If policy is a result of the problem recognition model that Theodoulou27 summarized earlier, then the problems that gain media recognition are much more likely to be addressed. 

Parties

     Political parties are distinct from other citizen organizations.  Rather than attempting to influence existing policy makers, parties seek to get their own members elected to policy making positions.  While interest groups seek influence on specific policy issues, parties seek influence on a wide spectrum of policy issues.  Parties develop issue platforms, draft candidates, campaign on behalf of candidates, and work to get out the vote.  In short, parties work to bring together citizens under a common banner. 

     While most people may think of parties only during election cycles, their policy influence extends beyond campaigns.  While the rise of the media over the last thirty years has de-emphasized the power of parties in electoral politics, Eldersveld28 accurately points out that parties continue to play a dominant role in policy outcomes.  First and foremost, the party that emerges dominant determines the direction policy will take. 

     The president is responsible to the party that got him or her elected, and therefore must pursue at least some of the policy objectives articulated at the party convention.  Congress continues to distribute committee membership and chairmanships according to party affiliation.  While negotiation and compromise is typically necessary, the general direction of congressional policy is directly tied to the ideology of the larger party.  The strength of political parties has waned over the past three decades, but parties maintain policy influence in critical areas.  Elections, patronage appointments, legislative committees, and national policy discourses all reflect the influence of parties.

Interest Groups

     Interest groups are a fundamental partner in policy making.  Citizens participate in the policy process through communication with policy makers.  Such communication takes place individually (e.g., letters to elected representatives), and collectively.  Interest groups facilitate collective communication.  James Madison recognized the propensity for individuals to factionalize in an effort to maximize political influence.29  Robert Dahl further refined the analysis of Madisonian democracy, arguing that in an open society all persons have the right to press their interests.  To the extent others share these interests, collective pressure may allow greater policy influence.  Indeed, Dahl argued, those issues that have greater salience have greater interest group representation.30

     The interest group dynamic, however, is not so simple.  While it may be true that many salient issues have interest group representation, the strength of that representation is not tied to the strength of the issue salience.  Further, the salience itself may be a consequence of interest group action.  When studying policy outcomes it is necessary to identify the policy actors and the political resources they use.  Maximizing policy interests --winning the policy game -- requires specific political resources. 

    The most common resources include bureaucratic knowledge, a network of contacts, citizen backing (size of constituency), an ability to make political contributions, and an ability to mount a public relations (media) campaign.  Clearly, no group utilizes all of these resources.  But, the ability of an organized group to utilize

one or more of these resources is critical for policy influence.

     The pluralist model of counterbalancing elites mediating interests is inadequate.  The theoretical work done by Mills, and empirical work done by Dye, Domhoff, and Presthus, among others, suggest that rather than competing, the interests of economic elites tend to cohere in key policy areas.31  Lowi's The End of Liberalism32 argues that this interest group influence threatens the democratic basis of government.  If interest groups provide the framework for government-citizen interaction, and these groups are based on individual self-interest, there is little opportunity for pursuing a meaningful national interest. 

     Not only are corporate interest groups and PACs at an all time high, but the structure of the policymaking establishment has come to accept private think tanks as democratic institutions.  The Brookings Institute, RAND Corporation, Council for Economic Development (CED), Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and others form a bridge between corporate interests and government.  The think tanks are considered by many policy makers to be neutral policy consultants, and are thus extended great access to the policy making arena.  Yet, virtually all of them have strong foundations in the corporate community.  The RAND Corporation was created as a joint venture between the U.S. Airforce and the aerospace industry as a think tank devoted to the theory and technology of deterrence.  The CED was founded in the early 1940s by a consortium of corporate leaders to influence specific policy formation.  The CFR was founded in 1921 by corporate executives and financiers to help shape foreign policy.  As a result, economic elites are able to influence policy through what are essentially interest group think tanks.33

Political Consultants

     Increasingly, political expertise is purchased by those with the need and the resources.  In reviewing the rise and structure of the political consulting industry, Sabato34 exposes the fragile relationship between articulating ideas in a political marketplace and manipulating public opinion.  It is virtually impossible to win at the policy game without the marketing skills held by consultants and strategists.  Like many other policy resources, political consultants are costly.  As a consequence, those with greater economic resources enjoy a policy advantage.

 

Conclusion

     This chapter has explored the role and influence of actors in the policy process -- both institutional (Congress, the President and Executive Bureaucracy, and the Courts) and non-institutional (media, parties, interest groups, and political consultants).  From the discussion it can be seen that policy outcomes are typically a result of institutional processes and non-institutional influence. 

 

 

 

                             Notes

 

1.   B. Guy Peters, American Public Policy:  Promise and Performance, 3rd ed. (Chatham, NJ:  Chatham House Publishers, 1993), p. 4.

 

2.   Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How  (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

 

3.   Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy, 4th ed. (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1987), p. 1.

 

4.   Richard Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).

 

5.   Barbara Hinckley and Sheldon Goldman, American Politics and Government:  Structure, Processes, Institutions, and Policies (Glenview, IL:  Scott, Foresman and Co., 1990).

 

6.   Hedrick Smith, The Power Game: How Washington Works (NY: Ballantine Books, 1988).

 

7.   Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

 

8.   James Q. Wilson, American Government, 5th ed., (Lexington, MA:  D.C. Heath and Co., 1992).

 

9.   David Mayhew, Congress: the Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

 

10.  James Q. Wilson, op. cit.

 

11.  Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (NY: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1980).

 

12.  Paul Light, "The Presidential Policy Stream" in Michael Nelson (ed), The Presidency and the Political System (DC: CQ Press, 1984).

 

13.  Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," Transaction, 4: Number 2 (1966).

 

14.  Walter Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policy, 2nd ed., (DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991). 

 

15.  Steven Cohen, "EPA: A Qualified Success." In Controversies in Environmental Policy, eds. Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clark (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986).

 

16.  Matthew A. Cahn, Environmental Deceptions:  The Tension between Liberalism and Environmental Policymaking in the United States (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, forthcoming).

 

17.  Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in From Max Weber:  Essays in Sociology, eds. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (NY: Oxford University Press, 1946).

 

18.  James Q. Wilson, "The Rise of the Bureaucratic State," Public Interest, 41; Fall 1975.

 

19.  Kenneth J. Meier, Regulation:  Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics (NY: St, Martin's Press, 1985).

 

20.  Lawrence Baum, American Courts: Process and Policy (NY: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1990).

 

21.  Nathan Glazer, "Towards an Imperial Judiciary," Public Interest, Fall 1975.

 

22.  Denis McQuail, "The Influence and Effects of Mass Media," in J. Curran, M. Gurevitch, and J. Woolacott (eds.), Mass Communication and Society (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1979).

 

23.  Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, The Emergence of American Political Issues:  The Agenda Setting Function of the Press (West Publishing Company, 1977).

 

24.  Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (NY: The Free Press, 1922).

 

25.  Doris Graber, Processing the News:  How People Tame the Information Tide, 2nd ed., (NY: Longman, 1988).

 

26.  Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, News That Matters: Television and American Opinion (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).

 

27.  See Stella Z. Theodoulou, this reader, Part 2, chapter 11.

 

28.  Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties in American Society  (NY: Basic Books, 1982).

 

29.  James Madison, "Federalist #10," in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (NY: New American Library, 1961).

 

30.  Robert Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

 

31.  See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1956); Thomas Dye, Who's Running America?  The Conservative Years, 4th ed., (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986); G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? (NY: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1983); Robert Prestus, Elites in the Policy Process (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974).

 

32.  Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 2nd ed., (NY: W.W. Norton, 1979).

 

33.  Matthew A. Cahn, op. cit.

 

34.  Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections (NY: Basic Books, 1981).

Suggested Reading

 

Richard Fenno, Homestyle:  House Members in their Districts
  (Boston: Little Brown, 1978).

 

Gary Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections  (NY:
  HarperCollins, 1992) 3rd Ed.

 

Randall Ripley, Congress: Process and Policy (NY: W.W. Norton,
  1983).

 

Edward Corwin, The Presidency: Office and Powers (NY: NYU
  Press, 1957).

 

James David Barber,  The Presidential Character (Engelwood
  Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985) 3rd. Ed.

 

Thomas Cronin, The State of the Presidency (Boston: Little
  Brown,1980) 2nd Ed.

 

Francis Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy
  (Boston: Little Brown, 1984) 3rd Ed.   

 

Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers (DC: Brookings Institute,
  1977).

 

David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court and American
  Politics (NY: Norton, 1986).

 

William Lasser, The Limits of Judicial Power  (Chaperl Hill,
  NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

 

Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent:  The
  Political Economy of the Mass Media (NY: Pantheon Books,
  1988).

 

Martin Linsky, How the Press Affects Federal Policymaking  (NY:   W.W. Norton, 1986).

 

Martin Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties
  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

 

Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl, When Parties Fail: Emerging
  Alternative Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University
  Press, 1988).

 

C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (NY: Oxford University Press,
  1961).

 

E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (NY: Holt,
  Rinehart and Winston, 1969).