3. Risk Perceptions of Energy Alternatives
You can use this case as a pattern for the final paper. As you read through it, be prepared to discuss the following questions:
1. What are the outrage factors in this case? Can you think of additional examples for each outrage factor?
2. What are the competing interests in this case?
3. To what extent should we raise outrage or lower outrage in this case (i.e., consider each outrage factor)?
4. How can we improve policies in this case?
Introduction
Over the modern history of risk analysis, we have seen an evolution in emphasis from risk assessment to risk communication to risk management. Risk assessment has focused primarily on the quantitative analysis of environmental risks to human health. Risk communication has focused on techniques for communicating technical risks to a wary public (mostly an analysis of the bad techniques we instinctively rely on). Risk management studies the appropriate actions we should take in light of what is usually incomplete information.
Risk perception of energy alternatives expands on these traditional areas in the following ways:
1. The risk assessment concerns far more than to human health. The risks from energy alternatives involve a still poorly understood greenhouse theory, which presents ecological as well as health impacts, and a complex global scale of effects.
2. The risk management is truly international in scope. While the U.S. probably has the greatest impact due to their highest level of energy consumption, successful management must rely on international cooperation.
3. The risk communication is tremendously exacerbated by the perceptions of diverse cultures towards a diverse set of energy alternatives, and these in turn will be influenced by public perceptions of the risks of greenhouse and other effects.
Thus, the focus of this case is on gaining an initial understanding of risk perceptions in this difficult area.
One of the definitive approaches to understanding risk perceptions starts with a term coined by Peter Sandman, referred to as "outrage factors." Factor analysis of literally hundreds of psychological variable yielded a list of 20 on the most important factors that influence whether people become outraged, or angry, about certain risks. This, in turn, influences peoples rating of how high the risk is, whether they would take action to correct it, and indeed goes a long way to explaining how individuals and societies prioritize their attention to risks.
This is, of course, a very valuable general tool. But it is particularly relevant to energy alternatives at this point in history. In the U.S., on April 15 of 1999, President Bill Clinton introduced the Electricity Competition Plan. This plan, if successfully passed through congress, would be analagous to the various right to know laws that address chemical risks, but would be applied to energy sources. Not only would it attempt to explain how different sources pollute, but ostensibly the public would have the right to choose from alternative energy suppliers.
While there is no assurance that this plan will become law (it continues to linger in the legislature with a proposed enaction date for the year 2003), it is certainly a significant sign of the times. It would represent the breakup of one of the last major monopolies in American life, and if successful may very well represent a model to other countries. The perceptions people hold towards energy sources is therefore more than an intellectual exercise - it could prove to have practical and far reaching consequences.
It is particularly important for environmental health professionals to understand these dynamics, because we are the professionals that the public often relies on to bring sense to environmental issues. Perhaps the public would turn to us more often if we had a better understanding of risk perceptions.
This said, I will now introduce Sandman's outrage factors. For each factor, I will provide examples of how this factor relates to energy issues. More than that, however, Sandman provides recommendations for improving risk communication by understanding each factor, and I will attempt to translate these recommendations for the issue of energy alternatives. My recommendations, however, come with a warning: these recommendations are bound to vary with culture, with different energy issues, and with what management position you support. First, while the outrage factors appear to be quite robust through different cultures, the application may vary. For example, Finns may define a "voluntary activity" differently from Americans, but the importance of voluntariness remains the same. Second, it also varies with energy issues - I will not examine every possible energy alternative, and clearly some energy alternatives (such as nuclear power) evoke greater outrage than other alternatives (such as solar power). Third, some individuals support nuclear power, while others oppose it. Depending on the position you take, you may wish to raise outrage or lower outrage, but once again, the principles should hold.
Finally, I will reflect on the application of this model and how environmental health professionals might proceed as these issues continue to unfold.
1. coerced versus voluntary
The first outrage factor distinguishes coerced versus voluntary activities. Activities that are coerced are much more likely to raise outrage than activities that are voluntary. One of my favorite examples of this is the Finnish Sauna - if we didn't know better, the prospect of being forced to take your clothes off and sit in a small room at temperature approaching 100 degrees centigrade would appear to be inhuman punishment. As an American, I must admit I was concerned with this prospect before I first visited Finland. But since it is a voluntary activity, I have come to appreciate the whole experience!
Similarly, the prospect of a disaster that is coerced on us by multinational energy corporations are much more likely to induce outrage because they are coerced, or to be more accurate, perceived to be coerced. Another example is that users of nuclear energy generally have no choice in the matter, while many if not most users of solar energy actually have the choice in installing such technology. That is to say, it is voluntary.
Sandman argues that the right to say no actually increases the likelihood that we will say maybe to different activities, from sauna to energy alternatives. In any event, the recent Electricity Competition Plan, by attempting to provide a choice of energy alternatives, will hopefully lower the outrage levels for energy alternatives.
2. industrial versus natural
The principal GHG, carbon dioxide, is emitted as a byproduct of the combustion of fossil fuels, including petroleum, coal, and natural gas, and other organic material (e.g., wood). Of course, they are all ultimately natural sources; however, nuclear energy requires far greater human intervention, perhaps explaining the greater outrage.
And yet, fossil fuels currently account for 84 percent of total U.S. energy consumption (4). Sandman argues that industrial sources always create more outrage than natural sources. Therefore, global warming policy seeks both to reduce energy consumption generally and to promote conversion to fuels with GHG emission rates that are either relatively low (natural gas) or zero (e.g., wind, solar, and hydro power).(8)
3. exotic
The petroleum industry is able to develop more-sophisticated technology to reduce costs and increase production. As a result, oil reserves have increased, while the public believes that they have decreased. This is one example where exotic technologies can result in an outcome that is completely different from public expectations. In terms of outrage, however, the examples may be even simpler. Nuclear power is based on the relatively exotic technology of nuclear fission. In contrast, solar power derives from a source we see on a daily basis. While both represent risks, the exotic nature of nuclear power raises more outrage.
The solution, as Sandman argues, is education. This includes not only education about nuclear power, solar power, and oil reserves, but education about all the energy alternatives. Trivial as it sounds, wind energy is indeed associated with mortality (at least one individual fell off a turbine tower, but he is just as dead as the deaths at Chernobyl).
4. memorable
Starting with the first oil price hikes in 1973, the idea that the world would soon run out of oil made it into newspaper headlines and even became common wisdom. This perception was articulated by Paul Ehrlich in his question: "What will we do when the pumps run dry?" (1) Sandman argues that we need to acknowledge memorability early in any discussion, but to continue with information, and to counter with other outrage factors.
5. dreaded
The greenhouse effect, at one point, raised the prospect of the end of the planet as we know it. No surprise, therefore, that outrage is raised. Even as more information accumulates that such a prospect is more out of a Hollywood movie, it may still be important to acknowledge and legitimate the dread that people have, and to counter it with education.
6. catastrophic versus chronic
The principle put forward by Sandman and others is that risks that result in a single catastrophic loss create more outrage than risks that invoke multiple incidents, even if they add up to the same amount of mortality. For example, each year, fossil fuels kill far more people (even if we excluded the association to hydrocarbons and cardiovascular disease), but it is the catastrophic nature of Chernobyl that raises more outrage.
In contrast, the effects of greenhouse are likely to unfold much more slowly. There have been attempts to typify invoke visions of towns under oceans, but we simply will not see the immediacy of an explosion with greenhouse.
Sandman's recommendation is to express risks in the same time frame, usually lifetime rates. Indeed, discussions of greenhouse should make estimates of mortality over even longer time frames to be comparable. The difficulty here, of course, is that such projections would be still highly uncertain with greenhouse effects, which leads me to the next factor.
7. unknowable
Uncertainty creates outrage. For example, complex technologies such as nuclear power bring with them a greater opportunity for uncertainty. In contrast, as we develop improved estimates of oil reserves (i.e., less uncertainty), there may be less outrage about the limitations of fossil fuels (1). While the actual reserves have not changed, our improved estimates bring more confidence and therefore less outrage.
8. outside control
Have you ever noticed that when you have no control over the thermostat in an office, you tend to have more complaints? Of course, this may not always true, but when it happens, it is an indication of the outrage over loss of control (or outside control). As the issue of energy alternatives takes on global implications, the possibilities for outside control should increase. This, in turn, raises outrage.
The solution is to empower people with individual controls. One interesting illustration of this is in the use of electric vehicles. It is perceived by many communities as an effective means of reducing hydrocarbon pollution. Yet, the electric current required to charge electric vehicle batteries can far exceed the total power consumed by all other devices in a building or home. An alternative approach is to focus on consumer-side power management by limiting how much total power is used within a home. By establishing a maximum home power level that must not be exceeded, demand for power within the home can be managed by arbitrating power usage among power-consuming appliances. This requires each appliance to have a suitable networking technology. (4)
9. unfair
Sandman was one of the first to warn us to look at the equity behind risk issues, and not just the bottom line. For example, the signatory nations will assemble again in late 1998 to flesh out details of the agreement, and the Administration may submit a global warming treaty to the Senate for ratification as early as 1999. At this time, ratification of the treaty by the U.S. Senate is considered tenuous because of the potential economic costs of compliance and a concern that less developed countries would not bear a fair share of the burden of GHG reduction. (8)
10. immoral
Auto executives tell us that, wherever they go in the world, someone will tell then that the internal combustion engine is an environmental villain whose time has passed. Yet people continue to want the freedom and convenience their autos provide.(3) This phenomenon illustrates that morality, when it is introduced, can increase the outrage of a risk.
The answer, as Sandman proposes, is to want 0 risk, even if you can't have it. Thus, we can stress the increasing safety features of cars over the past several decades, but we should also emphasize the desire to eliminate the risks.
Similarly, those that view nuclear energy as immoral usually remain undeterred by low mortality rates. Our only relief here is to consistently express the desire for zero risk, and continue emphasizing the more than zero risk from seemingly benign risks as wind power. More importantly, however, the moral argument will not disappear.
11. suspicious source
The corresponding outrage factor to morality arguments is the idea of a suspicious source. For example, evil oil companies. The recommendation here is to solicit credible sources and to build in accountability for the suspicious source.
For example, energy companies are enlisting the support of environmental organizations. Sworn enemies BP and Greenpeace have done the unimaginable - they have joined forces to develop solar power as a clean energy source. A view shared by many leading non-governmental organizations is that their adversarial name and shame tactics of the past are giving way to a new spirit of cooperation.(7)
12. unresponsive process
Much of the recommendations for dealing with outrage factors involves acknowledging the outrage early in the process. To do otherwise is to be seen as unresponsive. This is all the more important for issues with scientific controversy such as greenhouse. Sandman and other recommend that we train scientists in social issues. Energy companies have long enlisted the aid of public relations professionals, but it cannot replace the training that must be a part of every scientists work. The former president of AAAS F. Sherwood Roland, acknowledged as much in his presidential address.
13. vulnerable populations
The case for environmental and social policies is almost always originated by relatively prosperous citizens in rich countries. They can afford to pay more for ethical policies, fair treatment of employees, food produced in environmentally acceptable ways. They can be said to have surplus income, beyond that required for what they regard as an acceptable standard of living, and would prefer the benefit of a better environment to more material benefits. (5)
This aspect of energy policy is often missed in discussions. Indeed, when poorer nations call upon richer nations to invoke most of the energy reduction, it is often representatives of the richer nations express issues of inequity. If we stressed the nature of vulnerable poorer populations to greenhouse effects, perceptions could be affected.
14. delayed effects
Delayed effects are likely to invoke greater outrage. For example, the delayed effects from lower level nuclear exposures should bring more outrage than the more immediately measurable effects from primary pollutants such as ozone and carbon monoxide.
One strategy for addressing delayed effects is the concept of insurance. If compensation is guaranteed for effects, even if they are delayed, there is a sense of managing the risk.
The problem is that it is difficult to insure against losses that are still poorly understood such as greenhouse effects. Perhaps as more information becomes known about these and other effects, strategies for insurance against delayed losses may become more apparent.
15. affects future generations
The economic concept of discounting says the net present value of effects far into the future are actually relatively low. However, this is at odds with perceived risks, which places greater outrage on risks that affect future generations. This factor is clearly operating with regard to long term weather changes anticipated with greenhouse effects.
So, too, are the long term risks of nuclear wastes in comparison to short terms risks from such energy alternatives as wind energy.
16. identifiable victims
Identifiable victims evoke more outrage than statistical victims. For example, the victims of Chernobyl in the early aftermath of the explosion are far more memorable than the thousands, perhaps millions, who will suffer longer terms effects.
The guideline offered here is to search for victims of any energy source to place the risks in more comparable perspective. For examples, the projected impacts on farmers from a developing greenhouse effect can be quite striking. Also, with time we have seen more victims of Chernobyl.
17. not preventable
Risks that are not preventable are quite clearly more outrageous than risks that are completely preventable. For example, the risks from nuclear waste are, at this point, not preventable - they already exist. Indeed, the risk from all energy sources can never be brought to 0. However, in these case Sandman recommends that we stress risk reduction. For example, we can use facts to dispel some of the illusions people have about oil use and the environment. Public opinion surveys show that most Americans believe that the environment has actually gotten worse over the last two decades. But the facts support the opposite point of view. (3)
18. few benefits
Risks that bring few benefits are likely to raise outrage. Such a problem should not exist in energy sources. Quite simply, we cannot do without energy. What is said about energy in general also goes for fossil fuels given today's dependence on oil, gas, and coal. There is plentiful coal, increasing proven reserves of gas, and more oil today than in the mid-1970s when supplies were assumed to be on a declining path (2). Within this context, oil companies might do well to follow the lead of Royal Dutch/Shell and British Petroleum, which think of themselves not as oil and gas producers by as energy companies.
19. media attention
Much attention has been focused on the media as a factor that raises outrage. However, Sandman argues that the media is a result variable. In other words, the outrage had to be there to begin with for the media to exploit. By being aware of these factors and preparing for them ahead of time, this variable may be better managed.
20. opportunity for collective action
Where relatively few actors were involved in ozone depletion, it will be much more difficult to craft an agreement that is acceptable to the broad range of industries affected by climate change. However, business does have substantial influence over the timing and shape of international environmental agreements, even when there is considerable disunity within the business ranks. (9)