

The History, Development, and Policy Influence of the California Latino Legislative Caucus

Prepared by the Center for Southern California Studies, California State University, Northridge as part of the Faculty Research Fellows Program for the Center for California Studies, California State University, Sacramento

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Abstract: The California Latino Legislative Caucus (CLLC) was established in 1973 to advance the policy interests of both Latinos and the general population in California. As one of the largest legislative caucuses in the Legislature, the CLLC wields a great deal of influence over legislative committees, leadership positions, and policy outcomes. The CLLC expanded its own institutional capacity as its processes and structures became more formalized. Based on interviews with current and former Caucus members and staff as well as various other sources of data, this report examines the history, growth, development, and policy influence of the Caucus. Part I of the report provides a historical overview of the development of the CLLC. Part II explores various aspects of the growth and institutionalization of the Caucus including the development of key sub-networks, sources of Caucus unity, the routinization of Caucus procedures, and the role of leadership within the Caucus. Part III outlines the Caucus's policy agenda, roll call voting patterns, and influence on the policymaking process. Finally, the report concludes with a summary of findings and a brief discussion of the Caucus's role in the future.

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Introduction


The California Latino Legislative Caucus (CLLC) is comprised of Democratic Latino members from the California Assembly and the California Senate. Formally established in 1973, the Caucus is one of the oldest legislative caucuses in the Legislature and one of the oldest Latino legislative caucuses nationwide. Throughout its more-than 40-year history, the CLLC represented the interests of Latinos and California residents and passed legislation across a variety of policy areas.

Over the years, the CLLC grew to become one of the most influential caucuses in the California State Legislature and nationwide. In California, there are seventeen formally established caucuses representing a diversity of political interests, including political parties, particular policy areas, and historically under-represented demographic groups. In all, there are four partisan caucuses, seven caucuses dedicated to specific policy areas, and six caucuses formed around under-represented groups. Figure A compares the current membership level of all the historically under-represented group caucuses for the 2015-2016 session. Currently, the CLLC is the second largest of these caucuses with 22 legislative members—second only to the Women’s Legislative Caucus. The third largest caucus is the Jewish Caucus, followed by the Legislative Black Caucus, the Asian/Pacific Islander Caucus and the Lesbian-Gay-Bisexual-Transgender Caucus, respectively.

At the national level, the CLLC is also relatively large in comparison to other Latino caucuses. The CLLC currently holds 18 percent of the seats in the Legislature. Among the five states with the largest Latino populations—California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois—the CLLC’s seat share is second only to the Texas caucuses, which include independent caucuses

**Figure A Membership Totals
in California Legislative Caucuses
from Under-Represented Groups**

2016



from the Texas State Assembly and the Texas State Senate¹. The CLLC is also unique among other national and state Latino caucuses because the group is exclusive to Democrats and representatives of Latin-American descent. California's bicameral legislature is comprised of 80 members in the Assembly and 40 members in the Senate and so the contemporary CLLC represents a significant bloc of votes necessary to pass legislation in each chamber.

Aside from passing policy, the Caucus engages in other important activities that are critical for maintaining its size and influence. For example, the Caucus provides resources for its members seeking reelection and for Latino candidates seeking office for the first time. These endorsements send signals to a generally uninformed electorate about candidates' positions on policy (Lupia 1999). Additionally, the Caucus established a political action committee (PAC), the Latino Caucus Leadership PAC, to provide financial assistance and political support to other

¹ Although the Florida Latino Caucus has the same number of members as the CLLC (Alamo 2015), the Florida State Legislature has a larger number of seats (160 total). Thus, the Florida Latino Caucus represents a smaller proportion of the state legislature than the CLLC.

campaigns. Although the Caucus may formally endorse a candidate, it does not guarantee all endorsed candidates receive financial backing through the PAC.

Finally, the CLLC provides forums for legislators to meet with constituents and lobbyists. While the Legislature is in session, the Caucus holds meetings to provide opportunities for citizen and special interest groups to discuss issues affecting Californians. Over the past few decades, the CLLC built and maintained a professional staff, held special events to recognize leaders in the Latino community, and conducted outreach through social media and its website. These types of outreach initiatives helped the Caucus become more connected to the California electorate and interests in Sacramento.

Given the CLLC's potential to exert influence over legislative outcomes, it is important to understand the factors that contributed to the growth, development, and policy influence of the Caucus. To investigate these three areas, we relied on a mix of primary and secondary sources. Unique to this report, we conducted 21 face-to-face interviews of current and former members of the Caucus, consultants for the CLLC, and the Caucus's current and former staff members. The interviews were conducted in Sacramento in June 2016 and in Southern California throughout July and August of the same year². To supplement our interview data, we also relied on a list of significant chaptered legislation, provided to us by the Senate Research Office for the California State Legislature. The chaptered legislation includes all "significant" bills authored by members of the CLLC between 1975 and 2012³. Finally, we utilized demographic and voting data from various sources, campaign finance and election results made

² A small number of follow-up interviews were conducted over the phone. See Appendix A for all information regarding interviews with current and former CLLC members and staff, by date.

³ See Appendix B for all information regarding significant chaptered legislation.

available from the California Secretary of State’s website, and many contemporary journalistic accounts surrounding the CLLC.

This study of the California Latino Legislative Caucus is divided into three sections. Part I takes a historical approach by examining the Caucus’s growth and development through three developmentally distinct time periods. Part II provides an in-depth discussion of some of the drivers of growth in Caucus membership, the Caucus’s overall cohesion and unity, the institutional and structural development of the Caucus, and the importance of Caucus leadership. Finally, Part III describes the Caucus’s policy agenda, influence in the Legislature, and cohesion on key roll call votes. Part III also includes two case studies highlighting the policy influence of the CLLC: AB 540 (2001)—providing in-state tuition for undocumented students and AB 60 (2003)—providing driver’s licenses for undocumented immigrants in California. In summary, this reports details how the CLLC grew to become one of the most unified, institutionalized, and influential state legislative caucuses in the nation.


Part I: Historical Overview of the California Latino Legislative Caucus

The purpose of Part I is to examine the historical development of the California Latino Legislative Caucus. The developmental stages of the CLLC are broken into three distinct periods: a foundational period during the 1970s and 1980s, a period of growth in the 1990s, and a period of consolidation, professionalization, and institutionalization throughout the 2000s. The size and influence of the CLLC within the California Legislature did not happen overnight. Rather, it took several decades for the Caucus to reach its current membership levels. Figure 1.1 depicts Caucus membership between 1963 and 2016⁴. After the official establishment of the Caucus in 1973, Caucus membership varied between 5 and 7 members until 1992. Beginning with the 1992 elections, the Caucus experienced a period of substantial growth, increasing from 7 in 1992 to 24 members after the 2002 elections. By 2005, the Caucus reached its peak with 27 members. Although this total has since decreased, membership in the CLLC over the last decade has remained at least 22.

The growth and relative size of the Caucus have several implications for the group's power and influence in the Legislature. Since its inception, the CLLC increased its presence in the Legislature by actively recruiting and supporting new and incumbent Latino candidates in elections. The Caucus also placed its members in key committee chair positions—e.g., the appropriations and rules committees—and several CLLC members have been elected to floor leadership positions—e.g., Speaker of the Assembly and Senate President pro Tempore. These actions allowed the Caucus to pass significant legislation across a multitude of policy issues.

⁴ Although the Caucus officially formed in 1973, the figure begins in 1963 because Latinos were elected to the Legislature prior to the Caucus's formation.

**Figure 1.1 CLLC Membership Over Time
1963–2016**



Our interviews with former and current Caucus members—and other data examined in this section—suggest the precipitous rise of the CLLC was due to a confluence between demographic changes, electoral reform, a tumultuous political environment for Latinos in California, and the tireless efforts of leaders within the Caucus.

Laying the Foundation (1973-1990)

In 1973, five Latino legislators established the Chicano Legislative Caucus. Its founding members consisted of Joseph Montoya, Ray Gonzales, Richard Alatorre, Alex Garcia and Peter Chacón—all elected to the Assembly. The importance of these five legislators cannot be understated, as they followed on the heels of the first Latinos elected to the Legislature in the 20th Century, Phil Soto and John Moreno (elected in 1962). According to Nell Soto, the wife of Phil Soto, “they opened the door to public office for a lot of people who felt it couldn’t be done” (Woo 1999). However, Soto and Moreno’s terms were short-lived in an era without term limits; each served only two terms in office. Personal issues and competition from other Latino candidates in the Democratic primary made Moreno’s bid for re-election more challenging

(Woo 1999). Soto lost his bid for re-election after Democrats passed a 1966 reapportionment plan that split the Latino vote across Assembly districts and reduced his overall support for reelection (Thomas Jr. 1997).

According to Richard Alatorre, the idea of establishing a Caucus was initially developed during a discussion at the 1972 Democratic Convention in Florida. Alatorre was at the Convention as a delegate for Hubert Humphrey. Alatorre and his colleagues left the hall after it became clear George McGovern was going to win the presidential nomination. From there, they went to a restaurant to discuss the possibility of creating a formal caucus; thus, the Chicano Legislative Caucus was born.⁵

Based on our interviews, the decision to name the Caucus the Chicano Caucus was steeped in the historical context of the Chicano Movement⁶ of the 1960s and 1970s—a significant and turbulent period for California’s immigrant and Latino community. Prior to the Caucus’s formation, farm worker organizations—such as the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, led by César Chávez—called for farm worker’s rights in California’s Central Valley. These organizations engaged in boycotts, marches, and strikes to fight for collective bargaining agreements, higher wages, improved working conditions, and access to medical plans (García-Bedolla 2009: 69). In 1970, civil rights activists organized the Chicano Moratorium in East Los Angeles to protest the Vietnam War. Although demonstrators engaged in a peaceful protest, Los Angeles police broke up the demonstrations with violent tactics, using clubs and shooting

⁵ It is unclear to us if all five founding members attended the convention. However, Alatorre mentioned that he and other members were in attendance.

⁶ According to García-Bedolla (2009), “originally the word *Chicano* was a pejorative term for ‘Mexican-American,’ but it was purposely adopted by Mexican-American activists in the 1960s as a way to transform a negative stereotype into something positive” (p. 75).

tear gas into the crowd. The intervention of LA police resulted in the death of prominent *Los Angeles Times* reporter, Ruben Salazar (García-Bedolla 2009). The events of the 1960s and early 1970s were a clear motivation for the Caucus's original five members to form a group dedicated to the Chicano community.

Only two individuals held lengthy stints as Caucus chair during the groups early stages: Richard Alatorre and Peter Chacón. Alatorre served as the first chair between 1973 and 1978; Chacón served as the second chair between 1979 and 1990⁷. Naming Alatorre the first Caucus chair was a logical choice since he was enthusiastic about the position. In Alatorre's own words, "I was willing to do the legwork," which included traveling to districts, attending banquets, and raising campaign funds for Caucus members. More importantly, Alatorre had more time to devote to the chair position because he represented a relatively safe seat with a larger Latino population. According to Alatorre, the other Caucus members "had geographical problems"—suggesting these districts were less safe for Latino candidates. For example, both Peter Chacón and Ray Gonzalez represented districts where only 8 percent of population was Latino (Walters 2015; Rosales 2014: 76).

The early CLLC relied on legislative allies to overcome the group's smaller numbers. For instance, Alatorre and other former members of the Caucus mentioned the importance of their relationship with Willie Brown, who served as Assembly Speaker between 1980 and 1995. These relationships with leadership allowed the group to move policy initiatives through the Legislature. Part III of this report discusses the Caucus's policy agenda in further detail, but

⁷ Charles Calderon served as chair for one in year in 1987.

some of its early major accomplishments focused on education policy and immigrant students, such as the Bilingual Education Act of 1976.

The CLLC's small size meant decision-making was an informal process. According to Alatorre, members held regular meetings at their homes and restaurants. Importantly, the Caucus still required a majority of its members to agree for the Caucus to endorse legislative proposals. In the initial phases on the Caucus, this meant bill sponsorship and support required agreement between 3 out of 5 members. Our interviews also suggest the group's small size—and aforementioned electoral pressures—actually led to less group consensus. For example, in 1974 members of the Caucus attempted to pass AB 3370—a bill creating a three-member Agricultural Employees Commission to supervise secret-ballot elections and allowing unions to more heavily engage in boycotts, strikes, and existing contracts (Rosales 2014: 86). Alatorre sponsored AB 3370, which also received support from Art Torres. However, Ray Gonzalez—who represented the Kern County-area—did not support the bill in its original form. Gonzalez went as far as to propose amendments preventing farmworkers from engaging in secondary boycotts—thus, “making the bill more palatable for his more-conservative Kern County constituents” (Rosales 2014, 86). Alatorre resisted the inclusion of any amendments limiting the bargaining power of farmworkers. In the end, the bill passed the Assembly in its original form, but opponents kept the bill from reaching Senate floor (Pawel 2010: 149). As this example shows, the early CLLC's size and internal conflict meant the group exerted very little direct influence over the legislative process; the group had to choose their battles wisely.

The relationships forged by the founding members of the CLLC with Sacramento's political elite laid the foundation for the success of the next generation of Latino legislators. In 1981, Speaker Willie Brown appointed Alatorre to chair of the Elections and Reapportionment

Committee, charged with redrawing district boundaries. While Alatorre knew he needed to ensure the maintenance of African-American and Democratic seats, he also sought to increase the number of districts favoring Latinos. Accordingly, “Alatorre managed to create sixteen new districts with a minimum Hispanic population of 30 percent, up from the previous ten districts” (Richardson 1996: 281). Some Latino activists were critical of the plan, believing Alatorre did not do enough to increase the percentage of Latinos in these districts (Quinn 1988, 50-52). However, as shown in the next section, it is clear his efforts to redraw district boundaries benefited Latino candidates in the long run.

[An Era of Growth \(1991-2002\)](#)

The second distinct era of Caucus development occurred between 1991 and 2002. In comparison to previous years, this particular period is best described as an era of exponential growth in which the Caucus grew in size, from 7 to 22 members. This dramatic change in membership increased the Caucus’s presence in both chambers; although, growth came later in the Senate—the result of an “echo effect” detailed in Part II of this report. In 1991, there were 4 CLLC members in the Assembly and 3 CLLC members in the Senate. By 2002, the Caucus’s legislative presence had grown dramatically, as the Caucus held 15 seats in the Assembly and 7 seats in the Senate.

The growth the Caucus during this time period can be attributed to four factors: Caucus leadership, demographic changes in the state, the political context, and changes to California’s electoral rules. In terms of Caucus leadership, Richard Polanco is credited by most everyone we spoke with for leading the recruitment effort in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.

Polanco was elected to the Assembly in 1986 in a special election to fill the unexpired term of Alatorre, who was elected to the Los Angeles City Council in the same year. For the next two

decades, Polanco represented the 55th and 45th districts in the Assembly (1986-1994) and the 22nd district in the Senate (1995-2002). Prior to term in office, Polanco served as staffer for Los Angeles County Supervisor Edmund Edelman and as staff for Richard Alatorre. Given his work for Alatorre and other ties to the CLLC, Polanco became the “heir apparent” to lead the Caucus into the 1990s. He would go on to hold the chair position for 12 consecutive years between 1991 and 2002.

Early in his term as chair, Polanco changed the name of the Chicano Legislative Caucus to the California Latino Legislative Caucus⁸. Polanco and the rest of the Caucus recognized California’s population was becoming more ethnically diverse. For many years, California’s Latino population was predominantly of Mexican-national origin (Gey, Jiang, Stiles, and Einowski 2004). However, in the 1980s a new generation of immigrants arrived from other parts of Latin America, including Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Thus, members of the Caucus sought to be more inclusive by using the pan-ethnic identifier instead.

Changing the name of the Caucus was uncontroversial among members at the time, but the change speaks volumes about Polanco’s approach to the development of the CLLC. Polanco’s true impact on Caucus membership was his involvement in the election of a new group of Latino legislators. There is no question this growth would not have been nearly as rapid or as great unless Polanco and others worked to identify, recruit, and assist local candidates. Indeed, this work requires someone to be involved in a district-by-district basis, and, because state legislative candidates are rarely political neophytes, it means identifying and

⁸ Although debatable, the term “Latino” is generally a pan-ethnic term that has been used to describe individuals whose ancestors immigrated from one of the 22 Latin American countries formally colonized by Spain (Garcia and Sanchez 2008, 7).

grooming those legislative candidates at the local level. Only half-jokingly, Former Assemblymember and current U.S. Representative, Tony Cárdenas, explained that Polanco didn't seem to sleep. "Polanco just plain had more hours in the day," he said.

Once a candidate was identified, Polanco told us his formula for winning was simple. First, he would tell candidates some version of this: "you walk your district, speak to the issues, and you raise money, and you worry about nothing else. If you can't raise money, I'll help." Polanco also frequently ran candidates (and usually won) in primaries against other Latino Democrats. According to Polanco, in districts where there was a Democratic incumbent or a candidate backed by the party, fellow Democrats were not supposed to run. "I broke that rule," Polanco said to us. Instead, Polanco would let Assembly Speaker Willie Brown know ahead of time and move forward in helping candidates in these contested elections. One example was Cruz Bustamante, who found himself in a primary race against an African-American candidate, Jacqueline Hodge, backed by the Speaker. The impact of these recruitment and electoral strategies cannot be overstated. Representative Cárdenas told us he thought the Latino Caucus would be about half its current size if not for Polanco.


To be sure, Richard Polanco didn't do it alone. Others, such as Martha Escutia, helped lay the foundation, and, as the Caucus grew, other members and staffers aided Polanco in campaigning, fundraising, and organizing around the state in each election cycle. However, most conversations with CLLC members come back to Polanco. Current Latino Caucus Chair, Assemblymember Luis Alejo remarked, "Some of us that are former staffers, we realize we're not here by accident." According to Alejo, Polanco was "the architect" of the present-day Caucus. For this reason, Alejo stated, "we have a responsibility" to keep the Caucus going and to build on it.

In addition to Caucus leadership, the growth of the Caucus occurred against the backdrop of a changing demographic landscape in California and across the U.S. Polanco and the CLLC also recognized these changes. Figure 1.2 compares the adult Latino population in California from 1950 to 2010. In 1950, Latinos accounted for a little more than 7 percent of the total California residential population. The Latino population stayed relatively stable over the 1950s and 1960s—increasing to a little less than 11 percent of the state’s population. However, the number of Latinos in California increased dramatically during the ensuing decades, and, by 1990, the Latinos made up nearly one-quarter of state’s total population (Gey, Jiang, Stiles, and Einowski 2004). Today, Latinos represent the largest racial/ethnic group in California.

The growth in the Latino population in California can be attributed to significant changes in the nation’s immigration policy. In 1965, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act, which ended a long-standing national origins quota system that favored immigrants from Canada and northwestern European countries. In its place, the law established annual limits of 20,000 migrants from any country, but the new law also included exemptions for those who were relatives of U.S. citizens—undoubtedly benefited immigrants from Latin America, whose relatives were already residing in the U.S. By the 1980s, the number of new immigrant arrivals from Latin American outpaced immigrants from Europe nearly 2 to 1 (Lopez, Passel, and Rohal 2015).

Additionally, many Latinos became involved in California politics because of anti-immigrant policies passed during in the latter part of the 20th century. In the early 1990s, California experienced high unemployment and economic downturn. At the same time, Republican Governor Pete Wilson and his allies advanced a set of policies that had the effect of mobilizing a new generation of Latino voters. In 1994, California passed Proposition 187, which

Figure 1.2 Latinos as Percent of Total California Population
BY DECADE
1950-2010



denied social services and public education to undocumented immigrants. Two years later voters would adopt Proposition 209, ending affirmative action in the public sector. Then, in 1998, Californians voted to end bilingual education in California’s public education system. Although a federal district court would later place an injunction on Proposition 187, the bans on affirmative action and bilingual education in California remain.

The push for these various policies had two notable effects. First, it pushed Latinos even closer to the Democratic Party. During Governor Wilson’s 1994 bid for re-election, a Field Poll indicated 73 percent of Latinos preferred the Democratic candidate, Kathleen Brown (Monogan III and Doctor 2016). The tumultuous politics of the 1990s also had a similar effect on Latinos voting in national elections. In 1988, 65 percent of Latinos voted for the Democratic presidential candidate. By 1996—two years after the passage of Proposition 187—the figure rose to 75 percent (Barreto 2013). Indeed, the laws passed during the 1990s had lasting effects on Latinos and their voting behavior. Since the 1990s, more than 70 percent of Latinos in California have consistently voted in favor of the Democratic presidential candidate.

Second, the policies of Governor Wilson’s term encouraged Latino non-citizens to become naturalized citizens to gain the right to vote. Between 1992 and 2000, Latinos increased their share of the California electorate from 9.6 percent to 13.9 percent (Damore and Pantoja 2013: 14). Not only were newly-naturalized Latinos more likely to vote (Barreto, Ramírez, and Woods 2005), but they were also more likely to identify with the Democratic Party by a nearly 6 to 1 margin during the latter half of the 1990s (Damore and Pantoja 2013: 2). Thus, the political environment of the 1990s helped to build and motivate a new pool of voters, impacting California elections for years to come. As Rob Stutsman, a strategist for the Republican Party remarked, “There are a lot of second-generation Latinos in California who participate as voters who have trouble identifying with the Republican Party because of what is perceived as—and in some cases legitimately so—an anti-Latino immigrant bias among Republican politicians and Republican voters.” He went on to say, “to hear about your parents—who came here to make a better life for your family—described as illegals is a cultural divide” (Decker 2014).

During the 1990s, two major institutional changes contributed to the election of new Latino representatives and the growth of the Caucus: the creation of term limits in the Legislature and redistricting. In 1990, California voters approved the passage of Proposition 140, which limited members of the Assembly to three two-year terms and members of the Senate to two four-year terms. The new term limits led to high turnover in the Legislature, pushing incumbents out office⁹ and opening doors for new candidates—especially those from

⁹ The early departure of some state legislators forced special elections to fill open seats. According to Cain and Kousser (2004), “there were at least four special elections every year except one from 1990 and 1995” (14).

historically under-represented groups. Although some incumbents chose to leave office before their term expired, the new term limits true impact came in 1996—when incumbent Assembly began to term out of office. By 2004, the proposition removed all incumbent legislators who served consecutive terms in both chambers (Cain and Kousser 2004: 14).

Redistricting also contributed to the election of Latino representatives and the growth of the Caucus. Just prior to the 1992 elections, a court-appointed panel of judges made changes to district boundaries after Pete Wilson and the Democratically-controlled legislature failed to agree on a redistricting plan (Mosich 2005). The plan led to the creation of 22 Assembly districts and 10 Senate districts with Latino populations larger than 30 percent—a threshold important for determining where to recruit Latino candidates. The new redistricting plan created 9 Assembly districts and 3 Senate districts with majority-minority (Latino) populations¹⁰. Although the 1990 round of redistricting was out of the hands of the Legislature, the changes created new opportunities for Latino candidates to compete in districts historically held by white legislators.

The ensuing increase in membership of the CLLC and the changing landscape of California politics led to important milestones for the Caucus. Perhaps most significantly, Cruz Bustamante became the first Latino Speaker of the Assembly in 1996. In our interview with

¹⁰ The California Statewide Database was used for all Census information. According to Segura and Woods (2006), majority-minority districts refer to “electoral districts drawn with a sufficient minority population so that the minority population can elect a choice” (133, footnote 2). Although there is some debate over the meaning of “sufficient,” the authors reason the percentage typically ranges between 55 and 65 percent. The creation of majority-minority districts was facilitated by amendments made to the Voting Rights Act in 1982. These amendments stated members of a protected class must have “equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of choice”—an attempt by Congress to clarify its legislative intent and protect historically marginalized groups. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *Thornburg v. Gingles (1986)* these amendments were “widely interpreted to mean that states must create majority-minority districts wherever possible” (Gay 2001, 8).

Bustamante, he credited the Caucus for supporting one another and facilitating political gains. He noted, “the CLLC members stuck together. They helped one another. It became a thing. People came to the CLLC if they wanted help because it would bring a bunch of people along.” During his tenure in the Legislature, Bustamante played a key role in securing funding for U.C. Merced, helped to secure funding for food stamps program for children who are legal immigrants (Morain and Vanzi 1997), and authored legislation to allow the Attorney General to sue tobacco companies (Gladstone 1997). Bustamante would go on to serve two years as Speaker before becoming the first Latino Lieutenant Governor in California’s modern history. Needless to say, electing a Latino Speaker allowed the CLLC to exert a great deal of influence within the Legislature.

An Era of Political Influence (2003-Current)

Following the elections of 2002, the CLLC entered into a period of unparalleled influence in the Legislature. After Polanco termed out of office, the CLLC continued to grow. By 2005, its membership increased to 27—the group’s peak. Although its membership levels have since decreased to 22 members in the current legislative session, the CLLC continues to maintain its presence across both chambers of the Legislature. Additionally, the Caucus made major inroads into new regions of California throughout the 2000s. Figures 1.3 and 1.4, for example, depict the dramatic growth of the Caucus at the district-level. Between 1991 and 2005, the group achieved electoral victories in new areas of the state, including the Central Coast, the Bay Area, and the Central Valley. While such victories expanded the Caucus’s presence throughout


Figure 1.3
Latino
Legislative
Caucus
in the
California Assembly
1991-1992



California, the Caucus's geographical diversity also meant represented more diverse political interests.

The departure of Polanco in 2002 was another turning point for the Caucus. First, it created an opportunity for other members to become Caucus chair—a position held by Polanco for 12 consecutive years. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Caucus chairs after Polanco used the size of the Caucus to push a more diverse policy agenda. The Caucus leadership and their key legislative initiatives are further explored in Parts II and III of this report.

Figure 1.4
Latino
Legislative
Caucus
in the
California Assembly
2005-2006



While increased numbers in the CLLC created larger coalitions within the Legislature, the growth of the Caucus also created the potential for divisions within the group. One such division surfaced over Alex Padilla’s SB 405 (2013), the controversial ban on single-use plastic bags. The bill was backed by the California Grocer’s Association, which sought to have a uniform law that would offer “consistency and predictability both to consumers and business

trying to navigate a patchwork of varying county and city rules” (White 2013). Some Caucus members, including Senator Ricardo Lara and Senator Kevin de León, opposed the measure, arguing the bill would negatively impact immigrant families and plastic-bag manufacturers in their districts (Rosenhall 2014). Padilla, however, was able to win the support of his colleagues by attaching a \$2 million loan for plastic bag manufactures so that manufacturers could shift their operations to reusable bags, which was permitted under the bill (Associated Press 2014). Though not unique, this conflict and its resolution are emblematic intra-group conflict created by a larger, more diverse CLLC.

Despite such constituency-based differences, the CLLC managed to remain largely unified behind key policy initiatives throughout the 2000s. Caucus leadership facilitated this unity through on-going efforts to establish a clear policy agenda. In recent years, the CLLC created a formal decision-making process within the group to identify a specific subset of “priority bills”—legislation the Caucus (mostly) agrees to support¹¹. The Caucus also recently established annual policy summit for its members. The purpose of the summit is to hear from experts on specific policy issues and determine the group’s legislative agenda for the year. Partly because of these processes, the CLLC’s roll call voting record is remarkably unified on key legislative proposals. The group’s unity on key roll call votes is explored further in Part III of this report.

Another vital aspect of the CLLC’s legislative success is the placement of Caucus members into key legislative roles. Currently, Caucus members hold 14 committee chair/vice chair positions and five leadership positions, including the chairs to the Assembly and Senate

¹¹ Current policy priorities and legislation are made available on the Caucus’s website.

Appropriations Committees, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the Senate President pro Tempore. Control over legislative gatekeeping positions allows the CLLC to exert a great deal of influence over the state's budgetary process and the overall agendas of both chambers in the Legislature.

Finally, the current era of Caucus growth is marked by the group's expansion as a political organization. The Caucus is currently made up of three entities: The legislative caucus, a political action committee (PAC), and a non-profit foundation. The CLLC's legislative arm is documented through this section of the report, and refers strictly to the CLLC members and their staff working in the Legislature. In 2009, the CLLC created the California Latino Caucus Leadership PAC. The PAC's creation and fundraising activities are detailed in Part II of this report. Finally, the California Latino Legislative Caucus Foundation (CLLCF) focuses on the group's scholarship program, annual policy summit, and annual Spirit Awards¹². The addition of the California Latino Leadership Caucus PAC and CLLCF allowed the CLLC to extend its influence beyond the policymaking process in Sacramento. The CLLC now has an institutionalized presence in California's election and Latino community, ensuring the group's place as an important player in California politics for years to come.

Summary

The California Latino Legislative Caucus is one of the oldest and arguably most powerful ethnic-based caucuses in the California Legislature. In 1973, five Latino members of the Assembly took it upon themselves to establish an informal legislative caucus, despite their meager numbers. During the ensuing decades, the Caucus's membership substantially

¹² The Spirit Awards highlight positive role models in the Latino community.

increased. A growing Latino population in California— and a policy environment that energized many Latino voters —helped to facilitate the election of many Latino Democrats during this time period. The creation of term limits in the 1990s also provided new opportunities for Latino candidates to run for seats historically held by white legislators. More importantly, the electoral gains of the 1990s would not have been possible without the leadership of Richard Polanco. Finally, the contemporary era of the Caucus is highlighted by the unparalleled legislative influence and professionalization of the group. During this period, the Caucus capitalized on its numbers by pursuing a robust policy agenda and moving its members into key leadership positions within the Legislature. The Caucus further consolidated its gains by developing new institutional structures and formal processes to enhance its influence. Part II of this report expands on these institutional developments in greater detail.

Part II – The Growth, Organization, and Institutional Development of the CLLC

As we learned in Part I of this report, there is much more to the story of the CLLC's growth and development than just demographic change in California. In Part II, we dive a little deeper into some key parts of that story by looking at some of the specific patterns of growth in membership, leadership and unity of the Caucus, and the structures and institutions the CLLC built to leverage its legislative influence over time. Perhaps the best way to summarize the growth, organization, and institutional development of the CLLC is to say that the CLLC has matured. It is no longer a small collection of members who seek to find common ground and act in unison when they can. The CLLC is now a powerful institution in its own right, with a regularized set of processes for determining and pursuing its policy priorities. The CLLC built formal and informal campaign infrastructure around the state to recruit future Latino leaders, expanded its institutional power within the Assembly and the Senate, and developed rules and norms that are intended to foster and maintain unity and cohesion within the Caucus.

Sub-networks

When the Caucus ranged from 5 to 7 members for its first two decades, almost all of the Caucus members were from southern California and most were from the greater Los Angeles metro area. But as the Latino Caucus grew rapidly in the 1990s, it did so in large part by seeding and growing various sub-networks of elected officials in various parts of the state. One particular strategy the Caucus's Chair, Richard Polanco, employed to grow their numbers was to identify promising districts, work hard to win that first race in order to plant the seeds of a new sub-network in the area, and then let that sub-network grow on its own with outside assistance the Caucus. In this sense, Polanco's leadership seems to have shifted over time from working

one-by-one to elect individual candidates to office to building a candidate-service organization. Candidates in other parts of the state would get help from Polanco with fundraising, messaging, organization, etc., freeing up the Caucus leadership to begin planting seeds in other fertile districts across the state.

One example of the construction of what we call “sub-networks” was in the northeast San Fernando Valley. When 16-year incumbent, Assemblymember Richard Katz, announced he would step down from his 39th district seat in 1996, the LA Times reported that 32-year-old Tony Cárdenas, a local realtor, “was handpicked by Latino political leaders, Los Angeles City Councilman Richard Alarcon and state Senator Richard Polanco (D-Los Angeles), to become the Valley’s first Latino state lawmaker” (Hill-Holtzman 1996). Alarcon had just won a Los Angeles City Council seat in the area a few years earlier so the rise of Latino voting and political power in the area was still somewhat new and there was no Latino state lawmaker from the Valley. Despite the fact that the district was 62% Latino, voter registration rates were very low among Latinos in the district (and statewide), and Cárdenas faced two strong, well-financed opponents in Valerie Salkin and Jim Dantona. Salkin was endorsed by the Democratic Party of the San Fernando Valley and the National Women’s Political Caucus (Gorman 1996) while Dantona had support from law enforcement groups, labor unions, and other groups (Hill, Chu, and Cheevers 1996). Martha Escutia, who was serving her second term in the Assembly at the time, told us this was one of those seats Polanco and other Caucus members like herself had their eye on as they began to build numbers ahead of the 2000 round of redistricting.

When Cárdenas won, he did it with the help of many young staffers. 21-year-old Alex Padilla ran Cárdenas’s campaign and, early on, he brought in high school friends, Felipe Fuentes and Raul Bocanegra, to help. Of course, all three would later become members of the Latino

Caucus themselves. This campaign, therefore, served not only to elect the San Fernando Valley's first Latino state lawmaker. It began the process of building a sub-network of Latino staffers and elected officials in the area that created their own base of support. We'll discuss the implications of that kind of political network a bit more below but the key point for our purposes here is that this model was replicated in various spots throughout the state, such as the Inland Empire, Imperial Valley, San Diego, the San Joaquin Valley, and the Monterey and Bay Areas. Polanco and the CLLC didn't just build numbers. They built an organization that could be replicated and would become self-sustaining in various parts of the state.

It is important to note that these sub-networks become significant both in terms of identifying, recruiting, and grooming future staffers and elected officials (electoral sub-networks) and in terms of policymaking (legislative coalitions). We mentioned above that Padilla, Fuentes, and Bocanegra have since run and served in the Legislature and in the CLLC. Padilla served on the Los Angeles City Council, as a state Senator representing the area, and now serves as California's highest-ranking Latino state-wide elected official as Secretary of State. Felipe Fuentes served in the Assembly and now represents the area on the L.A. City Council. Raul Bocanegra worked as Chief of Staff for Fuentes while he was in the Assembly and then served a term in the Assembly himself. Bocanegra told us "When people think of Latino / Chicano power bases, they think of East L.A. / Boyle Heights and those power bases. Alarcon and Cárdenas changed that." Tony Cárdenas himself, of course, served in the City Council after being termed out of the state legislature and currently serves in the U.S. House of Representatives, representing the area. These networked individuals thus create an important kind of policy sub-network linking officials at the federal, state, county, and local levels of government.

These sub-networks grew and expanded over time. Richard Alarcon had moved from the City Council to the State Senate in 1998; among his staffers were Cindy Montañez and Nury Martinez. When Tony Cárdenas was termed out in 2002, Cindy Montañez ran for the seat and her campaign was managed by Nury Martinez, who later ran for and won a seat on the LA City Council (Smith 2013). Like any family, especially a family in which members are burdened by strict term limits, there are also squabbles and fights that occur from time to time. When Cindy Montañez ran for her Assembly seat, she squared off against Yolanda Fuentes, a candidate backed by Cárdenas and Padilla. Four years later, Padilla and Montañez opposed one another in the Democratic primary for a Senate seat, a race Padilla won. When Felipe Fuentes left the Assembly for the City Council, Raul Bocanegra (with the backing of Tony Cárdenas and Felipe Fuentes among others) ran and won against Richard Alarcon. And, years later, Montañez lost in a race for City Council against her former campaign manager, Nury Martinez.

The point of outlining all of these connections and history in this one sub-network is that these sub-networks grow and expand creating new links among members; the sub-networks also lead to conflict as their policy preferences and their ambitions sometimes put them on opposite sides of the same campaign. The old saying (most-often attributed to former U.S. House Speaker Tip O'Neill) that "all politics is local" truly applies here. It is even local to the sub-networks within sub-networks. The Latino Caucus tries to stay out of these intra-sub-network battles and has even included a provision in its bylaws that the Caucus does not endorse in a race where a current or former member of the Caucus is running against a current or former member of the Caucus. The group also chooses to stay out of races in some other cases where picking sides in an intra-sub-network battle occurs. When Richard Alarcon ran for the Assembly against Felipe Fuentes's Chief of Staff, Raul Bocanegra, the Caucus stayed neutral,

though some individual Caucus members still endorsed and got involved on their own. This year, as Raul Bocanegra is running against current CLLC member, Patty Lopez, the Caucus has given a “dual endorsement,” remaining neutral while still supporting the current and former members.

The example provided above of the sub-network from the northeast San Fernando Valley is replicated in other parts of the state. In telling us about how he got started in politics, Caucus member Freddie Rodriguez, who represents parts of the Inland Empire, explained that he was mentored by Norma Torres—then Mayor of Pomona. Rodriguez explained, “She helped mentor me” and helped him “figure out how to get things done.” Torres preceded Rodriguez in the Assembly and now represents the area in the U.S. House of Representatives. Torres, in turn, was preceded in the Assembly by Nell Soto, who served in both the Assembly and the Senate. Joe Baca was another Caucus member who was part of this sub-network and he also served in the Assembly, Senate, and U.S. House. And, of course, Soto’s late husband, Phil Soto, was elected to the Assembly in 1962 as one of the first Latino members of the state legislature in the modern era.

Similar sub-networks exist in southern San Diego County, the Imperial Valley, the Central Valley, and Monterrey County, where current Latino Caucus Chair, Assemblymember Luis Alejo serves. Alejo was preceded in this district by Anna Caballero and Simón Salinas. It is arguably the case that starting these sub-networks is the hard part. For this reason, we emphasize the importance of entrepreneurial Caucus chairs like Polanco, Firebaugh, and Escutia, who traveled all over the state seeking to identify candidates in new regions where the demographic changes might be such to support the next generation of Latino elected officials. Former Caucus Chair, Martha Escutia, commented that she was “gunning for” a win in the

Salinas / Gilroy area in advance of the 2000 round of redistricting. In helping Simón Salinas to win that first race for Assembly, she told us she lived out of a motel in the area for six straight weeks. Tony Cárdenas related to us that he recalled having a big mailer ready to go in his first campaign but he didn't have the \$17,000 in his campaign account to pay for the postage. Polanco sent an aide with a cashier's check the same day to get the mailer done.

In a similar vein, Cruz Bustamante—the first Latino Democrat from the Central Valley to serve since Ray Gonzales in the early 1970s—told us that he felt like he “had no role models” for how to be a successful Latino candidate in the Central Valley in 1993. In fact, he said, “I was the only Latino that I knew of that was a staffer for an elected official in the Central Valley.” But when his boss, Assemblymember Bruce Bronzan, resigned in 1993, Bustamante found himself running for the seat in a special election. Richard Polanco showed up and helped him win. From there, others have followed suit, including Dean Florez, Sarah Reyes, Juan Arambula, Nicole Parra, Henry Perea, and the newest member of the Latino Caucus, Joaquin Arambula.

In sum, we see a repeated pattern: the Caucus identifies a new area where they might succeed and a candidate who the Caucus might be able to help. If successful, a sub-network grows up around that initial win leading to a group of elected officials and staffers who follow in their footsteps. Luis Alejo told us that the Latino Caucus has “learned how to foster candidates.” He argues it really started with Richard Polanco finding candidates, helping them raise money, and placing Latinos in gateway political roles, such as parks commissions, planning commissions, etc. It is about “building a bench” Polanco said. Importantly, he added, “We have a responsibility to add that next step.”

The implications of these sub-networks for governing will be explored in the section below on the policy influence of the Caucus. But, for our purposes here, it is enough to make

two general points. First, the existence of these sub-networks is a significant part of the story of how the Latino Caucus grew so rapidly in the 1990s and how the Caucus has maintained its numbers. Second, the existence of these sub-networks means that there are built-in networks of elected officials at the local, county, state, and federal level that continue to work together over decades, even in an era of term limits. In an era when parties are weaker in terms of their ability to foster connections between like-minded legislators, these kinds of local networks play a big role in keeping the wheels of government moving.

Caucus Leadership

In our interviews with current and former Caucus members and staff, we were told over and over that the leadership of the Caucus at any given point in time is critical to the Caucus's success, and other data corroborate this line of thinking as well (more on this in Part III). The discussion of Richard Polanco's leadership in growing the Caucus in Part I is certainly an example of that. Just as the Caucus was beginning to grow rapidly in the early 1990s, the decision was made to formalize the Caucus's operations by writing bylaws. At some point after Senator Polanco left office, the Caucus amended its bylaws to both impose a 2-year limit on the tenure of Caucus chairs and decided that the chair position should alternate every two years between a member of the Assembly and a member of the Senate. Martha Escutia, recalled taking part in the discussion over term limits and the idea to shift the position back and forth between the chambers. In her view, there have been positives and negatives to this arrangement. Moving the chair around creates a greater sense of collective ownership and responsibility for the Caucus among members--creating greater connections between members and the chair. On the other hand, Escutia also recognized that the frequent replacement of

Caucus chairs made it difficult to “establish good campaign infrastructure” and to establish continuity and stability.

In the first 30 years of its existence (1973-2002), just four men (they were all men) served as chair—Richard Alatorre, Peter Chacón, Charles Calderon, and Richard Polanco (Calderon only served for a year). In the 14 years since, there have been 7 Caucus chairs. From our interviews, it is clear that in the view of current and former members and staff, the Caucus’s direction, energy, and unity in those 14 years have generally been a reflection of the chair. One former Caucus staffer told us, the “perception of the Caucus changes as the leader of the Caucus changes. The Caucus does its best when the Caucus stands for something.” Similarly, another staffer told us, “strong leadership keeps us on the same page.”

Assemblymember Richard Alatorre helped found the Caucus and led it as Chair for its first 6 years when it was called the Chicano Caucus. Alatorre described his time in the Caucus as “laying a foundation.” “What I contributed to the thing was redistricting,” he said. Though the numbers stayed at 7 by the end of the 1980s, the stage had been set for the work Polanco (who had served as a staffer for Alatorre before getting elected to the Assembly himself) was able to do in the 1990s. Alatorre told us, “Richard Polanco learned how to pick seats and right at the end, he’d get it funded.”

Of course, much of Polanco’s 12-year stint as chair from 1991 to 2002 was spent growing the Caucus’s numbers and that story has already been outlined in Part I above. But it is worth noting here that the CLLC did have some important legislative victories during those years, particularly in the later years of Polanco’s time as chair when the membership of the CLLC reached and exceeded 20. AB 540 was one such landmark victory but there were others,

such as like AB 2779 (1998)—providing cash assistance to aged, blind, and disabled immigrants—and SB 1373 (1994)—establishing March 31 as César Chávez Day, a state holiday.

When Polanco stepped down from the Senate and as Caucus chair in 2002, his young protégé, Assemblymember Marco Firebaugh, took over the reins. Like many Caucus members and staffers, Firebaugh had started his work in Sacramento as an intern and Polanco later hired him (McLellan 2006). Senator Polanco told us that even back then, Firebaugh “was an extraordinary young man” with “an incredible work ethic.” By 1998, after graduating from UCLA Law School, Firebaugh was elected to the Assembly from the 50th district¹³.

Firebaugh’s influence on the Caucus began well before his tenure as chair and the best way to describe that influence is to say that Firebaugh’s office was an incubator for young staffers and interns, so many of whom later spilled out from Firebaugh’s office into other staff positions and, in some cases, legislative seats of their own. Across our interviews, Firebaugh’s name came up in almost every case, especially as we asked about legislators’ backgrounds. Speaking on the rise of the Caucus’s numbers and power in the legislature, former Senator Martha Escutia remarked, “It all goes back to Marco and Polanco in terms of staffers building a network.” Juan Torres, now Deputy Chief of Staff for Assembly Speaker Anthony Rendon, went to work for Firebaugh after completing a stint as a Senate Fellow. He said, “Those of us who worked for Firebaugh learned how to work. He elevated my game and taught me how to be operational.” Assemblymember Eduardo Garcia mentioned being inspired by meeting Polanco and Firebaugh while working on Joey Acuna’s campaign. Senator Ricardo Lara was a staffer working for Senator Nell Soto when he went to work for Firebaugh to help pass AB 540. He

¹³ Firebaugh succeeded Martha Escutia, who had been termed out of the Assembly and had moved on to the Senate

eventually became Firebaugh's Chief of Staff. In speaking with us, he recalled how dynamic the Caucus was under Firebaugh's leadership. "I loved it. I loved being in the room while these big issues were being debated." Adriana Sanchez-Ochoa, who currently is Liaison to the Caucus for Assembly Speaker Anthony Rendon, told us she left a good job in the corporate world to go work as a receptionist for Firebaugh. She said there was a "pay it forward" mentality emanating from Firebaugh's office and the continued presence of this "Firebaugh network" in Sacramento is evidence of that.

Firebaugh also had a tremendous impact on policy in a short time. As Richard Polanco told us, "Marco took the Caucus to the next level." One staffer remarked that, because Firebaugh took over the Caucus at a point when the number of members was reaching its current levels for the first time, Firebaugh shifted the focus towards using those numbers to enact legislation. For instance, we were told that, for the first time, the Caucus put together a budget document. Serving concurrently as Majority Leader and Caucus Chair, Firebaugh pushed forward clean air legislation specifically intended to improve the health of low-income communities, like the one he represented. He also focused his influence on appointments to the California Supreme Court and leadership positions on University of California and California State University campuses.

After being termed out in 2004, Firebaugh began to campaign for Martha Escutia's Senate seat (she was termed out in 2006) but he fell ill and passed away in March 2006. Firebaugh's passing is still a difficult topic for current and former legislators and staffers who worked with him. Senator Ricardo Lara, Firebaugh's former Chief of Staff told us, "It was devastating. He had done so much good work and who is going to carry this on?" The answer, of course, was all of those former interns and staffers (like Lara). So many of them have

become powerful legislators and influential staffers in their own right; this was the lasting impact Firebaugh had on both the Caucus and the Legislature, as a whole.

As a close ally of both Polanco and Firebaugh (to put it into the context above, they were all part of the same sub-network in Los Angeles politics), Martha Escutia's time as chair (2005-2006) represented a general continuation of the leadership of the Caucus. However, Escutia also put her own stamp on the Caucus. For one thing, she is the only woman to have served as Caucus chair (she also served as the chair of the California Legislative Women's Caucus). During Escutia's tenure, the Caucus's policy priorities turned towards issues that included childhood obesity, health care, and education issues. This broadly progressive agenda also reflected the fact that the Caucus, under Escutia, reached its peak in membership—27 members overall, including 11 Latinas overall. The end of Escutia's time as chair marked another endpoint of sorts. Escutia had been part of the first wave of new CLLC members elected to the Caucus as the group first began to grow in the wake of the 1992 election. She had served the maximum 14 years under the 1990 term limits law across the Assembly and Senate. This time marker represented a generational shift within the CLLC.

Assemblymember Joe Coto assumed leadership of the Caucus in 2007 and, describing this period, one staffer told us, "Things started getting more moderate, we were working more with interest groups." Representing a district in San Jose, Coto was the first Caucus chair from outside southern California. As such, his policy preferences may simply have been out of step with the more progressive center of gravity in the Caucus. He was followed as chair by Gil Cedillo, who served for two years and then by Tony Mendoza, who served for approximately one year. Many current and former members and staffers described this 5-year period (2007 – 2011) as one in which the Caucus was not as unified as it had been. One former member who

was not in the Caucus at that time told us, “I got disillusioned by the Caucus” during that period. One current member of the Caucus went so far as to say the Caucus had been “a shambles” during that time and another simply said there was some “turmoil” in that period. Another former member explained the Caucus’s policy agenda in that period was too much a reflection of the Caucus chairs and there just wasn’t enough of a collective mentality. One staffer speculated term limits and the increased number of Caucus members with shared district borders contributed to the problem. There was sometimes an attitude of “I’m going to run against you so I’m not going to collaborate,” and so this was a structural problem that perhaps had nothing to do with the chair at any given point in time.

Whatever the reason, there also seemed to be a sense among those we spoke to that things changed once Ricardo Lara became Caucus chair in 2012. Richard Alatorre told us “I think what Ricardo Lara has done is to institutionalize it further.” For one, Lara brought on additional staff, hiring Willie Guerrero as a Principal Consultant¹⁴ for the Caucus, adding a seasoned capital hand to the existing staff. Guerrero told us that Lara brought him on to try to bring the Caucus “to the next level” and to more effectively “harness their political influence.” He also told us that Lara’s leadership style was “about helping each individual member.” This approach might mean holding a hearing in a member’s district or it might mean working with a member on specific legislation. Lara also decided to give the Caucus more focus by having the Caucus develop a short list of legislative priorities each year. For his part, Lara reflected on what he learned while serving as Caucus chair. He clearly understood that the Caucus has much greater influence than it did 20 years before and knew the group’s influence is only enduring if

¹⁴ This term denotes a specific job classification and payscale, not rank within Caucus staff.

the Caucus is able to work with others. He said that it was critical to work to leverage the Caucus's numbers while working with the Speaker and the Senate President pro Tempore, but he also said that the Caucus has to think about the question, "How do we treat folks now that 'we're' in power?"

Lara's successor and current Caucus Chair, Luis Alejo, continued the practice of having the Caucus develop a short list of priority legislation. He said, "We've learned to use our collective membership to focus on a short list and get our priorities into law." He added that the greater numbers and the greater geographic diversity of the membership (Alejo himself represents the Salinas / Gilroy area) is a key strength of today's Latino Caucus. "The expertise that the Latino Caucus members have has grown and been amplified over the years." The Caucus has also become more sophisticated in how it seeks to build coalitions, he said. Finally, Alejo also pointed out that the recent changes to the term limit laws¹⁵ are making it easier for the Caucus to come together. He said, "It is very evident people are trying to build relationships now because they'll be here a while."

Taking the view of Caucus leadership from 30,000 feet, there does seem to have been a generational shift of sorts in Caucus leadership in the last few years. It is notable that Ricardo Lara, Luis Alejo, and Ben Hueso, the last two Caucus chairs and the next Caucus chair were all elected for the first time in 2010. In our conversations with current and former Caucus members, this generational shift is something that came up a lot. One clear change is that this new generation of Caucus members are not as busy building new sub-networks; they are the

¹⁵ Proposition 28 was passed in June 2012. The new law maintained term limits but created greater flexibility for members to serve for longer periods in one chamber. Within the new term limits, members elected in November 2012 (and after) could serve 12 years total. Among other things, this effectively means members can now serve in leadership positions, like Assembly Speaker, for longer periods of time.


product and beneficiaries of those sub-networks. It may be that this frees them to change the mix of their work towards the politics of policy and a little bit away from the politics of elections than was the case during Polanco's tenure as chair. As Alejo noted, the recent change to term limits helps with this as well. In this view, the current group of Caucus members might be something like a "Joshua generation" (Remnick 2008) – a reference to an analogy President Obama has used in understanding his place vis-à-vis the previous generation of civil right leaders, like Martin Luther King, Jr., Congressman John Lewis, Ambassador Andrew Young, and others. Reflecting on the current state of the Caucus and his job as chair, Alejo told us "It's an honor to be chair."

Building Out the Caucus

In a few places above, we have discussed the rapid expansion in the numbers of Caucus members beginning in 1992 as a result of a variety of factors, including the rise of term limits. But it is important to understand some of the patterns of Caucus growth because the geographic and demographic mix within the Caucus continues to evolve over time. One pattern of growth we can discern very clearly is that almost all senators in the Latino Caucus previously served in the Assembly. As you can see in Figure 2.1 below, out of the 28 senators to serve in the CLLC, all but four served in the Assembly first.

As the Caucus's era of rapid growth played out in the 1990s, that growth happened first in the Assembly and only later in the Senate for two reasons. First, term limits in the Senate were a little longer (two four-year terms) and that meant veteran incumbent senators had more time in office even after term limits took effect. But second, and more importantly, there was an "echo effect," because, if most senators serve in the Assembly first, the Latino Caucus needed a little time to build up the number of incumbent (and sometimes termed-out)

Figure 2.1 Percent of CLLC Senators with Previous Service in the Assembly




members of the Assembly as a pool from which to run Senate candidates. By 1998, even though the Latino Caucus’s roster in the Assembly had grown from 4—at the beginning of the decade—to 14, the number of senators in the Caucus had only grown from 3 to 4 in the same timeframe. In that year, members of the Senate began to be termed out and the Caucus’s Senate roster slowly rose from 4 to 9 over the course of the next few election cycles as Latino Caucus members from the Assembly moved to the Senate.

One other noticeable trend in the data is that, although 10 of the 28 senators in the Latino Caucus have been Latinas, every single one of the Latina Caucus members in the Senate have previously served in the Assembly. This has created an even more noticeable “echo effect” among Latinas in the Senate and in the Caucus more generally. According to Figure 2.2, the first Latina member of the CLLC, Assemblymember Gloria Molina, was elected in 1982 and it would take another 5 years for the second Latina, Lucille Roybal-Allard, to be elected as a CLLC member¹⁶. As the numbers of Latinas in the Assembly grew in the 1990s, it created a strong pool of future Latina senators. In 1993, for instance, four Latinas—Martha Escutia, Diane

¹⁶ The election of Roybal-Allard did not contribute to the growth of Latinas in the Caucus, as Roybal-Allard replaced Molina in the 56th District when Molina won a seat on the Los Angeles City Council.

**Figure 2.2 CLLC Latina Members
1983–2016**



Martinez, Grace Napolitano, and Hilda Solis—were elected to the Assembly, making up four of the eleven Caucus members (36 percent). This led to a wave of Latina Caucus members in the Senate that crested between 2001 and 2006 when there were 6 Latina senators in the Caucus—Senator Martha Escutia served as Caucus chair for the latter two years of this period. This “echo effect” can be seen playing out in the other direction as well. By 2007, there were just 4 Latinas in the Assembly serving in the Latino Caucus. Absent a pool of Latinas with experience in the Assembly, the number of Latinas in the Senate has since diminished. By 2015, there were no Latina senators in the Caucus and just 5 Latina Caucus members in the Assembly.

How do we explain this success building the number of Latinas in the Caucus for more than a decade and then the subsequent decline? The obstacles female candidates face in running for office have been well-documented by political scientists (see, for instance, Lawless 2016). While there are a variety of potential explanations for the diminished number of Latinas in the Caucus, most current and former legislators we spoke to argued it is a problem of recruitment at various levels. In describing her first run for the Assembly, Martha Escutia told


us that Richard Polanco insisted she run for office by simply telling her, “You’re going to run.” He also brought his political consultant, Richie Ross, on board and helped Escutia raise money as he did for other candidates in the Caucus. This same kind of effort was repeated in recruiting Latina candidates across the state for more than a decade guided by Polanco, Firebaugh, Escutia and others.

By about 2005, the focus on recruiting, grooming, and funding Latinas to run for office diminished a bit. It is not clear why, but the declining numbers became difficult to ignore. By 2011, just 3 Latinas were members of the Caucus. Several of people interviewed for this project, including staffers, applauded the renewed focus by both Lara and Alejo in identifying, recruiting, and (hopefully) helping to elect Latinas to the Legislature. Lara told us “There was a conversation about how do we replace ourselves with women?” Alejo agreed this is a significant problem to be addressed saying, “We could do much better in getting more Latinas in office.” The number of Latinas in the Assembly is back up to 5 and (likely) rising. 11 of the 15 Assembly candidates the Latino Caucus PAC is supporting in 2016 are Latinas, as are both of the Senate candidates¹⁷ the PAC has endorsed. If history is any guide, there will likely be CLLC Latinas in the Senate in the near future.

One final point needs to be made regarding how the “building out” of the Caucus is related to the geographic distribution of Caucus members. As we described above, there was an effort by Caucus leadership to not only identify places where Latino candidates could run and win but to establish roots in those places as a sub-network grew up around that initial victory. Richard Polanco told us he had a simple rule-of-thumb in deciding whether to “play” in

¹⁷ We already know that one of the Latina Senate candidates endorsed by the PAC, Katherine Pérez-Estolano, will not be elected this year as she finished third in the primary.

**Figure 2.3 CLLC Assembly Membership
BY DISTRICT
1973-2016**




California's State Assembly districts are numbered 1st through 80th, roughly in north-to-south order.

Member Serving as CLLC Chair

a certain district: the district had to be at least 30% voting-age-population Hispanic. Generally speaking, Assembly districts are numbered 1 to 80 from north to south and Senate districts are numbered 1 to 40 north to south. Because districts are equal in population (at least when initially-drawn at the beginning of the decade), the middle numbers (40 in the Assembly and 20 in the Senate) are located at the state's mid-point in terms of population. These districts are located in the Los Angeles area because about half of the state's population lives in Los Angeles and south. Assembly District 39, for instance, is located in the northeast part of the San

**Figure 2.4 CLLC Senate Membership
BY DISTRICT
1973-2016**



Fernando Valley and has been represented by a Latino Caucus member since Tony Cárdenas won the seat in 1996. Senate district 20 represents similar parts of Los Angeles. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 above show the geographic spread of Latino Caucus members over time by identifying the district numbers held by Latino Caucus members since 1973 in the Assembly and the Senate.

According to the information in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, there was just one Latino Caucus member representing an Assembly district north of Los Angeles in 1990, and there were none in the Senate. By the mid-1990s, a handful of sub-networks had been established north of Los Angeles in places like the Central Valley where Latino Caucus members were routinely elected,

even in the era of term limits. In the Senate, the geographic pattern is even more pronounced. Just a few Latino Caucus members have represented areas north of Los Angeles and currently, there are none. Finally, it is worth noting that the red highlighted districts are those represented by the CLLC chair. Just two chairs have been from north of Los Angeles, Joe Coto and Luis Alejo.

Caucus Cohesion and Unity

Beyond the expanded numbers, it is clear that a key variable in Latino Caucus power over time has been the cohesion and unity among its members. We explore the ideological cohesion of the Caucus as expressed in roll call votes in Part III of this report but, here, we are speaking of unity and cohesion in slightly more personal terms—the sense of personal closeness, camaraderie, and friendship among members. There is no doubt there were tensions within the Caucus as members often found themselves on the opposite sides of campaigns. When Gloria Molina was elected as the first Latina in the Caucus in 1982 her primary opponent had been Richard Polanco. The wounds from that conflict never entirely healed as Molina backed Polanco’s opponent in 1986—Richard Alatorre and Art Torres supported Polanco. Subsequent electoral battles among these principals and the candidates they supported ensued over the years. That said, such instances of rivalry have been more the exception than the rule within the Caucus.

As the Caucus grew in the 1990s, Caucus members and staff from that time tell us they were a tight-knit group. “We hung out together a lot,” Polanco told us. “We put a lot of restaurants on the map” in Sacramento. It was more than a group of like-minded legislators. Tony Cárdenas, who was elected to the Assembly in 1996, told us he shared an apartment in Sacramento with Polanco and fellow Caucus member, Assembly Speaker Cruz Bustamante. This

kind of close personal relationship was replicated among other Caucus members. Aside from personal friendship, there was also a sense among many members that there were double-standards working against in the Legislature. For instance, Polanco pointed out that, until Bustamante was elected as Speaker, Latino Caucus members were often “pigeonholed” into “social services kinds of committee assignments.” Martha Escutia told us that so much of their work was “defense” in the mid-1990s and this unified the Caucus as well. Former Assembly Speaker Cruz Bustamante told us that the Latino Caucus, was and is “a political family” and he described Polanco as “the godfather” of that family¹⁸. Essentially, Polanco “created this family and allowed family members to achieve what he could have achieved but didn’t.”

Electoral changes also had an impact on unity within the Caucus over time. As we mentioned above, term limits and redistricting created more tension in the Caucus as members in neighboring districts sometimes found themselves wary of collaborating with a potential future campaign opponent. As a corollary, it could be argued subsequent recent changes to the term limits—giving members more time to serve in one chamber—have eased some of those tensions. Perhaps it is no surprise then that among the current members we interviewed, many of them used the words “family” or “*familia*” to describe the Caucus. Current Vice-Chair of the Caucus, Senator Ben Hueso used this term and explained that the Caucus “is very powerful but it is up to how united we are.” The newest member of the Caucus, Assemblymember Joaquin Arambula explained that the Caucus is “*familia*.” He said he appreciated that members “came and walked a mile in my shoes” by visiting his district and campaigning for him. Assemblymember Eduardo Garcia told us, “There’s a really tight group within the Caucus” and

¹⁸ By “godfather,” he explained he meant that “not in the movie sense but in the cultural sense.”

pointed out that his relationship with Caucus members was forged when he served in local government before running for the Assembly.

It is also clear that the unity and cohesion of Caucus members and Caucus staff is built on a shared sense of personal experience. In our interviews with current and former members and staff, we typically asked the same question first: “how did you come to serve as a staffer or elected official in Sacramento?” The answers to this question showed a great deal of consistency across former and current CLLC members. In a variety of different ways, current and former members and staff associated with the Latino Caucus related how their personal identity both shaped their policy outlook and bound them to other Caucus members and staff. For many in the prior generation, their political identity was forged by the cause of the United Farm Workers movement and César Chávez. For the more recent members and staff, statewide policy fights—like Proposition 187 and opposition to Governor Pete Wilson’s policies—served the same role. Luis Alejo told us his first work in politics was organizing against Proposition 187 and his first trip to Sacramento was to protest Governor Wilson’s policies. But deeper than their political identity, members and staffers opened up about the way their personal identity brought them together. As explained in Part I, the Caucus’s original name was “the Chicano Caucus,” and we had the opportunity to ask the first Caucus Chair, Richard Alatorre, about the name of the Caucus and whether it bothered him that the name had been changed. He told us that he identified as Chicano and still does to this day. But (in colorful language) he also said that it did not bother him that they subsequently changed the name to the California Latino Legislative Caucus. He effectively related that the values of the Caucus had not changed and that was what was important.

Senator Hueso told us that, because his parents were Mexican immigrants, he sensed as a young man that others viewed him as an outsider. Yet he explained that, on a trip to see family in Mexico, he felt just as much an outsider there. Similarly, in describing his youth and his path into public service, Cruz Bustamante told us, “I never really fit in anywhere. I didn’t attribute it to racism. I attributed it to my parents pushing me towards activism.” Later, after he was elected in a special election in 1993, Bustamante was sworn in on the day of César Chávez’s funeral. He told us, “I never forgot that. What was I going to mean to the Latino community, to the workers?” Senator Ricardo Lara told us that he grew up “in a bubble” in East L.A.; he thought the whole world was like the community he grew up in until he went to college at San Diego State University. Once he was there, he tried to find people like himself and gravitated towards MEChA¹⁹ and got involved in student government. He described his time in College as a period of learning, self-discovery, and self-empowerment. There were other stories like these but what is important about this for our purposes is that, putting policy and ideology aside, these similar personal experiences across many members is part of what built the remarkable unity and cohesion of the Caucus.

Finally, one last explanation for the Caucus’s unity and cohesion has to do with the way the Caucus has weathered some of its more difficult moments. As the Caucus grew larger and as term limits sometimes pitted member against member, there were squabbles, feuds, and even factionalism. For instance, in 2012, Assemblymember Tony Mendoza stepped down as chair in the middle of his term when various members expressed concern about both his fundraising for the Caucus’s PAC and a dispute related to a potential Caucus endorsement for

¹⁹ Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán (the Chicano Student Movement of Aztlán)

an open seat in the 58th Assembly district (PolitiCal 2012). Ricardo Lara was then elected to take over as chair. A year and a half later, the Caucus faced a different kind of turmoil when Senator Ron Calderon was being investigated for accepting bribes and an outdated office roster led news organizations to report that the FBI was searching the Caucus's offices in addition to Calderon's. The story wasn't true but the damage to the Caucus's public image had been done (Thompson and Verdin 2003). Speaking of the Calderon saga in particular, Senator Lara told us, "It was difficult because we all get painted with the same brush." But in the end, he saw the episode as a measure of the Caucus's strength. "I'm so proud of how the Caucus stuck together and we stuck together and we got through it."

Formalizing and Professionalizing the Caucus

As we noted above, the Latino Caucus was less formal in its operations during the group's early years. In part, this was simply a function of the numbers. With just 5 to 7 members for the first 20 years of the Caucus's history, it was easy enough to meet less regularly without formal bylaws. The Caucus did have influence in those early years, though it wasn't as much the result of policy statements and formal endorsements. Part I described how relationships with key leaders within the Legislature allowed the Caucus to exert some influence, despite the group's small numbers.

Once the Caucus started to grow larger and become more diverse, formalized institutions and structures were needed. The Principal Consultant for the Caucus, Willie Guerrero, told us the Caucus bylaws were first adopted in 1991 and have been formally amended six times since. Generally speaking, the bylaws include rules about who can be a member of the Caucus, provisions on how the Caucus decides whether to endorse in a race,

and guidance on the role of the Caucus chair and vice-chair. As mentioned earlier, the Latino Caucus is restricted to Democratic members.

The rules guiding endorsements are an example of formalized Caucus processes that have changed over time. Richard Polanco told us that he always felt the Caucus should be unanimous when it makes endorsements in order to have the greatest impact in the election. He related to us that the contemporary change to a two-thirds majority for endorsements could potentially make the Caucus seem less unified. There is also a provision in the current bylaws that states the Caucus will not endorse a race where a current Caucus member is running against another Caucus member. However, the rules can be overridden if enough members agree to do so²⁰.

The Latino Caucus has also become more “institutionalized” in that it held more regular meetings over time, and there has been greater formalization of Caucus staff roles. Polanco told us that the intention was to have structure, duties, and responsibilities that were more clear. He said, “I always thought it was important to have a mandatory meeting of all the members and everyone say what their top priorities were.” He also made it a point to invite staff into meetings so that everyone would be on the same page. Caucus staff is certainly another area where the operation of the Caucus has become more formalized. Technically, the staff of the Caucus are actually assigned to the individual legislators who lead the Caucus. David Pacheco, a former staffer for several members in the early years related to us that back in the late 1970s—when the number of members was small—there really wasn’t any dedicated Caucus staff. According to Pacheco, the staff of the individual members would do the Caucus’s

²⁰ Such as the dual endorsement of Assemblymember Patty Lopez and former Assemblymember Raul Bocanegra mentioned earlier in the report.

work on behalf of their member. The role of Caucus staff seems to have become a bit more distinct from individual legislator's staff in the 1990s when Saeed Ali worked as dedicated staff for the Caucus under Richard Polanco. By 2000, the idea of staff as vital to the work of the Caucus was well-established. Speaking of that time, one staffer explained that Caucus staff play a big role in both building support for Caucus priorities and even in setting policy priorities. Another staffer told us how happy he was to move from working primarily for an individual member to working for the Caucus. He said, "Once I got a taste of what the Caucus does ... it was just better than legislative work."

In recent years, the role of staff in the Caucus has expanded and has become even more professionalized. The Caucus effectively has three dedicated staff today—Willie Guerrero, who serves as a Principal Consultant for the Caucus on the Senate side, Armando Chavez, who has worked as Caucus staff for almost a decade, and Cesar Anda, who works as a Principal Consultant for the Caucus Chair, Assemblymember Alejo. One other recent change is that both Guerrero and Chavez are continuously serving as Senate staff rather than moving between chambers each time the chairmanship moves. This dedication of staff to a particular chamber creates greater stability and a sense of permanence.


Beyond the staff, the CLLC has also grown in complexity and structure as an institution by creating other outside entities over time to which the Caucus is linked. Richard Polanco told us, as a staffer, Marco Firebaugh began work on a strategic plan for a Latino Caucus Institute for Public Policy. By the time Polanco stepped down from the Senate in 2002, the Institute was founded (and funded) and began accepting 6-10 Polanco Fellows from across the state to participate in a year-long internship and fellowship. The Fellows were given a stipend and medical benefits—much like the Capitol Fellows program run by the Center for California

Studies. The Institute also funded an “Elected Officials Training Academy” for newly elected public officials. The Polanco Fellows program came up again and again in our conversations with current and former legislators and staff. Current Caucus staffers, Armando Chavez and Cesar Anda both served as Polanco Fellows—as did Assemblymember Rudy Salas, a current member of the Caucus.

While the Institute shut down a few years ago, the Caucus has created two other entities that are flourishing. The California Latino Caucus PAC was established on October 15, 2009 and its website states that its purpose is “to support current Latino Caucus members and promote the next generation of Latino candidates. Funds raised through the PAC are primarily utilized to provide direct financial support to endorsed candidates” (calatinocaucuspac.com). The PAC has raised and spent more money in each election cycle since then. The rise of campaign funds raised by the Caucus’s PAC is detailed in Figure 2.5.

While Figure 2.5 outlines the growth of fundraising by the California Latino Caucus PAC, it significantly understates how much more the PAC will raise in the current cycle. The \$630,757 raised by the PAC in the 2015-2016 cycle is only through June 30, 2016. In the 2011-2012 and 2013-2014 cycles, the PAC raised 59.85% and 48.48% of its total money for each of those cycles in the last 6 months of the cycle. If we assume this pattern continues, the PAC would be on pace to raise \$900,000 or more in the current cycle. The Caucus has an extensive and rigorous process in place for determining which candidates to endorse and support financially. Those seeking the endorsement and support of the Caucus provide information to the PAC via a questionnaire and then Caucus members and staff do research and conduct interviews with candidates. The reality is that, despite strong fundraising in recent cycles, the PAC has limited resources and seeks to invest those resources in candidates who both need the

Figure 2.5 Total Contributions to California Latino Caucus PAC BY LEGISLATIVE SESSION 2009–2016



support and are likely to benefit from the additional support. We noted above that the PAC’s list of endorsed candidates for 2016 includes 15 Assembly candidates and 2 Senate candidates—just 4 of these candidates (all from the Assembly side) are male. Most of the endorsed candidates are not incumbents. Only Joaquin Arambula (recently elected in a special election), Ian Calderon, and Patty Lopez (one of the dual-endorsed candidates in AD 39) are incumbents running for re-election. Nora Campos is a current Assemblymember running against incumbent Senator Jim Beall. It is clear the PAC is endorsing and supporting only those candidates that Caucus members think need the support.

In 2004, the Caucus also founded the California Latino Legislative Caucus Foundation. According to the organization’s website, the Foundation is a 501(c)(3) charitable, non-profit that is intended “to promote and support Latino culture and heritage in California and to educate the public about Latino culture, heritage and issues of importance to Latinos in California” (www.clcf.org). The Foundation serves a variety of functions for the Caucus but three are particularly important. First, the Foundation supports an annual policy summit that all Caucus members attend among others. In effect, it serves as an opportunity at the

beginning of the year for members to dive deeper into salient policy issues and to work to develop a set of policy priorities for the year. Second, the Foundation supports a scholarship program that provides \$1,000 scholarships to 25 students attending colleges and universities in California each year. Finally, the Foundation also funds and hosts the annual Latino Spirit Awards, an event that honors distinguished Latino/as in a variety of fields.

Finally, one last way in which the Caucus has become institutionalized and formalized, and perhaps the most important, is in the development of its annual policy priorities. The Caucus's list of policy priorities became more important as a policy statement over time, and the process of choosing policy priorities has become formalized in recent years. Richard Polanco told us that it was always important to him to have all members put forward their policy priorities, but this process was only effective when the group could reach a consensus. Speaking of one period when he thought the Caucus was less effective, he said, "I don't know what happened ... maybe it was the chair's bills that got priority." In recent years, Caucus members have tried to act on that advice by developing a yearly list of "priority legislation" that is sponsored by members across policy areas and that the Caucus can rally around. One particular example of the importance of this, the enactment of AB 60, is outlined in Part III below.

The professionalization of the Caucus has led it to serve as a model for other caucuses in the legislature. As we've described, some of the lessons the Caucus learned the hard way. Senator Lara told us, "We learned the bylaws and accounting has to be 100% kosher. We had attorneys and accountants look at this and we offered them to help with other caucuses." Work with other caucuses is something that Speaker Rendon also highlighted. He said there is more interest now in coordinating among the "tri-caucuses" (the California Legislative Black

Caucus, the California Asian Pacific Islander Legislative Caucus, and the Latino Caucus) than there has been in the past.

Latino Caucus Members as Legislative Leaders

Any discussion of the institutionalization and development of the Latino Caucus would be incomplete without a discussion of the rise of Latino Caucus members in legislative leadership. Today, it may seem commonplace for a Speaker of the Assembly to be a member of the California Latino Legislative Caucus, but this was not always the case. Cruz Bustamante was sworn in as California's first Latino Speaker on December 2, 1996—less than 20 years ago. As depicted in Figure 2.6, in the 7,213 days²¹ since then, the Speaker has been a member of the Latino Caucus for 4,494 (62.3%) of those days. Given that the current Speaker, Anthony Rendon, is expected to serve in that role for some time under the new term limit rules, that percentage is likely to grow.


In the last 20 years, there have been 5 Speakers who were members of the Latino Caucus—Cruz Bustamante, Antonio Villaraigosa, Fabian Nuñez, John Pérez, and Anthony Rendon. Given the expanded numbers of the Caucus and the fact that the Democratic Party has been in the majority in the Assembly continuously since 1996, it is not surprising that the Caucus has had its members serve as Speaker. But Latino Caucus members typically make up a third or less of the Democratic Caucus in the Assembly, even in recent years. We asked the current Caucus Chair, Assemblymember Luis Alejo, if the Latino Caucus was likely to dominate the Speakership in the years to come. He told us, “the Speaker won’t always” be a member of the Caucus, but no Speaker can ignore the Latino Caucus. “You have to be attuned to our

²¹ as of September 1, 2016.

**Figure 2.6 CLLC Membership and
CLLC Speakers of the Assembly**

BY YEAR

1963-2016



issues.” Several members, including Alejo, told us there was an early discussion over who would be the next Speaker. Alejo and others told us there were several potential candidates just from within the Caucus and the message to everyone was to “go round-up votes, but we all get behind whoever has the most.” In the end, not quite everyone in the Caucus got behind Rendon but Rendon did acknowledge the importance of the Caucus’s support in his bid.

Of course, Latino Caucus members are institutionally powerful beyond the Speaker. Current Senate President pro Tempore, Kevin de León, is the first Latino Caucus member to serve as the leader in the Senate. Both chambers’ Appropriations Chairs, Senator Ricardo Lara and Assemblymember Lorena Gonzalez, are Latino Caucus members. In fact, both of the previous Appropriations Chairs, Senator de León and Assemblymember Jimmy Gomez, are Latino Caucus members. In sum, it is fair to say that the Latino Caucus is getting more than its fair share of key roles in the Legislature. In our conversations with current and former

members and staff, the most common explanation we heard for this is the Caucus's unity and its sense of shared mission. Whatever the particular explanation, it is clear the Latino Caucus has grown from a small—but effective—group of legislators into an institutionalized force in the nation's most powerful and professionalized state legislature.

Summary

The growth, organization, and institutional development of the CLLC have been remarkable in several ways. In just over 40 years, the CLLC has built a robust set of networks that yields a consistently large cohort of members. Beyond this development, the Caucus built a set of institutional structures that yields influence within the Legislature for its members. It is because of these structures that the newer generation of CLLC leaders—members like Senator Lara, Assemblymember Alejo, and Senator Hueso—are able to start each legislative session in a much stronger position the groups founding members could have ever dreamed of.

It has always been the case that influence on policy processes and outcomes are the true measure of the CLLC's success. While Part III measures and explores the policy influence of the CLLC in some depth, what we've learned in Part II is that the policy success and influence of the CLLC is the result of decades of institution-building both across the state and in Sacramento.

Part III – The Policy Influence of the California Latino Legislative Caucus

The unity displayed amongst CLLC members is obviously a key component of the Caucus's development and success. Part III examines several quantitative components of this unity. Specifically, the legislative successes, agenda diversity, roll call voting patterns, and roll call voting patterns of CLLC members are examined. Case studies of two of the most significant bills authored by CLLC members—AB 540 (2001) and AB 60 (2013)—are also explored to highlight the Caucus's influence over the legislative process. The CLLC displays many unsurprising characteristics—e.g., similar ideology and consistent voting records. The data also highlight important divisions within the CLLC. Despite these apparent divisions, the CLLC remained largely unified behind the group's policy priorities throughout its nearly 45-year history.

The Policy Agenda

One way to understand the policy influence and success of a legislative coalition is to simply look at the number and variety of bills passed by the group. To this end, a list of significant chaptered legislation²² authored by CLLC members was coded by policy topic²³. Significant bills were placed into one of 20 separate categories based on the content of the legislation. The policy codes are simply meant to capture the broad policy issue addressed by a bill—not specific government programs or the segments of the population targeted by the

²² This list was provided by the Senate Research Office.

²³ Specifically, Baumgartner and Jones' Policy Agendas Project coding scheme is used. The scheme consists of 20 "major-topic" categories designed to comprehensively describe all government action ranging from macroeconomics to public land management. The categories are hierarchical, meaning an observation can only be assigned to one category.

policy change. This section provides a broad overview of the CLLC's main legislative priorities since 1975.

Significant Legislation and Agenda Diversity


In total, CLLC members authored 301 significant chaptered bills from 1975-2012. Figure 3.1 displays the number of significant CLLC bills passed into law by legislative session.

Unsurprisingly, the number of chaptered bills grows over time. The increased number of significant bills passed is largely a testament to the growth of the Caucus's membership and influence in the Legislature. However, it is important to note the CLLC was still successful in passing a number of bills when membership was low during the 1970s and 1980s. Over this time span, the CLLC successfully maneuvered a minimum of 10 bills through the legislative process per two-year session²⁴. A cursory glance at the policy codes attached to the legislation passed during the '70s and '80s indicates the Caucus was largely focused on a narrow set of issues. Between 1975 and 1990, the CLLC authored 17 chaptered bills pertaining to education policy and 22 chaptered bills pertaining to crime/family issues. Together, these two issue areas comprised 45.3% of significant CLLC bills passed during this time period. The other 54.7% of chaptered bills cover 12 broad policy areas, but no single policy issue comes close to achieving the amount of attention given to education and crime/family issues. Overall, it is clear the CLLC largely focused on two broad issues facing the Latino community during the Caucus's developmental stages.

The period following the 1992 election cycle—marking a time of substantial growth in the Caucus—displays an increase in both the number of bills passed and the variety of policy

²⁴ During the 1988-1989 session, the Caucus facilitated the passage of 20 significant bills.

Figure 3.1 Number of Significant CLLC Chaptered Bills and Agenda Diversity
BY LEGISLATIVE TERM
1999–2012



**Please note higher Herfindahl-Hirschman Index value indicate agenda concentration.*

issues covered by those bills. Between 1993 and 2012, the CLLC authored a total of 190 significant chaptered bills. The smallest number of bills passed during this time period was 13 during the 2003-2004 session; the largest number of bills passed was 27 during the 2007-2008 session. The success of the Caucus during this time period can be attributed mostly to a surge of newly elected CLLC members and the placement of CLLC members in key legislative gatekeeping position (e.g., committee chairs and floor leaders). The policy focus of the CLLC also appears to diversify greatly after 1992. Much like the earlier time period, the CLLC focused heavily on bills related to education and crime/family issues (14.7% of bills passed after 1992 addressed education policy, while 23.58% of bills related to crime/family issues). However, the

Caucus also facilitated the passage of significant bills covering a wide swath of policy issues, such as health (11.58% of bills), labor (7.9% of bills), and domestic commerce (7.4% of the bills). In total the CLLC successfully passed legislation pertaining to 17 separate policy areas after 1992.

While a superficial discussion of the types of policies passed by the CLLC is helpful, a more comprehensive measure of agenda concentration is needed to explore the diversity of the group's policy priorities. The second plot in Figure 3.1 displays the agenda concentration of the CLLC. Agenda concentration is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)²⁵. HHI values can be placed into three general categories: values below 0.15 indicate a diverse agenda, values between 0.15 and 0.25 indicate moderate concentration, and values above 0.25 indicate an agenda concentrated on a very narrow subset of policy issues²⁶.

The HHI values in Figure 3.1 indicate a dynamic change in the CLLC's agenda over time. The group's early policy priorities appear to be very concentrated. This is not surprising, given the group's lower numbers and level of influence in the Legislature. The passage of legislation focused on the Latino community was also atypical—and somewhat unpopular—during this time period, so the CLLC had to pick and choose their battles wisely. However, the concentration of agenda items quickly diversifies as time goes on. By the 1989-1990 legislative session, the CLLC policy priorities showed a great deal of diversity. In fact, 25 percent of the

²⁵ The HHI is a measure originally developed in the field of economics to account for market concentration and monopolization by determining the overall distribution of firms within a market. The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) uses the HHI as a benchmark to determine unlawful market monopolies. The logic of the HHI can also be applied to policy agendas. In this case, policy issues represent firms within a market. Much like economic markets, the issue agenda is constrained and can sustain a finite number of policy issues. Therefore, the HHI—when applied to legislation—accounts for the concentration of policy issues on the agenda.

²⁶ Please note this scale is inverted for easier interpretation. These are the same breakpoints used by the USDOJ to determine market monopolies.

significant bills passed by the CLLC during the 1989-1990 session addressed environmental policy—a relatively new policy area for the group—and the remaining 15 significant bills addressed 10 separate policy issues.

The CLLC’s policy priorities remained relatively diverse throughout the 1990s and 2000s. One exception was the 1997-1998 legislative session. Over this two-year session, the CLLC passed 18 significant bills into law—a small drop from the previous session—but these bills only addressed five policy areas (health, labor, education, crime/family issues, and welfare). Moreover, 7 of the 18 bills passed by the CLLC dealt explicitly with crime/family issues. This brief period of agenda concentration in the late 1990s underscores how the CLLC’s policy initiatives were hampered by Governor Wilson’s administration and public sentiment during this time period. Rather than focusing on a diverse set of issues, the CLLC was forced to “play defense” on policies perceived to be harmful to the Latino community.

The CLLC’s agenda grew far more diverse following the 1998 election. Throughout the 2000s, the HHI of significant legislation remains very low and even dips below the 0.15 threshold, indicating little to no agenda concentration. Like previous time periods, a plurality of significant bills pertained to crime/family issues (23.9 percent of bills passed after 1998). Increased membership in the Assembly and Senate and a more favorable political environment (i.e., a Democratic governor and more popular public sentiment toward the Latino community) allowed the CLLC to spread its influence across a wider variety of policy issues. The CLLC even branched out into a number of new policy issues, such as macroeconomics and defense policy. In total, the CLLC passed 142 significant bills covering 17 separate policy areas after 1999.

The CLLC’s agenda became slightly more concentrated during the 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 legislative sessions. Additionally, fewer significant bills were passed during these sessions

compared to previous years. As noted in Part II, our interviews with staff and CLLC members indicate the Caucus leadership made a conscious effort to focus on a smaller subset of bills during this time period. The relative lack of agenda diversity and number of bills passed over this timespan is most likely a result of these leadership decisions. This is not to say the CLLC was an insignificant player or unsuccessful during these legislative sessions. In fact, the CLLC passed one of the most significant reforms to state higher education financial aid, the California Dream Act (AB 130 and AB 131), in 2011. The data displayed in Figure 3.1 simply point out the effect leadership plays in the agenda diversification of the group over time.

As previously noted, the policy codes applied to significant CLLC bills do not account for issue dimensionality or valence; nor does the coding scheme describe specific details on policy programs. While the data indicate the CLLC greatly diversified its policy agenda over time, most significant legislation was still directed toward California's immigrant population. The growth of the CLLC's membership and influence throughout the 1990s and 2000s simply allowed the group to address a wider range of policy problems.

Unity on Significant Legislation

Maintaining a unified front has been a key component of the CLLC's policy influence throughout the group's history. Nearly every interview with staff and CLLC members included the words "unity," "solidarity," or "cohesion." Part II of this report describes the qualitative and historical reasons for the emphasis on unity. This section adds to the discussion by analyzing the roll call votes of CLLC members on significant chaptered legislation authored by Caucus members. In doing so, the data provide a quantitative basis for understanding the unified approach of the CLLC.

The first plot in Figure 3.2 displays the “unity score” of CLLC members on significant chaptered legislation authored by fellow Caucus members in each chamber from 1999-2012²⁷. The unity score is measured as the percent of CLLC members voting “aye” on significant bills. Therefore, a score of 1.0 indicates complete unanimity amongst the Caucus. The data displayed in Figure 3.2 support the notion of a largely unified group. On average, significant bills receive support from no less than 80 percent of the Caucus in either chamber. This average is higher in the Assembly than the Senate, but CLLC members in both chambers are largely unified²⁸. Both chambers display extremely high unity scores in the 2011-2012 legislative session (an average unity score of 0.94 in both chambers), indicating near unanimity in roll calls.


The data in Figure 3.2 represent the average unity score per two-year legislative session, so there are definitely a few exceptions to the broad picture painted by these scores. For example, Senator Gloria Romero’s SBx54 (2010), a bill authorizing K-12 open enrollment and the Parent Empowerment Program, received very little support from fellow CLLC members. The bill received support from only 12 percent of CLLC members in the Assembly, but received substantially more support in the Senate (66 percent of CLLC Senators voted in the affirmative)²⁹. Likewise, Assemblymember Lou Correa’s AB 1742 (2000), a bill detailing time horizons for the admission of DNA evidence in sex offender cases, received support from only 46 percent of CLLC Assembly members. These examples are the only significant chaptered bills authored by CLLC members between 1999 and 2012 that received “aye” votes from less than

²⁷ Roll call records are not available online prior to 1999.

²⁸ One explanation for the small differences between chambers is the number of legislators present in each. Smaller numbers in the Senate mean one or two defections represent a larger percentage change in unity scores.

²⁹ No significant bill received support from less than 50 percent of CLLC Senators between 1999 and 2012.

Figure 3.2 CLLC Vote Unity and Influence on Significant Chaptered Legislation Sponsored by CLLC Members 1999–2012



50 percent of CLLC members in either chamber. Clearly, broad support from fellow CLLC members is the norm.

The second plot in Figure 3.2 displays the percent of the chamber majority threshold (41 in the Assembly, 21 in the Senate) comprised by CLLC “aye” votes on significant bills. These data are included to highlight how the CLLC’s unity translates into influence on the passage of legislation. On average, CLLC support comprised between 30 and 40 percent of the majority threshold in both chambers between 1999 and 2012. The ability of the CLLC to maintain this staggering amount of influence is largely a function of membership, which was at record highs during this decade. However, increased numbers in the CLLC does not automatically guarantee

a winning coalition; the members must also present a unified front. This unity and influence is clearly demonstrated in Figure 3.2. One surprising aspect of this data is the similar amount of influence the CLLC maintained in the both Assembly and Senate. The CLLC did have a record number of senators from 2003 to 2010 (nine senators in each session). Coupled with the high rate of unity over this timespan, the CLLC had a dramatic impact on Senate roll call votes. As a whole, the information in Figure 3.2 demonstrates how increased Caucus membership—paired with highly consistent roll call voting—allowed the CLLC to exert a great deal of influence on the passage of significant legislation.


Ideological Voting of CLLC Members

The stable unity of the CLLC is a dominant theme throughout this report. This consistent, unified front is noteworthy because there are important differences between Caucus members and their constituencies. Every Latino representative does not have the same policy preferences; nor do their constituencies demand the same government services. Some of these geographic and constituency differences are described in Parts I and II. This section adds to previous discussions on intra-caucus differences by examining the ideology of the CLLC over time.

Figure 3.3 contains the ideological distributions of the CLLC and Democratic Caucus from 1993 to 2014³⁰. One noteworthy aspect of Figure 3.3 is the large amount of variation within the Democratic Caucus, especially during the 1990s. High levels of intra-party variation are evident

³⁰ These data are made available by Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty on their website: <https://americanlegislatures.com/papers/>. The ideology scores represent point estimates for each member of the legislature based on roll call voting. The ideology values range from -3 (most liberal) to 3 (most conservative). A value of zero represents a perfectly moderate legislator. For a more comprehensive explanation of the data please refer to Shor and McCarty (2011).

Figure 3.3 Ideology Scores of Democratic Caucus and CLLC 1993–2014



from the low central peak and sizable distance between the ends of the distribution. In comparison, the distribution of the CLLC shows far more intra-group homogeneity over the same time period, with a high central peak and narrower distribution. The differences in the


distributions indicate the CLLC was far more ideologically unified than the Democratic Caucus over the course of the 1990s.

It is also important to note the two groups shared roughly the same median value during the 1990s. However, these median points diverge after the 2002 elections. The median point of the CLLC stays relatively constant from 2003 to 2014, indicating the Caucus did not become significantly more or less liberal over the decade. Conversely, the median point of the Democratic Caucus shifts farther to the left beginning in 2003. The changes to the groups' median values make it clear the Democratic Party, as a whole, became more liberal throughout the 2000s, but the CLLC maintained a slightly more moderate (but still fairly liberal) position. There is also an emerging bi-modal aspect to the CLLC distribution from 2009 to 2014. One consequence of the increased membership of the CLLC over this time period is a slightly more moderate Democratic Party. Without the large bloc of CLLC legislators, the Democratic Party would be even farther to the left, and the two major parties in California would be even more polarized. The wider, less consistent ideological distribution displayed by the CLLC during this time period is at least partially due to the Caucus's electoral gains in the Central Valley. These geographic differences in ideology are more clearly understood in a comparison of ideologies within the CLLC.

Figure 3.4 displays the aggregate distribution of ideology scores of CLLC members separated by the geographic location of members' districts from 1993 to 2014. Specifically, ideologies are compared across three regions: Southern California, the Central Coast/Bay Area, and the Central Valley³¹. On average, the most liberal legislators within the CLLC come from

³¹ There are undoubtedly more than three important geographic differences within the Caucus. However, CLLC members and their staff clearly perceived differences between legislators from these

Figure 3.4 Comparing Aggregate CLLC Ideology Scores
BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION
1993-2014



districts in the Central Coast and Bay Area. The narrow distribution indicates these legislators display very similar ideologies³². In comparison, legislators from Southern California are only slightly more moderate. The distribution of CLLC members from Southern California also contains more variation, which is a product of the larger number of legislators elected from the region and differences across Southern California constituencies. The distribution of legislators from the Central Valley presents the more intriguing puzzle, and helps explain why the CLLC has

regions during the interview process. The limited number of observations within other distinct locations, such as the Inland Empire or districts bordering Mexico, make such comparisons difficult to interpret.

³² Only seven Latino legislators were elected from these districts between 1993 and 2014.

not moved as far left as the rest of the Democratic Party in California. The median point of Central Valley legislators is more moderate than their Central Coast/Bay Area and Southern California counterparts. This is unsurprising, given the region's history of electing Republican legislators with a more rural support base. Therefore, newly-elected Democratic Latinos from the Central Valley must maintain a more moderate position in the legislature to win reelection. The Central Valley distribution is also bi-modal. A closer look at the data reveals legislators elected from the Sacramento-area are more liberal than those elected from other parts of the Central Valley; these legislators serve very different constituencies, even within the same broad region.

The differences displayed by the Caucus members' ideological scores underscore the importance of roll call unity examined earlier in this section. There is no reason to expect near unanimity among Caucus members, given the clear competing constituency pressures faced by individual members. Moreover, the California Latino community is not monolithic; it encompasses a variety of cultures, backgrounds, and experiences. Despite these differences, the CLLC maintains remarkable unity. Part II describes the sense of belonging and shared experiences that brings these legislators together as policymakers in greater detail. The data presented in this section highlight how the CLLC is able to maintain this unity on key roll call votes, despite clear ideological and constituency-based differences. The ideological differences detailed in Figure 3.4 also help to explain the CLLC leadership's focus on presenting a unified front within the Legislature. Clearly, the group is not without its differences, but the leadership also understands how much influence can be exerted when the vast majority of the Caucus supports the same legislation. The culminating influence of leadership, the general sense of

belonging, and roll call unity is better understood by examining the circumstances surrounding the passage of some of the CLLC's most significant legislative victories.

Policy Case Studies

In this section, two major legislative successes championed by the CLLC, AB 540 (2001) and AB 60 (2013), are explored. Of course, the CLLC can claim far more than two significant legislative wins since 1975, but these case studies provide unique insight into the unity and policy influence detailed throughout Part III of the report. AB 540 and AB 60 also exemplify the CLLC's forward-thinking strategies for progressive policy reforms serving immigrant populations, making California a true policy innovator. Such reforms are not created overnight. Key leaders within the CLLC understood large-scale policy change was possible only if membership within the CLLC grew and Caucus members remained unified on roll call votes. However, increased numbers in the Legislature is only one component of significant change. The leaders of the CLLC also understood they would need to first lay a foundation for progressive policy change by suffering legislative losses in order to ensure success at a later date. The following case studies highlight this important aspect of the policymaking process.

AB 540 – In-state Tuition for Undocumented Students

With the passage of AB 540 in 2001, California became one of the first states (along with Texas) to grant in-state tuition for undocumented students in the state's higher education system. Today, a total of 18 states allow undocumented students to pay in-state tuition. The CLLC was the major force behind the passage of AB 540. However, the Caucus's efforts to make California the progressive leader on the issue took more than a decade.

The first major action on the issue of in-state tuition for undocumented students happened in 1991 with the introduction of AB 592 by Assemblymember Richard Polanco. This

legislation would have changed the definition of “California resident” as it relates to college tuition—essentially creating a statutory exemption for undocumented students. AB 592 successfully passed both chambers, but was eventually vetoed by Governor Pete Wilson. The veto by Wilson was not a surprise, given Wilson’s tumultuous relationship with the state’s Latino population discussed in previous sections. Despite ultimately dying on the Governor’s desk, AB 592 played a vital role in the eventual passage of AB 540 in 2001.

According to Richard Polanco, big statutory reforms, especially those related to California’s immigrant population, cannot be achieved without first laying a foundation for future success. In this case, Polanco knew his legislation would ultimately fail, but the loss was deemed necessary in order to ease the public and lawmakers into the idea of substantial reform. Moreover, future lawmakers would be able to learn from the loss to craft a better legislative strategy; such is the case with 1991’s AB 592.

The lead Polanco staffer on AB 592 was a man who would play a key role in the eventual passage of AB 540: Marco Firebaugh (Pérez 1991). Despite Firebaugh continuing to work for Polanco, subsequent legislation on the issue gained little traction in the Legislature over the ensuing decade. The lack of movement on the issue undoubtedly related to the CLLC being forced to “play defense” on various policies proposed by the Wilson administration during the 1990s. However, Firebaugh was eventually elected to represent the Assembly’s 50th district in 1998. The replacement of Pete Wilson with Democratic Governor Gray Davis during the same election cycle created an opportunity for renewed efforts to grant in-state tuition for undocumented students.

In 1999, newly-elected Assemblymember Marco Firebaugh introduced AB 1197. This bill built on the ideas of Polanco’s original AB 592, but differed in ways that made the proposal

more palatable to other lawmakers. Unlike 1991's AB 592, Firebaugh's legislation did not create a new definition for "California residency." Instead, eligible undocumented students who met various requirements³³ would be granted an exemption from paying nonresident tuition at California State University or California Community College campuses. By not redefining residency status, Firebaugh was able to circumvent many of the arguments made against AB 592 in 1991. It is important to note the CLLC was almost completely unified behind AB 1197, with 18 of 19 Caucus members casting "aye" votes³⁴. This unity granted AB 1197 easy passage through the Assembly (with 52 "ayes") and a narrow majority in the Senate (with 23 "ayes"). Despite the majority coalitions in both chambers built by Firebaugh and the CLLC, Governor Davis indicated AB 1197 would conflict with federal law (specifically, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996) governing postsecondary education benefits for undocumented students. For this reason, Davis vetoed the bill on September 29, 2000.

Not to be deterred, Firebaugh immediately introduced a new in-state tuition bill, AB 540, at the start of the next legislative session in 2001. When introduced, AB 540 created far more controversy because the bill granted undocumented students eligibility for state-funded higher education assistance (i.e., the Cal Grant Program). Negotiations with Governor Davis' office indicated a new willingness to enact the in-state tuition portion of the bill. The change in the Governor's position was partly attributed to similar legislation signed by the Governor of

³³ Specifically, undocumented students were exempt from paying nonresident tuition if they met the following criteria: attended a California high school for at least three years, graduated from high school, and successfully obtained admission to a school in the California State University or California Community College systems.

³⁴ Assemblymember Sally Morales Havice did not record a vote on AB 1197. Morales Havice routinely faced competitive challenges in reelection bids. Her non-vote likely reflects these electoral pressures.

Texas early in 2001. The Chief Legislative Counsel also released a statement indicating neither AB 1197 nor AB 540 violated federal law. Regardless, Davis threatened a veto if the language regarding financial aid remained intact. According to interviews with legislators and staff members close to Firebaugh at the time, the decision to drop the financial aid provisions in the bill was one of the most emotional and difficult decisions he made during his time in office. In the end, a compromise was reached, and the sections of AB 540 pertaining to state-funded financial aid were removed. The final version of the bill received more support than the 1999 bill—due in large part to a growth in CLLC membership in the previous election cycle—with 57 “ayes” in the Assembly and 27 “ayes” in the Senate. This time all 24 CLLC members displayed complete unity by casting “aye” votes. Faced with overwhelming majorities in both chambers and Firebaugh’s willingness to compromise, Governor Davis signed AB 540 into law on October 12, 2001.

The passage of AB 540 is noteworthy because it highlights the prominent influence the CLLC exerts over the legislative process. First, strong leadership played a key role. The groundwork laid by Polanco and Firebaugh in 1991 proved vital for radical policy reform. The loss on AB 592 also exposed potential hurdles to reform that would need to be overcome in the future. Most importantly, Firebaugh kept pushing for change after the 1999 veto and reached a compromise with opponents in 2001. Firebaugh’s decision to compromise on AB 540 would eventually be validated with the passage of the California DREAM Act in 2013³⁵. The other important aspect of this case study is the CLLC’s unity on roll call votes. Only one person did not cast an “aye” vote in 1999, but the same person voted in the affirmative in the following

³⁵ The DREAM Act grant state-funded financial aid eligibility for undocumented students.

session. The addition of five Latino legislators during the 2000 elections also helped create larger winning coalitions in both chambers. The combination of strong leadership, growth and unity in the CLLC, and improved political circumstances allowed for the passage of significant policy change directly benefiting California’s immigrant population.

AB 60 – California Driver’s Licenses for Undocumented Immigrants

The fight over driver’s licenses for undocumented immigrants in California was long and arduous, but the eventual legislative victory underscores the CLLC’s tenacity and unity on issues affecting the state’s immigrant community. The story begins in 1993 when Governor Wilson signed SB 976, a bill prohibiting the issuance of California driver’s licenses (CDLs) to undocumented immigrants. Specifically, SB 976 required all CDL applicants to provide a social security number, which automatically excluded the undocumented population. As previously discussed, the CLLC spent most of the 1990s “playing defense” under Governor Wilson’s administration. For this reason, attempts to repeal SB 976 received very little support in the Legislature. By the end of the decade, only one state, Washington, passed legislation allowing the issuance of driver’s licenses without a social security number.

The election of Democratic Governor Gray Davis and the increased number of newly elected CLLC members after the 1998 elections allowed the issue to resurface in California. The first bill seeking to remove the proof of citizenship requirements on CDL applications with broad support in the legislature was introduced in 1999 by Assemblymember Gilbert Cedillo—who would remain the issue’s biggest proponent throughout his tenure in the Legislature. Cedillo’s 1999 bill, AB 1463, passed both chambers (46 “ayes” in the Assembly, 21 “ayes” in the Senate) , but Governor Davis vetoed the bill in 2000. The issue was then reintroduced in 2000,

receiving similar majorities in both the Assembly and Senate; Davis vetoed this bill as well. Notably, only one member of the CLLC did not vote in the affirmative on either bill³⁶.

The recall election of Governor Davis in 2003 marked a turning point for many issues affecting California's immigrant population; the CDL proposal was no exception. In the midst of the recall election, Governor Davis reversed course, and signed Cedillo's newest proposal, SB 60³⁷, into law in September of 2003. The move was seen as a last-ditch effort by Davis to court Latino voters in the recall election. Immediately following the special election of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Senator Rico Oller introduced SB 1, a repeal of Cedillo's SB 60. The newly-elected Governor threatened to send the issue to the voters in the following election cycle unless the Legislature supported the repeal. Fearing the difficulty of overcoming a voter referendum, the CLLC and Democratic Party reluctantly supported SB1 with the hope of reintroducing the issue in the following legislative session.

The CLLC responded by introducing a new piece of legislation, AB 2895, on February 20, 2004. After passing both chambers, the bill was vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger. The bill's co-sponsor, Assembly Speaker Fabian Nuñez, expressed his dismay at the Governor's veto stating, "I am disappointed that the governor vetoed this measure, despite the fact that this right currently exists in other states ... Considering he gave his word that he could work with the Legislature on an acceptable bill, we are back at square one" (Rau and Vogel 2004). Notably, Governor Schwarzenegger gave very little explanation for his actions in the veto message attached to AB 2896, with only vague mentions of "security concerns."

³⁶ Again, Assemblymember Sally Morales Havice did not cast a vote on these early CDL bills.

³⁷ SB 60 passed both chambers by very narrow margins (40 "ayes" in the Assembly, 23 "ayes" in the Senate).

Senator Cedillo again introduced a new driver's license bill at the beginning of the 2005 legislative term. In negotiations over the new bill, Schwarzenegger demanded a separate driver's license design—so as to clearly indicate the card holder was an undocumented immigrant—and strict adherence to the federal Real ID Act signed by President Bush. The 2005 bill made these concessions by creating a unique design and stipulating the license could only be used for driving—not for airplane travel or other official purposes. These compromises angered supporters who felt a second-tier license created greater inequality in the state (Salladay and Delson 2005). Despite making these changes, the bills narrowly passed in the Assembly and Senate (43 “ayes” in the Assembly, 22 “ayes” in the Senate), but Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill. In his veto message, the Governor indicated the bill undermined national security efforts and would cost California taxpayers millions of dollars. A similar bill was again vetoed by Schwarzenegger in 2007.

Due in large part to the Schwarzenegger administration's unwillingness to compromise, the CLLC was unable to push the driver's license issue in subsequent legislative sessions³⁸. As described in previous sections, the CLLC was less active as a policymaking coalition between 2009 and 2011. The reinvigoration of the Caucus in 2012 and the presence of a Democratic Governor opened yet another window of opportunity to pass a driver's license bill. On January 7, 2013, Assemblymember Luis Alejo introduced the latest iteration of the CDL bill, AB 60. In its original form, the bill did not require a unique design or special identifying mark for CDLs issued to undocumented drivers—the so-called “Scarlet Letter.” This version of the bill easily passed in the Assembly (55 “ayes”), but encountered problems in the Senate.

³⁸ A 2009 version of the bill, SB 60, passed in the Senate (24 “aye” votes), but failed to progress through the Assembly.

The major issue with Alejo's original AB 60 was the exclusion of provisions requiring an identifying mark on driver's licenses of undocumented immigrants. Alejo was told his bill would die in the Senate unless he added amendments requiring the identifying mark. Hoping to postpone negotiations until he could ensure the success of an "unmarked" CDL, Alejo asked for AB 60 to be moved to the Senate "inactive file" in August. AB 60 remained inactive over the course of the summer until Governor Brown sent informal signals to members of the Senate indicating he would be willing to sign AB 60 if the bill was amended to include an identifying mark for undocumented immigrants. While most CLLC members agreed the move toward an unmarked CDL was "righteous," the group also recognized this was their best chance to pass the legislation. Moreover, discussions with constituents indicated a desire for any kind of valid CDL. According to one Senator, his constituents told him, "give us horns and a pitchfork; I don't care. I just don't want to be afraid of being pulled over any more." Armed with this knowledge, key CLLC Senators decided to move forward with the driver's license bill.

Knowing there might be retribution from outside groups and leaders in the Assembly for moving forward on the inactive CDL bill, the CLLC Senators met to discuss the situation. In a stunning display of unity, every Senator agreed the prospect of finally authorizing CDLs for undocumented immigrants was more important than the success of their individual bills. After negotiating specific amendments with Governor Brown, AB 60 was once again on the Senate's active agenda in September. Finally, on September 12, 2013, the Senate voted to pass the amended AB 60. Alejo was then able to personally present—with the entire CLLC delegation standing behind him—his amended AB 60 to the Assembly for a vote. One Senator described the scene on the Assembly floor as simply "electrifying." The measure easily passed, and Governor Brown signed AB 60 into law on October 3, 2013.

California joined 10 other states³⁹ that provide driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants 20 years after Governor Wilson signed SB 976. Much like the battle for in-state tuition for undocumented students, AB 60 would not have been possible without the dedication, leadership, and unity of the CLLC. Moreover, the failure of previous CDL legislation paved the way for eventual success in 2013. For these reasons, both AB 540 and AB 60 highlight the various aspects of the CLLC that make the group such an influential player in California politics.

Summary

Unity is a reoccurring theme in any discussion of the CLLC. The Latino community in California is an incredibly diverse group encompassing individuals with different backgrounds, experiences, and cultures. Despite these apparent differences, CLLC members and their staff adamantly agree the group's biggest strength is its unity. Parts I and II of this report describe the historical and qualitative reasons why such a non-monolithic group presents a unified front within the Legislature. Part III provides quantitative evidence of the unity and policy influence displayed by the CLLC.

An examination of significant chaptered legislation authored by CLLC members highlights the group's policy success and its agenda diversity over time. The CLLC successfully maneuvered more and more significant bills through the legislative process as the Caucus's membership increased after 1990. It is also important to note the CLLC's agenda became far more diverse over this same time period. Originally, the CLLC focused on a narrow subset of

³⁹ As of 2016 there are 13 states (including the District of Columbia) issue driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants.

policy issues affecting the state's Latino community. As the Caucus grew in size, the group extended its influence into a much wider variety of policy issues.

The policy success of the CLLC is not surprising, given the increased number of Caucus members elected to the Legislature since the 1990s. However, larger numbers do not automatically result in legislative victories; the group must also be unified in its voting patterns. The analysis of the CLLC's roll call voting patterns indicates the group remained consistently unified across time. On average, more than 80 percent of the CLLC votes in the affirmative on significant legislation authored by a fellow Caucus member. Moreover, this unity is consistent between the Assembly and Senate.

These displays of unity on roll call voting are noteworthy because the Caucus is made up of individuals with electoral and ideological differences. The ideology scores of CLLC members show substantial differences across the geographic location of legislative districts. In particular, members elected from districts in the Central Valley appear to be more moderate than their counterparts elected from the Bay Area, Central Coast, and Southern California regions. There are also differences between Central Valley legislators, with Sacramento-area officials displaying more liberal scores than members elected from other parts of the region. Despite these ideological differences, the data presented in Part III depict a largely unified Caucus. Two case studies, AB 540 (2001) and AB 60 (2013), highlight how leadership, perseverance, and solidarity within the CLLC culminated in major policy victories for the California Latino community. These displays of unity in the face of electoral and geographic differences are a testament to the unique and influential role the CLLC plays in California politics.

Part 4 – Conclusion

The CLLC occupies a unique place in American legislative politics. From its humble beginnings, the group has grown into a singularly powerful player in California. Today, the CLLC is one of the most well-organized, influential legislative caucuses in the nation. The development and maturation of the Caucus did not happen by accident; it is the culmination of decades of political and policy work, demographic change, and the leadership of generations of Latino legislators.

Over 40 years ago, the CLLC was founded by five Latino members of the Assembly. Despite the group's meager numbers, the early Caucus used political savvy and relationships with other powerful legislators to usher in several important legislative reforms aimed at California's Latino community over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. By the end of the 1990s, membership in the CLLC had more than tripled, making the group a vital part of any winning coalition in the Legislature. The dramatic growth of the Caucus was largely due to demographic changes, progressive redistricting plans, new term limits for state legislators, and a political context that mobilized California's growing Latino community. A key catalyst behind the CLLC's growth was the tireless work of the Caucus's Chair in the 1990s: Richard Polanco. The electoral impact of Polanco's leadership and involvement in countless campaigns cannot be overstated. More importantly, the efforts of Polanco and those around him established various sub-networks of Latino elected officials across the state. These sub-networks created fertile ground for identifying, recruiting, and grooming candidates and electing new CLLC members from districts ranging from Imperial County to the Bay Area and Central Valley.

The CLLC has always been an unusually unified group, bound by their shared interests and experiences. Caucus leaders in the 2000s, such as Marco Firebaugh, sought to use this

unity and the group's increased numbers as leverage for influence over legislative outcomes. To this end, the Caucus formalized processes for decision-making. Some of the processes were as mundane as routinizing meetings. Another change was the development of a formal process for identifying the group's short list of annual "policy priorities." The new system allows each member to propose bills, but the final list is based on consensus. Caucus leadership also formalized the CLLC's procedures for electoral endorsements, and the group formed a PAC to provide financial support to new and incumbent CLLC members. Finally, the CLLC created a non-profit foundation to help members develop new policy initiatives and to extend the group's community outreach efforts. The creation of such institutions and processes ensures the Caucus's continued influence in the Legislature and larger Latino community.

The growth and institutionalization of the Caucus had a direct impact on the group's legislative success. Early in its history, the Caucus's low membership numbers meant members focused on a more narrow set of issues impacting the state's Latino community. Today, the CLLC's growth and unity allows the group to exert tremendous influence over a variety of policy issues. The key to this influence is the group's unity on roll call votes. As we saw in Part III, despite clear intra-group divisions, the CLLC routinely displays remarkable levels of unity on key roll call votes across a variety of policy issues. This unity allows the Caucus to influence a diverse set of policy agendas affecting the larger California population.

The future is bright for the CLLC. The group is likely to net several additional legislative seats in the 2016 election. Moreover, California's voting-age Latino population will continue to grow, as a large generation of American-born Latinos become eligible to vote in the coming decades. The Caucus also makes up a sizable portion of the Democratic Caucus, meaning Democratic leaders simply cannot ignore the policy preferences of the CLLC as long as the

Caucus is unified. Certainly, the electoral strength of the CLLC and changes to California's demographic landscape guarantee the Caucus will continue to hold a number of key legislative gatekeeping positions.

One area where the Caucus has been less successful in recent years is the election of Latinas to the Legislature and several Caucus leaders expressed their concern about this trend. The existence of regional sub-networks and the California Latino Caucus PAC put the CLLC in a unique position to identify, promote, and support Latina candidates. The Caucus's recent endorsements make it clear the group is devoting significant energy and resources to increasing the number of Latinas in the CLLC. In addition, a number of Caucus members have successfully moved on from the Legislature to state-wide offices or to seats in Congress. While these positions are not the main focus of the Caucus's efforts, it is clear advancing the Caucus's agenda will require greater success in some of these non-CLLC races.

The CLLC is arguably the most powerful caucus of its kind in the nation. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus, for instance, does not make up nearly as large a proportion of the House Democratic Caucus in the U.S. Congress. Similar caucuses in other state legislatures are either not as large or are not as unified. The maturation, institutionalization, and influence displayed by the CLLC over time make the Caucus a truly singular entity in legislative politics.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Interviews with Current and Former CLLC Members and Staff, by Date

Date	Name	Position
June 14, 2016	Willie Guerrero	Principal Consultant for CLLC
June 14, 2016	Armando Chavez	Consultant for CLLC
June 14, 2016	David Pacheco	Former Staff for CLLC Members
June 14, 2016	Frank Molina	Former Staff for CLLC Members
June 14, 2016	Adriana Sanchez-Ochoa	Former Consultant for CLLC, Current Staff for Speaker Anthony Rendon
June 14, 2016	Cesar Anda	Principal Consultant for CLLC Chair, Asm. Luis Alejo
June 14, 2016	Fmr. Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante	Former CLLC Member and Former Speaker
June 15, 2016	Asm. Freddie Rodriguez	Current CLLC Member
June 15, 2016	Sen. Ben Hueso	Current CLLC Vice Chair
June 15, 2016	Asm. Luis Alejo	Current CLLC Chair
June 15, 2016	Asm. Joaquin Arambula	Current CLLC Member
June 15, 2016	Juan Torres	Deputy Chief of Staff for Speaker Rendon, Former Staff for CLLC Members
June 16, 2016	Asm. Eduardo Garcia	Current CLLC Member
July 15, 2016	Sen. Ricardo Lara	Current CLLC Member and Former CLLC Chair
July 18, 2016	Speaker Anthony Rendon	Current CLLC Member
July 25, 2016	Sen. Martha Escutia	Former CLLC Member and Former CLLC Chair
July 29, 2016	Asm. Raul Bocanegra	Former CLLC Member
August 11, 2016	Sen. Richard Polanco	Former CLLC Member and Former CLLC Chair
August 12, 2016	Asm. Richard Alatorre	Former CLLC Member and Former CLLC Chair
August 17, 2016	U.S. Rep. Tony Cardenas	Former CLLC Member
August 18, 2016	Sen. Ricardo Lara (by phone)	Current CLLC Member and Former CLLC Chair

Appendix B: Significant Chaptered Legislation Authored by Members of the CLLC, 1975 - 2012

Bill No.	Year	Author
AB 326	1975	Chacón
AB 353	1975	Montoya
AB 1436	1975	Torres
AB 2099	1975	Montoya
AB 2163	1975	Alatorre
SB 949	1975	Ayala
AB 1329	1976	Chacón/Moscone
AB 1719	1976	Alatorre
AB 3147	1976	Chacón
AB 3298	1976	Montoya
AB 3339	1976	Chacón
AB 4079	1976	Torres
AB 4099	1976	Torres
SB 1301	1976	García
AB 88	1977	Chacón
SB 98	1977	García
AB 459	1977	Montoya
AB 3470	1978	Chacón
AB 3460	1978	Torres
AB 3274	1978	Torres
AB 3206	1978	Torres
AB 191	1979	Torres
AB 384	1979	Alatorre
AB 1204	1979	Torres
AB 507	1980	Chacón
AB 2615	1980	Chacón
AB 2980	1980	Alatorre
SB 545	1980	Montoya
AB 1377	1981	Alatorre
AB 1670	1981	Torres
SB 67	1981	García
AB 2690	1982	Torres
AB 2901	1982	Martínez
AB 2691	1982	Torres
AB 3298	1982	Chacón
SB 2021	1982	García
SB 2041	1982	Montoya
AB 398	1983	Chacón
AB 885	1983	Chacón
AB 1407	1983	Molina
AB 2091	1983	Chacón
AB 582	1983	Torres
AB 1155	1983	Torres
AB 3075	1984	Chacón
AB 3422	1984	Molina
AB 3654	1984	Calderon
AB 3778	1984	Chacón
AB 3883	1984	Molina
SB 380	1984	Montoya
SB 1621	1984	Torres

Bill No.	Year	Author
AB 52	1985	Chacón
AB 141	1985	Molina
AB 1502	1985	Molina
AB 1697	1985	Chacón
AB 2415	1985	Molina
AB 4090	1985	Molina
SB 46	1985	Torres
SB 65	1985	Torres
SB 1044	1985	Torres
AB 2704	1986	Molina
AB 3705	1986	Molina
SB 675	1986	Montoya
SB 1046	1986	Torres
SB 1837	1986	Montoya
SB 2119	1986	Torres
SB 2335	1986	Montoya
SB 2424	1986	Torres
AB 213	1987	Calderon
AB 900	1987	Polanco
AB 1344	1987	Polanco
AB 2202	1987	Chacón
SB 245	1987	Torres
SB 432	1987	Torres
SB 867	1987	Ayala
SB 1386	1987	Montoya
AB 1592	1988	Polanco
AB 2534	1988	Polanco
AB 3442	1988	Chacón
AB 4346	1988	Roybal-Allard
AB 4536	1988	Polanco
AB 3709	1988	Polanco
AB 328	1989	Roybal-Allard
AB 3778	1989	Polanco
AB 498	1989	Polanco
AB 1382	1989	Polanco
AB 2233	1989	Polanco
SB 68	1989	Torres
SB 109	1989	Torres
SB 304	1989	Torres
SB 475	1989	Torres
SB 1050	1989	Torres
SB 1493	1989	Montoya
AB 244	1990	Calderon
AB 2700	1990	Roybal-Allard
AB 2966	1990	Polanco
AB 3600	1990	Polanco
SB 1250	1990	Torres
SB 1845	1990	Torres
SB 2262	1990	Torres
SB 2641	1990	Torres

Bill No.	Year	Author
SB 2774	1990	Torres
AB 38	1991	Chacón
AB 747	1991	Roybal-Allard
AB 1009	1991	Roybal-Allard
SB 123	1991	Torres
AB 3053	1992	Polanco
AB 3485	1992	Bacerra
AB 3526	1992	NA
SB 97	1992	Torres
SB 296	1992	Torres
SB 1764	1992	Torres
AB 1791	1993	Polanco
SB 1X	1993	Ayala
SB 145	1993	Calderon
SB 590	1993	Torres
SB 1082	1993	Calderon
SB 1140	1993	Calderon
SB 1258	1993	Torres
AB 1670	1994	Friedman/Alpert/Solis
AB 757	1994	Polaco
AB 2849	1994	Escutia
AB 3034	1994	Solis
AB 3102	1994	Martínez
AB 3137	1994	Escutia
AB 3754	1994	Caldera
SB 354	1994	Ayala
SB 697	1994	Torres
SB 923	1994	Calderon
SB 1257	1994	Ayala
SB 1288	1994	Calderon
SB 1373	1994	Torres
AB 62	1995	Baca
AB 391	1995	Bustamante
AB 457	1995	Moreno-Ducheny
AB 578	1995	Napolitano
AB 717	1995	Moreno-Ducheny
AB 1840	1995	Figueroa
AB 1973	1995	Figueroa
AB 1490	1996	Caldera
AB 1980	1996	Figueroa
AB 2125	1996	Figueroa
AB 2359	1996	Bustamante
AB 2457	1996	Figueroa
AB 2617	1996	Baca
AB 2819	1996	Caldera
AB 2827	1996	Escutia
AB 2861	1996	Villaraigosa
AB 38	1997	Figueroa
AB 103	1997	Figueroa
AB 174	1997	Napolitano

Bill No.	Year	Author
AB 233	1997	Escutia/Pringle
AB 748	1997	Escutia
AB 1126	1997	Villaraigosa/Figueroa
AB 1275	1997	Baca
AB 1542	1997	Moreno-Ducheny
AB 1576	1997	Bustamante
AB 1610	1997	Ortiz
AB 1612	1997	Ortiz
SB 564	1997	Solis
AB 190	1998	Napolitano
AB 1570	1998	Bustamante
AB 1784	1998	Baca
AB 2779	1998	Moreno-Ducheny/ Villaraigosa
SB 1682	1998	Solis
SB 1715	1998	Calderon
AB 18	1999	Villaraigosa
AB 1001	1999	Villaraigosa
AB 1059	1999	Moreno-Ducheny
SB 1237	1999	Escutia
AB 1742	2000	Correa
AB 1858	2000	Romero
AB 1993	2000	Romero
AB 2306	2000	Florez
AB 2484	2000	Romero
AB 2900	2000	Gallegos
SB 87	2000	Escutia
SB 739	2000	Solis
SB 876	2000	Escutia
SB 984	2000	Polanco
SB 1644	2000	Ortiz
SB 1689	2000	Escutia
ABX2 26	2001	Calderon
AB 79	2001	Havice
AB 120	2001	Havice
AB 495	2001	Diaz
AB 540	2001	Firebaugh
AB 1025	2001	Frommer
SB 9	2001	Soto
SB 19	2001	Escutia
SB 639	2001	Ortiz
SB 771	2001	Figueroa
AB 1170	2002	Firebaugh
AB 1599	2002	Negrete McLeod
AB 1830	2002	Frommer
AB 1999	2002	Correa
AB 2064	2002	Cedillo
AB 2695	2002	Oropeza
SB 1595	2002	Escutia
SB 1745	2002	Polanco
SB 1950	2002	Figueroa

Bill No.	Year	Author
SB 2083	2002	Polanco
AB 177	2003	Oropeza
AB 1124	2003	Nuñez
SB 60	2003	Cedillo
SB 578	2003	Alarcon
SB 602	2003	Figueroa
SB 619	2003	Moreno-Ducheny
SB 677	2003	Ortiz
SB 853	2003	Escutia
AB 389	2004	Montañez
AB 1629	2004	Frommer
SB 391	2004	Florez
SB 1352	2004	Romero
SB 1431	2004	Romero
AB 68	2005	Montañez
AB 121	2005	Vargas
AB 164	2005	Nava
AB 380	2005	Nuñez
AB 405	2005	Montañez
AB 460	2005	Parra
AB 760	2005	Nava
AB 1045	2005	Frommer
AB 1088	2005	Oropeza
AB 1180	2005	Torríco
AB 1576	2005	Nuñez
AB 1666	2005	Frommer
SB 8	2005	Soto
SB 12	2005	Escutia
SB 965	2005	Escutia
SB 1087	2005	Florez
AB 127	2006	Nuñez/Perata
SB 1137	2006	Moreno-Ducheny
AB 7	2007	Saldaña
AB 62	2007	Nava
AB 118	2007	Nuñez
AB 246	2007	Torríco
AB 771	2007	De León
AB 976	2007	Calderon
AB 821	2007	Nava
AB 1381	2007	Nuñez
AB 1488	2007	Mendoza
SB 2	2007	Cedillo
SB 7	2007	Oropeza
SB 14	2007	Negrete McLeod
SB 38	2007	Florez
SB 219	2007	Romero
SB 624	2007	Padilla
SB 729	2007	Padilla
SB 959	2007	Romero
AB 159	2008	Florez
AB 2040	2008	Nuñez

Bill No.	Year	Author
AB 2136	2008	Mendoza
AB 2232	2008	de la Torre
AB 2618	2008	Solorio
SB 447	2008	Maldonado/Florez
SB 1126	2008	Cedillo
SB 1369	2008	Cedillo
SB 1388	2008	Correa/Maldonado
SB 1473	2008	Calderon
ABx3 23	2009	Coto
AB 552	2009	Solorio
AB 962	2009	De León
SB 17	2009	Padilla
SB 18	2009	Oropeza
SB 94	2009	Calderon
SB 135	2009	Florez
SB 310	2009	Moreno-Ducheny
ABs 33 and 34	2010	Nava
AB 211	2010	Mendoza
AB 1048	2010	Torríco
AB 1717	2010	De León
AB 2055	2010	de la Torre
AB 2210	2010	Fuentes
AB 2470	2010	de la Torre
AB 2503	2010	Pérez
SB 1476	2010	Padilla
SB 1449	2010	Padilla
SBx43	2010	Romero
AB 22	2011	Mendoza
AB 130	2011	Cedillo
AB 131	2011	Cedillo
AB 141	2011	Fuentes
AB 353	2011	Cedillo
AB 665	2011	Torres
AB 746	2011	Campos
AB 1122	2011	Pérez
AB 1424	2011	Perea
AB 1221	2011	Alejo
SB 2641	2011	Padilla
SB 559	2011	Padilla
SB 879	2011	Padilla
AB 1713	2012	Campos
AB 1844	2012	Campos
AB 2051	2012	Campos
AB 2209	2012	Hueso
AB 2386	2012	Allen
SB 535	2012	De León
SB 1064	2012	De León
SB 1234	2012	De León
SB 1264	2012	Vargas
SB 1298	2012	Padilla