The Impact of Corporate Retail Investment in South Los Angeles

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2008

Conducted with the generous support of the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation
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Acknowledgements

This study was conducted with the support of the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation, which generously awarded me a Faculty Research Grant in 2007. I feel honored to have been entrusted with their support and encouragement. I received additional support for research costs from the Whitsett Endowment, the munificent gift of the Whitsett Foundation. Both Dr. Stella Theodoulou and Dr. Thomas Maddux, the Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Chair of the History Department, respectively, have been consistently supportive of my research. CSUN Graduate Student Joe Dixon provided superb general research assistance. Much of the data analysis was performed by Richard Bowman, a doctoral fellow at Pardee RAND Graduate School. John Vaughn and Laura Coleman at the California State Employment Development Department processed data orders and answered technical questions with great efficiency and courtesy.
Executive Summary

- Due to the declining employment opportunities in the Los Angeles manufacturing sector since the late 1960s, African American leaders have consistently fought for greater inclusion in the burgeoning retail and food service sectors of the Southern California economy.

- African American leaders and developers have argued that bringing new retail businesses to South Los Angeles will not only create new jobs but also have a "spillover effect" by luring other employers to the area, and will improve neighborhoods by reducing crime and raising property values.

- Between 1990 and 2006, retail employment consistently accounted for a little more than 10% of employment in Southern California and projections from the California Employment Development Department suggest that employment in the retail sector will continue to account for just over 10% of all jobs in Southern California through 2013.

- Opened in 2001 at the intersection of Slauson and Western Avenues in South Los Angeles, Chesterfield Square created approximately 650 retail jobs.

- However, there is no "spillover" employment effect on the surrounding area. Not only are no additional jobs created outside of the mall, but there is a net decrease in retail employment in the surrounding area.

- When losses in neighboring zip codes are calculated, the net effect of the mall opening was the addition of no jobs to the local economy of South Los Angeles.

- Contrary to common wisdom and developer claims, the opening of Chesterfield Square had no effect on either home values or the number of home sales in the surrounding area.

- Contrary to common wisdom and developer claims, the opening of Chesterfield Square did not significantly reduce crime. Arrests for felonies or misdemeanors among both adults and juveniles did not decrease as a result of the mall opening.

- In the case of Chesterfield Square, the free market model of inner city renewal has not solved inner city problems.

- The failure of Chesterfield Square to solve inner city problems should not be taken as evidence that the free market model cannot work. Rather, it may be taken as proof that the model simply does not work on such a small scale and that further investment is required to generate the desired effects.
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I. Introduction: The Significance of Retail in South Los Angeles

Since at least World War II, one of the hallmarks of life in the poor and historically-black neighborhoods of the United States has been the paucity of competitively-priced retail outlets for local consumers. Mirroring the pattern of increased racial isolation and segregation experienced by most urban blacks between World War II and the 1990s, large retailers – and most significantly, supermarkets – were generally loathe to invest in communities which they perceived as hostile, crime-ridden, and deeply impoverished. In many black neighborhoods, particularly since the 1960s, these assumptions were born out by the grim, and verifiably high, rates of poverty and crime. And in Los Angeles, the spectacular Watts Riot of 1965 and Los Angeles Riots of 1992 seemed to offer visible, terrible, support for this perspective. Unwilling to challenge these assumptions, or to think carefully about distinctions between low-income and medium-income black neighborhoods, the vast majority of retailers simply decided to avoid black neighborhoods altogether. The only consistent exception to this pattern throughout the late 20th and early 21st century has been that ubiquitous icon of the American ghetto, the liquor store, an enterprise ill-equipped to accommodate the diverse needs of the local clientele.
On the surface, the “problem of retail” seems benign when compared to the staggering statistics on mortality, morbidly, crime, education, and poverty in the black neighborhoods of the late twentieth-century. Furthermore, in the realm of popular culture – which plays no small role in shaping our perceptions of life in the nation’s poorest neighborhoods – the retail problem is seldom “sexy” enough to warrant inclusion in a hip-hop recording, music video, or mainstream film. One notable exception was the 1993 film *Falling Down*, in which anti-hero William Foster’s rampage begins when he is price-gouged at an Asian-owned liquor store in an area described as “gang land”, probably East Los Angeles. “I’m not a vigilante,” the gun-toting Foster later says, “I’m just standing up for my rights as a consumer.”

Yet both residents and local political representatives are more sensitive to the retail problem in their communities, and have been for some time. They recognize that the retail problem operates on numerous levels and that it exacerbates the conditions which ostensibly created the problem in the first place. First, and perhaps most abstractly, the paucity of retailers in the nation’s poor neighborhoods is a grim psychological reminder of the history of second class citizenship to which blacks, and to a lesser extent, Latinos, were subjected in the United States at least through the 1960s. If post-war American citizenship was centrally defined by the practices of mass consumption, as historian Lizabeth Cohen has compellingly argued, the absence of those opportunities in the poorest neighborhoods again re-inscribed second class citizenship even while the civil rights movement made great strides. But the scarcity of retail options has also had a startling web of material implications which are largely unknown outside of those neighborhoods.

Perhaps the most well-known material effect of the retail problem is the lack of competitive pricing and product quality that it has engendered. “Anyone who has ever struggled with poverty knows,” James Baldwin wrote in 1963, “how extremely expensive it is to be poor.” “Go shopping one
day in Harlem—for anything—and compare Harlem prices and quality with those downtown.”

Numerous quantitative studies conducted in the 1960s confirmed Baldwin’s observation. Other studies have qualified these findings, but arrived at essentially the same conclusion. For example, a close study of Watts and the suburban community of Culver City in 1969 found overall prices between the areas to be essentially comparable, but found that prices for cereal, baked goods, canned fruits and vegetables in Watts were significantly higher. A function of the prevalence of “mom and pop” stores in Watts, as opposed to larger chain stores, this disparity also manifested itself in lower quality products, and fewer fresh fruits and vegetables. Finally, even in cases where prices are only slightly higher in poor areas, these differences have a significant effect on people already living on the economic margins. For example, a 1993 study of Los Angeles supermarkets found that a family of four in South Central Los Angeles spent almost 36% of their annual income on food, while a similar family in the middle class suburb of Lakewood spent only 12% of their income on food.

In the case of local food markets in poor areas, the prevalence of higher prices, poor selection, and substandard produce in local, non-chain, markets has also exacerbated the pronounced health crisis plaguing many of the nation’s poorest neighborhoods. A 2002 study conducted by Amanda Shaffer of the Urban and Environmental Policy Institute at Occidental College in Los Angeles revealed the staggering disparities in fresh food in South Los Angeles. The absence of fresh foods, she points out, eliminates the choice to eat healthily and poor people thus tend to rely on high-calorie diets well-provided by the abundant fast-food establishments in the neighborhoods. The Census of 2000 revealed that African Americans have the highest rate of both diabetes and obesity of any racial group in the United States, the results of the very dynamic Shaffer describes.
But there is yet another way in which the retail problem materially affects the lives of residents of poor neighborhoods, and that is in the realm of employment. Historically, retail has occupied a significant portion of the job opportunities in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Region (a statistical area used by the Census, comprised of the cities of Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Glendale). Between 1990 and 2006, for example, retail employment accounted for approximately 10% of all employment consistently across the period, with only a small dip in the mid 1990s (see Table 1). By way of comparison, the 2000 census revealed that the proportion of the workforce employed in retail in Los Angeles (10.5%) was less than the national proportion (11.7%), and less than the proportion in Miami (12.3%), but greater than the proportion in Chicago (8.9%), New York City (9.0%), Atlanta (9.4%), and San Francisco (10.3%). Furthermore, the California Employment Development Department’s “Industry Employment Projections” shows a growth of more than 63,000 retail jobs in the Los Angeles metropolitan region by 2014, with retail continuing to account for approximately 10% of all work.

![Table 1: Retail Employment as Proportion of All Employment in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area, 1990-2006](image)
To residents of South Los Angeles old enough to remember the region’s vibrant manufacturing sector, the value of retail employment is undoubtedly dubious. At this peak in the 1950s and early 1960s, the manufacturing sector provided the economic foundation for a black middle class in what was then called South Central Los Angeles (It was renamed South Los Angeles by the Los Angeles City Council in 2003). At the high watermark in 1960, 24% of employed African American men and 18% of employed black women in Los Angeles worked as manufacturing operatives in region’s booming automobile, steel and rubber tire industries. But as those industries first suburbanized, and then left the United States altogether in the deindustrialization wave of the 1970s and 1980s, African Americans found a mismatch between their skills and experience on one
hand, and the demands of the new economy on the other. The new economy favored highly educated and skilled workers at the top and very low-wage, non-unionized workers on the bottom.

Retail employment today rarely confers the same benefits as those manufacturing jobs did. The oft-quoted charge that America’s retail jobs are being “Wal-Martized” has been borne out by numerous empirical studies which clearly demonstrate the declining standards of retail work.\(^8\) Retail wages have fallen steadily since the late 1960s, part time work has come to dominate, and by the early 1990s, only one-third of full-time retail workers had pension coverage and less than two-thirds had employer sponsored health plans.\(^9\) A 1999 study found that the introduction of Wal-Mart into the California grocery industry would result in a loss of more than $2.8 billion in wages and benefits throughout the state.\(^10\)

So it would be foolish to propose that minimally-skilled blacks, Latinos or whites hitch their economic aspirations to the cart of retail employment. At the same time, however, it is worth considering how to expand the availability of these jobs, rather than to lament their inferiority to the jobs of yesteryear. In South Los Angeles, where more than 30% of the families live below the poverty line in multiple zip codes, the arrival of new jobs is an unalloyed blessing: people are simply desperate for work.
II. The History of Retail Employment in South Los Angeles

Given the historic, continuing, and projected importance of retail employment in the economy of the Los Angeles Metropolitan area, it is not surprising that black leaders have long invested great hope in the potential of retail development to ease the problem of chronic unemployment and underemployment. As early as the 1930s, African Americans in Los Angeles joined blacks in other Northern and Western cities in “Don’t Spend Where you Can’t Work” campaigns directed at neighborhood retailers who engaged in racially discriminatory hiring practices. Radical by the standards of the time, this direct-action technique became a model for the civil rights activism of the 1950s and 1960s. Complemented by other campaigns, like the “Double-Duty Dollar” campaign (in which blacks were encouraged to buy from black businesses to “advance the race” and stimulate job growth), African Americans increasingly recognized the economic importance of their inclusion in the retail sector. Merchants and Farmers Bank, Ralph’s grocery store, and Sears all acquiesced to black protests and began hiring blacks in South Los Angeles in the years before the Watts Riot. 11

But by the 1960s, white suburbanization and the simultaneous innovation of the suburban supermarket further intensified the longstanding retail gap between the poor and affluent in general, and blacks and whites in particular. Black resentment against the perceived exploitation of
local retailers intensified. In fact, there is little evidence of wide-spread price-gouging on the part of local retailers in Los Angeles or elsewhere; higher prices were usually the function of the small scale of these enterprises coupled with the higher insurance rates they usually paid in comparison to their suburban counterparts. Thus, as the famous Kerner Commission concluded in 1968, higher prices, and higher credit rates “do not necessarily involve ‘exploitation,’ but they are often perceived as exploitative.” A 1967 UCLA study of “ghetto merchants” found that, prior to the 1965 riot, retail businesses in Watts experienced approximately the same annual growth in revenue as did the economy as a whole. “This contradicts a common belief,” the study concluded, “that businesses in ghetto areas do exceptionally well.”

Even if the “ghetto merchants” were not gouging local consumers, however, it was difficult – particularly in Los Angeles – for African Americans to appreciate that fact. Less than one half of the families in Watts owned cars and public transportation was infamously paltry in the 1960s and 1970s; blacks desirous of leaving South Central to shop often faced uncertain journeys on privately-contracted jitneys with erratic schedules and routes. Furthermore, the ascendancy of Black Power ideology legitimized open antagonism to white store owners who became local proxies for the “white power structure” in particular, and white-dominated capitalism more broadly. In the case of Watts, in fact, most of the merchants were white, with Jews and non-Jewish whites comprising 67% of the business owners sampled in the 1967 “ghetto merchant” study, while blacks comprised only 13% of shopkeepers, roughly the same proportion represented by Asians. But these whites were also overwhelmingly Democratic, overwhelmingly supportive of Johnson’s Civil Rights Agenda, and described themselves as working class more often than did whites citywide, and described themselves as middle class less often than did whites citywide. In short, the “ghetto merchants” in
Watts were generally white, but they were certainly not part of any “white power structure” and, in most cases, sympathetic to the national civil rights agenda.13

The Watts Riot of August 1965 forever changed the retail landscape of South Los Angeles. Triggered by legitimate and longstanding grievances in the black community about constant police harassment and rampant racial discrimination, the riot itself was (as most riots are) merely an exercise in mob psychology; local stores – those owned by whites as well as by blacks – were largely selected as targets of opportunity. But the effects of the riot were quite clear cut: the first was the literal erasure of most business in the riot area, where an estimated 1000 stores were damaged, many at a total loss to the owner. The second was the diminished capacity or willingness of remaining business owners to stay on in what they perceived as an increasingly hostile environment. Among a sample of remaining business owners interviewed six months after the riot, 54% anticipated that their prospects were either “not good,” “bad,” or “uncertain” over the two-to-three years; 65% said the same about their prospects in the next five-to-ten years. In short, they anticipated that their business would decline with time, a strong motivator to close their doors. Third, those business owners who wanted to stay were faced with skyrocketing insurance rates as most companies reclassified the area as “high-risk.” Shortly after the riot, California’s Insurance Commissioner, Richard Roddis, acknowledged that “insurance costs for some Watts retailers went up about 200 percent following the riots” and spokespeople from the business insurance industry admitted that rates increased by 60% in “higher-risk classifications. Finally, as historian Jonathan Bean has explained, rebuilding efforts were hampered by the Federal Government through the Small Business Administration (SBA), which was not only “stingy” with the aide it doled out to small business owners in the riot area, but was also an agency so mesmerized by the ideology of “black
capitalism” that prospective white investors had no faith in its ability to aide their efforts to bring businesses back to Watts.\textsuperscript{14}

And so, one after another, small business disappeared from South Los Angeles and larger firms refused to move in. By 1967, 103\textsuperscript{rd} street in Watts, once regarded as “one of America's busiest retail centers” according to the \textit{Los Angeles Times}, had been virtually erased. When \textit{Times} journalist Arelo Sederberg visited the former business district in 1967 as part of a story on the aftermath of the riot, he observed “empty, weed-choked lots [which] gape openly where thriving retailers operated an uninterrupted succession of small shops prior to the riot two years ago.”\textsuperscript{15} Another \textit{Times} journalist observed the difficulty buying food in 1968. “Anyone who does not own a car and who lives near the heart of Watts (or in one of several other black ghettos) cannot conveniently buy decent food at decent prices.” “Driving up and down the grim streets of Watts,” he wrote “we passed countless small, dingy markets and not one big grocery store or supermarket.”\textsuperscript{16}

An aggressive self-help campaign by local African Americans in the early 1970s offered momentary optimism about the future of retail in South Central. Most significantly, the Watts Labor Community Action Committee -- a remarkably vibrant organization led by former autoworker Ted Watkins -- formally took ownership of four supermarkets that had suffered since the 1965 riot. Securing loan assistance from the SBA, the United Automobile Workers, and Bank of America, Watkins brokered a deal with the owner of the Shop Rite chain – hard hit during the 1965 riot -- who sold the inventory for Shop Rite's four stores and one of the actual properties at the intersection of Rimpau Boulevard and Washington Boulevard for $950000 (the other stores were located at 20\textsuperscript{th} and Central, 103\textsuperscript{rd} and San Pedro, and 2008 W. Compton Blvd).\textsuperscript{17} Shortly thereafter, in 1972, basketball star Willie Naulls invested in and opened a shopping plaza at 103\textsuperscript{rd} and Avalon.
But both the Shop Rite and Nauls ventures appear to have been short-lived, victims of the impoverishment of their prospective customers.\(^{18}\)

These failures presaged further retail divestment in South Central in the late 1970s. In 1976, the Sears store on Vermont and Slauson – long perceived as an anchor business for South Central -- finally closed its doors, leaving what then Mayor Tom Bradley described as a “tremendous hole there.” “Unless we can restore that kind of retail activity there, the residents will suffer and the street suffers and the people have to travel distances for shopping. It’s just blight.” \(^{19}\) Compounding this was the subsequent closure of the Compton Sears in 1978. Fortuitously, however, Sears donated the land at the vital Slauson and Vermont intersection to the City of Los Angeles which then contracted with a new non-profit organization, the Vermont Slauson Economic Development Corporation (originally a citizen advisory committee for Mayor Tom Bradley), to develop a commercial retail center. Buttressed with funding by the Economic Development Administration, a mall opened in 1981 amidst much fanfare.\(^{20}\) In addition to providing approximately 400 new jobs, the mall (which housed a Zody’s Department Store, The Boys Market, Sav-On Drug Store, and a McDonald’s restaurant) also operated under an unusual agreement by which 60% of the annual profits went directly to the Vermont Slauson Economic Development Corporation which was then reinvested in the development of affordable housing in the surrounding area. Critics complained about the unprecedented security at the complex, which included a seven foot iron fence around the perimeter with only two driveways, dozens of security guards, infrared motion detectors, and a security tower and nighttime illumination three to five times the standard. Developer Alexander Haagen was vindicated when his mall was virtually unscathed during the 1992 riot: the only store damaged on the site was a shoe store that had the unfortunate distinction of being the only store not located inside the fenced perimeter.\(^{21}\)
While the Vermont & Slauson complex survived the 1992 Riots, it was exceptional. In contrast to the approximately 1000 destroyed or damaged during the 1965 riot, more than 10,000 were damaged or destroyed in 1992. The ferocity of the violence – which left 58 dead, more than two thousand injured, and almost $1 billion in property damage – also virtually guaranteed that whatever slow progress was being made on the retail front was doomed. Initially, this appeared not to be the case: Rebuild LA, the high-profile campaign -- headed by former baseball commissioner and 1984 Olympics organizer Peter Ueberroth – to create thousands of new jobs in South Los Angeles through heavy corporate investment seemed promising. Less than three months after the riots, Ueberroth secured a guarantee from the CEO of Vons supermarkets to bring Vons back to South Los Angeles (most of the South Los Angeles Vons stores had been closed prior to the riots). Pledging to invest $100 million to build twelve new stores in South Los Angeles and create between one thousand and two thousand permanent jobs, Vons was followed by similar commitments by Ralphs, Smart and Final, and Food 4 Less. But as criticism of Ueberroth's failure to act more quickly reached a fever pitch, these corporate commitments evaporated, and Ueberroth quit one year after his appointment. A 2002 study found no net gain in supermarket chain stores in the area designated by Rebuild LA as a recovery area. Certainly, part of this could be blamed on the wave of consolidations in the California supermarket industry. But in the main, the failure to build stemmed from the longstanding disinclination – recently burned into the consciousness once again – to invest in the poor urban areas. And as they had after the Watts Riot, small business owners often had trouble securing loans and insurance.

If Rebuild LA failed, its driving concept – that large scale corporate investment was a better engine for inner-city renewal than the government subsidy model of the 1960s and 1970s – was gaining currency in important places. The concept, in fact, became a cornerstone of President Bill
Clinton’s urban policy. Clinton strongly supported, and narrowly passed, the Economic Empowerment Act of 1993 at the heart of which were “empowerment zones” and “enterprise communities”, Congressionally-recognized districts in which prospective employers could receive very generous tax incentives for conducting business and hiring local residents (California had its own Enterprise Zones since 1984). Additionally, in the wake of the 1992 Riots, the California State Legislature created a Los Angeles Revitalization Zone in the riot area to further stimulate investment. But research suggests such “place-based” incentive programs have had very little benefit for the areas targeted. The incentives, studies generally agree, have not been a determining force for investment. They have simply not been able to overcome entrenched resistance to investment.24

Thus, by the late 1990s, it seemed that little had changed in South Los Angeles in the realm of corporate investment in retail since the days before Watts. If subsidy or place-based tax incentive programs had failed to revitalize these areas at all, the effect was quite minimal. There was very little reason to be optimistic that this would change. In 2000, South Los Angeles commentator and radio show host Earl Ofari Hutchinson proclaimed that “South Central Los Angeles is still a near textbook case of a neighborhood grossly underserved by business and lenders, and that screams for a massive boost in investment.”25
III. The Free Market Model and the Rise of Chesterfield Square

In the mid-1990s, a Harvard economics professor named Michael Porter founded a non-profit known as The Initiative for a Competitive Inner City, garnering immediate national media attention.26 “The time has come,” Porter wrote in a 1997 article which encapsulated the philosophy of the Initiative, “to recognize that revitalizing these areas requires a radically different approach”:

Today, most efforts and public resources, including the Empowerment Zone program, are still targeted toward meeting residents’ immediate needs rather than generating jobs and economic opportunity that will mitigate the need for social programs in the long run. Although efforts to provide education, housing, health care, and other needed services are essential and must continue, these must be balanced with a concerted and realistic economic strategy focused on for-profit business and job development. The necessity—and the real opportunity—is to create income and wealth, by harnessing the power of market forces, rather than trying to defy them. The private sector must play a leading role and, in many ways, is already beginning to do so.27

In this article and elsewhere, Porter has touted the purchasing power existing in America’s inner-cities, and the aggregate numbers are impressive: in 2006, Porter estimated that inner-city residents spent $122 billion on retail annually (a Housing and Urban Development study saw an even greater buying potential).28 Appealing primarily to the market potential of the inner city, Porter has also argued that new investment “serves as a catalyst for additional inner city development.”29

In business journals and newspapers, it became increasingly common in the late 1990s and early 2000s to see reference to the inner-city as the “new frontier” for businesses. The Los Angeles Business Journal, for example, declared in 2000 that “charity-minded redevelopment efforts have been largely a bust. Little surprise.” “But now another force is starting to have a profound impact on the inner city: Private developers have discovered there is money to be made there.” “Change is
afoot in corporate America,” another wrote, because “chain retailers now smell a goldmine of opportunity in under-served communicates throughout the nation.” The *Los Angeles Times* also extolled the benefits of tapping-in to the inner city market. And in 1999, Pepperdine University released a study which echoed similar themes and further made the case for inner-city retail development. Most striking, the report found that there was $400 million worth of “leakage” from South Central Los Angeles produced by consumers leaving their neighborhoods to shop elsewhere.

A champion of this reinvigorated free market strategy was a local African American housing developer named Christopher Hammond, the CEO of Capital Vision Equities, who had already begun assembling industrial parcels at the intersection of Western and Slauson Avenues in anticipation of developing a housing complex. But after extensive consultation with neighborhood groups, Hammond determined that a large shopping center was more desirable to residents. Extraordinarily well-connected in City Hall, Hammond secured the support of Councilman Mark Ridley-Thomas (now a California State Senator) to begin assembling other parcels adjacent in anticipation of a much larger project. Ultimately, eight parcels encompassing twenty acres were assembled which included a former lumber yard, milk processing plant, cold storage facility, and gasoline station. Though Hammond had the local political connections, he lacked the financial capacity to handle such a large-scale project and both he and Ridley-Thomas reached out to local developers to become involved. The man they found, Jerry Katell, was as an unlikely an inner-city developer as one might find.

A Stanford Business School graduate with thirty-five years of experience in Southern California suburban office park development, Jerry Katell had never even been to South Central Los Angeles. At the time, he was developing a project called Warner Ridge, a multi use project with over
690,000 square feet of office space and 125 apartment units in the suburban Woodland Hills section of Los Angeles. But after being introduced to Hammond and traveling to the site, Katell was immediately impressed by the fact that community was underserved: “The area around the project was full of graffiti and barbed wire and barred windows. But what surprised me were the neatly tended lawns and nice little houses with families clearly trying to live a normal life in spite of the problems in the area. I could see by observation that the area was underserved.” Without conducting market research, Katell trusted his instinct about the project and signed on as the principal developer. By personally guaranteeing the loan, Katell secured a 90% loan from the Community Development Bank (at an extraordinarily high interest rate of 19%). “It was probably the riskiest thing I had ever done in my 35 year development career. But I believed in it and also felt it was going to be the most important thing I ever did.”34

Katell’s initial investment paid off when Home Depot and Food 4 Less signed on as tenants, allowing Katell to pay off the land loan and roll into a lower-interest construction loan. More significantly, these “anchor” tenants legitimized the project and made it a more appealing project for other tenants. In order to make the project viable, however, the smaller tenants would have to pay comparable rents to the Westside and few believed that this would happen. Nonetheless, Starbucks, Radio Shack and McDonald’s quickly followed suit. Other tenants could not be convinced, particularly major supermarkets, citing crime and high unemployment.35

Since first being announced in 1999, Chesterfield Square has received nothing but enthusiastic endorsements. Even before it opened, Councilman Ridley-Thomas proclaimed that Chesterfield Square “means jobs. It means improvement in property values. It means removal of blight.” The Los Angeles Times, and Los Angeles Business Journal shared the enthusiasm, as did the hundreds of job applicants that lined up on the day Home Depot and Food 4 Less opened their
doors late in July of 2001. And Chesterfield bore immediate results: 250 positions had been filled by September and by April 2002, after Subway, McDonalds, and Starbucks had opened, almost 600 positions were filled in Chesterfield Square. “Chesterfield Square,” Katell Properties now advertises on its website:

is positively transforming the identity of a community; it functions as a ‘tipping point’, spurring job growth and further investment in the inner city; and it fulfills real needs in an underserved community by providing requested resources in a safe and accessible landscape.

And The Urban Land Institute – a leading real estate research institute -- ranked Chesterfield Square as a finalist for its 2005 Awards for Excellence, regarding it as a “meaningful development” and a “commercial anchor and a point from which to finally rebuild.”

The optimism about Chesterfield Square – which echoes Michael Porter’s high profile claims about the benefit of inner-city competitiveness – is based on several beliefs. The first is that investment in the inner-city begets more investment in the inner-city and that it “spurs job growth”; the second is that it leads to neighborhood renewal, an ambiguous concept but one that must certainly be related to rising property values; and the third is that retail-driven renewal reduces crime. These seem like reasonable assumptions, and they certainly appeal to virtually all players involved, but are they accurate? In order to answer this question, we first need to have a sense of the contemporary social and economic landscape of South Los Angeles.
IV. An Overview of the 5-Zip Code Study Area

“South Los Angeles” is an imprecise geographic description generally used today to refer to the area South of the I-10 Freeway, East of Crenshaw, North of El Segundo Boulevard, and West of Alameda Street. Until 2003, when the City changed the official name, the area was known as South Central Los Angeles because of the historic thoroughfare of S. Central Avenue which was once its cultural and economic heart. A collection of racially, architecturally, and culturally diverse neighborhoods, South Central became increasingly African American after the migration of hundreds of thousands of blacks between World War II and the late 1960s. The racial profile of “South Central” became so essential to its name that it could be said that as blacks moved west and south in the 1960s and 1970s, “South Central” moved with them. In popular perception, “South Central” simply meant a place where blacks in Los Angeles happened to live.

Because South Los Angeles is not a city, nor even a neighborhood, we must use alternative geographies to identify relevant data about its inhabitants. Though zip code boundaries are somewhat arbitrary in that they do not conform to any social indicators in the way that census tracts do (like population size, for example), they are useful because they represent the smallest geography for which there is monthly employment and housing data. For this reason, I designed a “5-zip code study area” surrounding Chesterfield Square that we can use to detect and identify important changes on the local level. The 5-zip code study area is bounded approximately by Exposition on the North, South Van Ness on the West, South Main on the East, and El Segundo on the South (Map 1). As arbitrary as the use of zip code boundaries generally is, the boundaries of the 5-zip code study area actually correspond very well with the historically black core of South Central Los Angeles.
The most striking change to take place in the 5-zip code study area prior to the opening of Chesterfield Square was certainly its racial and ethnic transformation. By the 1980s, the trend toward complete African American segregation in South Central showed steady signs of reversing. Fueled by the dynamic Southern California economy – which created thousands of new jobs even at the height of American recession in the mid-1970s – as well as changes in immigration law, millions of immigrants arrived in Southern California in the 1980s and 1990s. Latin Americans generally, and Mexicans in particular, began to transform the landscape of South Central, where they found affordable housing stock, if not always welcoming neighbors. Between 1990 and 2000, blacks went from being the majority population of South Central (55%) to 39.8% and Latinos went from 45.5% to 58% in the same period. The Latin Americanization was just one phase of the transition in black population as it absolutely declined in the same period. Almost 70,000 blacks left South Los Angeles in the 1990s, finding opportunities in Los Angeles suburbs long closed to them, affordable housing in eastern Riverside County, and even welcoming communities in the American South.\footnote{36}

In the 5-zip code study area, the proportion of blacks in the total population declined between 1990 and 2000 in each zip code, and in three of the five, they were overtaken by Latinos in that decade (See Table 3). Only in zip codes 90047 and 90062 did African Americans retain majorities by 2000 and in 90062, that very slim majority has likely disappeared at the time of this writing. Only in Zip Code 90047 is it reasonable to suppose that blacks still hold a majority, and even there, it has likely slipped considerably since the 2000 census. This shift in the ethnic composition of the study area was accompanied by other important shifts in neighborhood economies. Most striking, the growth of the Latino population in the study area was accompanied by an increase in the proportion of families living below the poverty level, as Table 4 demonstrates.
In every zip code of the 5-zip code study area, the proportion of families living below the poverty line increased between 1990 and 2000 (the countywide proportion also increased from 1990 to 2000 from about 12% to 14%). At first glance, these figures would certainly be discouraging to anyone inclined to envision the inner city as the “next frontier” of retail.

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<td>90003</td>
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<td>90037</td>
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<td>90044</td>
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<td>90047</td>
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<td>90062</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>29%</td>
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Table 3: Proportion of Blacks and Hispanics in 5-Zip Code Study Area, 1990-2000
Table 4: Proportion of Families Living Below the Poverty Line in the 5-Zip Code Study Area, 1990-2000

Table 5: Median Income in the 5-Zip Code Study Area, 1990-2000
However, as Table 5 demonstrates, at the same time the proportion of families living below the poverty line increased, so too did the median income in the area. In every zip code in the study area, the median household income increased between 1990 and 2000. Additionally, in three of the five zip codes, the ratio of local median income to countywide median income also increased. In other words, the incomes of residents in these zip codes not only increased absolutely, but they also moved closer to parity with countywide median income in the decade between 1990 and 2000.

In short, the 5-zip code study area underwent dramatic demographic shifts between 1990 and 2000. The neighborhoods within the area became increasingly Latino; the proportion of people living below the poverty level increased, but so too did the median income. Nothing in these shifts indicated that South Los Angeles was any more of a retail frontier than it had ever been. What changed, evidently, was the attitude of investors. I would argue – though I cannot thoroughly explore this point here – that this was the function of at least two important changes. The first was
the novelty of the Latino consumer base. Unlike African Americans, Latinos represented a relatively new and untested market. The rate at which they have opened and operated businesses in Southern California, bought homes, and consumed products has been impressive to potential investors looking for the “next big market.” One only has to look at the enormous financial investment that Target and other major retailers have made for Spanish-language advertising to get a sense of the perceived potential in Southern California. The second reason that South Los Angeles might suddenly have seemed attractive to investors was the California real estate boom that began late in 2001. As investors looked for untapped financial potential outside of the stock market in the wake of the terrorist attack on the United States in September of 2001, they bought land that they would normally have considered unworthy of investment (at the height of the boom in 2006, single family homes with gated windows in Watts were selling for over half a million dollars). In this context investors saw opportunities where previously they had seen none.

The fact that the tenants at Chesterfield Square have been paying premium rents and keeping their doors open is ample evidence that they are a financial success. Katell, who no longer owns any portion of the Chesterfield Square property, recently expanded on this. “Starbucks,” he told me, “does $800 per square foot in spite of a quote in the Los Angeles Times from a local that no one in that area would ever pay $3.50 for a cup of coffee. The Radio Shack is one of their top two or three stores in the state. The McDonald’s does gangbusters.” In this regard, investors made a wise decision and it would seem that the benefits of inner-city retailing are real and not just imagined. But what of the benefits to the surrounding community that were such an essential part of the promotion and politicking for the mall?
V. Does Inner-City Retail Investment Have a “Spillover” Effect on Employment?

In the case of Chesterfield Square, it did not. In order to determine if the arrival of Chesterfield Square had a spillover effect on employment in the 5-zip study area – that is, whether it created new jobs beyond itself – I acquired monthly zip code level data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for the years 1996-2006.37 A close analysis of the data reveals that while the mall itself created approximately 650 new retail jobs between December 2000 and December 2002 in the zip code in which it is located (90047), it did not create new retail employment in neighboring zip codes. In fact, immediately following the opening of the mall, retail employment declined in the other 4 zip codes, most conspicuously in the zip code immediately neighboring Chesterfield Square (90062). There, the decline in retail employment exactly mirrored the rise in 90047 (Tables 7 and 8). Thus, when losses are factored in, Chesterfield Square failed to produce a net gain in retail employment in the 5-zip code study area.

What is particularly remarkable here is the temporary negative effect the opening of Chesterfield Square had on retail employment in surrounding zip codes. It is not discernable from the data whether the people acquiring the new jobs at Chesterfield were leaving their current retail employers, or whether those smaller retailers were simply unable to hire employees at their preferred rate because of competition from the larger retailers at Chesterfield Square. In either case, this negative effect on retail employment requires more investigation and needs to be fully considered in the realm of policy before such projects are undertaken.
Table 7: 90047: Retail Employment, 1996-2006

Table 8: 90062: Retail Employment, 1996-2006
VI. Does Inner-City Retail Investment Improve Property Values?

The opening of Chesterfield Square had no effect on either property values or the number of properties sold in the surrounding area. When the control group (zips 90003, 90037, 90044) was compared to the zips immediately adjacent to the mall (90047, 90062) from the years 1996-2006, there was no difference in either property values or number of sales. Of course, across this time period, housing prices generally increased, but this simply paralleled county and statewide value increases and was not related to Chesterfield Square. Tables 9 through 11 show mean home price between 1996 and 2006 in 3 groups: the county, the “control group” (zip codes 90003, 90037, 90044) and the “mall group” (zip codes 90047, 90062). If there were an effect on housing prices in the mall group, we would see an increase between months 51-62, the months that correspond to the year of Chesterfield Square's opening, but there is none. Tables 12-14 show the median number of sales in each group, and again, there is no increase which corresponds to the mall's opening.
Table 9: Mean Home Price, 1996-2006, Los Angeles County

Table 10: Mean Home Price, 1996-2006, Zips 90047, 90062 (mall group)

Table 11: Mean Home Price, 1996-2006, in Zips 90003, 90037, 90044 (control group)
VII. Does Inner-City Retail Investment Reduce Crime?

In the case of Chesterfield Square, probably not. In contrast to the data on housing and employment, the data on crime is significantly less precise, and consequently, inspires less confidence in the results. The weakness of the data is manifold. First, the smallest geographic unit for which extensive LAPD data is easily available is the station level. Even though the station level represents a much smaller geography than the Bureau level, it is still quite large (see Maps 2 and 3). Chesterfield Square and the “mall group” zip codes fall within the jurisdiction of the 77th Street Station of LAPD’s South Bureau, but portions of the “control group” zip codes do as well. Thus, this data does not provide a clear picture of where – within the broad boundaries of the Station – crime is escalating or declining. The second problem with the data is that it is a record of arrests; arrests data may – and often does – reflect changes in policing strategies rather than in the numbers of crimes actually being perpetrated. Finally, the arrest data is compiled annually, so any brief changes in crime patterns are essentially invisible here. This, however, is less of a limitation than the previous two limitations because to support the argument that the mall reduces crime, one would need to show a much longer trend of crime reduction than simply a few weeks or months. For these and other more technical reasons, the crime dataset does not lend itself to a statistical regression.

But despite the limitations of the data, and its unfitness for more advanced statistical analysis, one can gain a surprisingly clear picture of the relationship between the arrival of Chesterfield Square and crime rates in LAPD's 77th Street Station. And the picture suggests that the mall had virtually no effect on crime rates.
Map 2: LAPD’s Four Bureaus

Map 3: LAPD 77th Street Station
Arrest and crime records for the LAPD are divided into two categories; Part I and Part II crimes. Part I crimes include homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and vehicle theft. Part II crimes include forgery, fraud, illegal possession of a weapon, prostitution, liquor laws, drunkenness, disturbing the peace, and gambling. Across the period of 1996-2006, there was virtually no change in the number of Part I crimes committed in any of the four stations within the South Bureau, as Tables 15-18 show. If the arrival of Chesterfield Square reduced Part I crimes, we would expect to see a drop between 2001 and 2002 in the 77th Street Station, the station under whose jurisdiction Chesterfield Square falls. Instead, we see an essentially straight line, as we also do in the case of the Southwest Station. Where there is a small decline in Part I crimes over the period in the South Bureau, it occurs in the Harbor and Southeast Stations. Because of the data limitations, it is possible that Part I crimes declined – for example – on the streets immediately adjacent to the mall and that we cannot detect that change. But even if we allow for this possibility, it does not change the fact that the number of arrests for Part I crimes remained essentially constant, meaning that any reduction immediately surrounding the mall was offset by increases elsewhere in the 77th Street Station jurisdiction. In short, Chesterfield Square had no effect on reducing overall arrests for violent crimes.

While there is little significant change in Part I crimes throughout the entire South Bureau between 1996-2006, there is significant change in Part II crimes. Across all four stations, Part II arrests decline between 2000 and 2003 before rising again (Interviews with several LAPD sergeants suggests that declining arrests for misdemeanors during this period was a function of sagging officer morale in the face of the Consent Decree). The best evidence that it was not caused by the mall comes from looking at Part II crimes at the station level. One clearly sees that where
there was a dramatic reduction in Part II crimes, it occurred in the Harbor and Southeast Stations, while the decline was much smaller in the Southwest and 77th Street Stations.

Looking exclusively at arrests for prostitution further amplifies this point. To a greater extent than other Part II crimes, prostitution is a “street crime”, a crime which requires constant and visible access to public thoroughfares. In this regard, it is precisely the sort of crime that we might expect to decrease as a result of the arrival of a busy, well-illuminated mall like Chesterfield Square. As in the case of Part II crimes overall, we see a decrease across all four stations during the approximate period of 2001-2003, but again, the decrease is least significant in the 77th Street Station (tables 19-22). Moreover, in contrast to the other three stations, 77th Street Station actually experienced a fairly steady increase in prostitution arrests between 2002 and 2006. In short, even in the case of the victimless crime of prostitution -- where a diminishment would be only a modest contribution to an overall “reduction in crime” -- Chesterfield Square has had no significant effect.
Table 19: Prostitution Arrests, Harbor Station, 1996-2006

Table 20: Prostitution Arrests, Southeast Station, 1996-2006

Table 21: Prostitution Arrests, Southwest Station, 1996-2006

Table 22: Prostitution Arrests, 77th Street Station, 1996-2006
VIII. Conclusion: What a Mall Can and Cannot Do for the Inner City

If the opening of Chesterfield Square in South Los Angeles did not improve local housing values, did not deter criminals from committing crimes, and did not spur the expansion of job opportunities in the area, one might reasonably ask “of what value is Chesterfield Square to the community in which it is located?” My response would be that the mall only appears to have “failed” in this regard because developers, activists, and local politicians have simply expected it to do much more than one mall can reasonably be expected to do. My findings do not suggest that the free market model for inner city renewal cannot work, only that it has not worked in the case of Chesterfield Square. Given the vast size of South Los Angeles, it is perhaps not surprising that the effects of Chesterfield Square are negligible. But it would be a mistake to conclude that the free market model is not worth pursuing. Indeed, if there were more Chesterfield Squares in South Los Angeles, it is quite possible that we might begin to see substantive changes in the quality of life there. As long as the tenants remain viable and the businesses profitable, there is every reason to think that more developers will follow the footsteps of Home Depot, Food 4 Less, Starbucks and the other retailers at Chesterfield Square.
Notes


10 Marlon Boarnet and Randall Crane, “The Impact of Big Box Grocers on Southern California: Jobs, Wages, and Municipal Finances,” Prepared for the Orange County Business Council, September 1999, 1; For historic trade literature on Southern California’s retail sector, see: *California’s Retail Trade* (Los Angeles: Security First National Bank, 1983); See also, *Retailing Trends: California and Its Regions* (Los Angeles: United California Bank, 1972).


28 “New Markets: The Untapped Retail Buying Power in America’s Inner Cities” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, July 1999)


32 Thomas Tseng, “Common Paths: Connecting Metropolitan Growth to Inner City Opportunities in South Los Angeles” (Malibu, CA: Pepperdine University Institute for Public Policy, 1999)

33 Unfortunately, according to the Los Angeles Times, Mr. Hammond was financially irresponsible and intentionally bounced several hundred thousand dollars worth of checks including one for $18,000 to a liquor store owner he bought out in his attempt to assemble the parcels at Slauson and Western. But his deep political connections, which stretched back to the Bradley era, apparently insulated him from criticism at the level of the City Government, and his company secured numerous contracts for redevelopment projects throughout the city. Ted Rohrligh and Ralph Frammolin, “City Funds Flow to Check-Bouncing Developer,” Los Angeles Times, June 14 2004, a1.

34 Author’s Email correspondence with Jerry Katell.

35 Katell shared a telling anecdote about an unnamed supermarket. “One major supermarket chain turned us down because they told me their studies showed there was 46% unemployment in the area. This was in 2000 when everyone had a job. I asked for a copy of the report. Amazingly they gave it to me. They had taken the entire population in the area, from babies to 100 year olds, and only 54% were employed, hence 46% unemployment . . . their way of justifying turning down a project in this area.”


37 This data is also referred to as ES202 data.

38 LAPD also keeps records of “Basic Car Areas” which is a much smaller geography than the station geography. But these records are not published and can only be acquired through the generosity of station managers who – in my case – did not have the time, resources, or inclination to compile that data.

39 This view was explained further by an LAPD officer writing under the name Jack Dunphy in a 2003 article. “Nearly everything the typical street cop or detective does in the course of his workday is now complicated
and delayed by the labyrinthian [sic] demands of the consent decree. A simple arrest that might once have taken a pair of officers two hours to process now takes four, and if even a slight amount of force is required to take an uncooperative suspect into custody the resulting paperwork can take days or even weeks to complete and pass through the various stages of review and approval.” Jack Dunphy, “Death by Oversight: Why Criminals Love the LAPD’s Consent Decree,” National Review Online, November 18, 2003.